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ABSTRACT
OWNERSHIP AND WRITER AGENCY IN WEB 2.0
MAY 2022
THOMAS PICKERING, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT ARLINGTON
M.A., WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Donna LeCourt
This dissertation explores what it means for writers to maintain agency and ownership
over their textual productions in big data age, where to write means to participate in a
complex weave of software, code, and networked algorithms, and where writing produces
both conventional text and data. Given how much everyday writing flows through
proprietary digital platforms, my dissertation asks: how can we carve out a model of
ownership that centers the agency of writers and users in the face of corporate web
platforms that aggressively appropriate the value of our textual productions? Digital
writing scholarship has responded by appealing to copyright law and proprietary
authorship; however, calls to property or authorship no longer work towards the
advantage of writers because they are rooted in an industrial capitalism framework where
the propertization of writing was primarily expressed through copyright. Attending
closely to Web 2.0’s infrastructure, I show that property on the digital web has shifted
from texts (copyright) to platforms (the means of producing texts), and that the function
of property has shifted from rewarding authors to appropriating the value of their labor.
Drawing on classical and contemporary political economic theory, I develop a framework
for writer agency grounded in a critical theory of property, where agency is tied to the
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struggle against the propertization of writing and writing technologies and with writer
control over the circulation infrastructures that make up the web.

I test this theoretical model of agency against existing attempts to create alternative
writing platforms that center writer agency, and by looking at the experiences of writers
on those platforms. My findings show, first, that the most successful alternative
platforms—free and open-source platforms like Mastodon—attempt to empower writers
through decentralized server structures that make large-scale data appropriation and
production impossible. Second, I show that solving the issue of data appropriation is not
enough; writers need control over the governance and design of a platform in order to
attain agency in Web 2.0. However, existing platform models, including Mastodon, do
not yet achieve this standard. Together, these findings suggest that digital writers need
more ambitious writing instruction that treats server architecture, platform and interface
design, circulation protocol and content moderation, and platform governance as part of
what it means to write in Web 2.0.
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CHAPTER 1
POLITICAL ECONOMY IN WEB 2.0

Introduction
This is a dissertation about the agency of writers in Web 2.0 and, more broadly, in
contemporary digital web economies. But I would like to start by recounting an old feud
from the nineteenth century. In this feud were two competing perspectives on the nature
of human economic activity. On one side were a group of emergent bourgeois political
economists like David Ricardo who, in an effort to imagine the foundation of economic
theory, told a version of Daniel Defoe’s 1719 novel Robinson Crusoe. In this version, the
protagonist Crusoe—stranded on a desert island—invents a rational way to organize the
challenges of life alone on the island. He estimates the ratio of labor vs. reward for each
activity—making tools, growing barley, raising goats—records his estimations in a
ledger, and delegates his time on the desert island accordingly. In economic terms,
Crusoe secures ideal economic information and uses it to maximize his reward. In doing
so he became a kind of ideal economic figure for bourgeois political economists: an
independent, rational actor who, in his struggle against nature, labors in the most efficient
way possible by choosing those activities that will reward him the most value per hour of
labor spent. Because Crusoe is alone on the island in what appears to be a “pure” or
“natural” situation free of social bonds, bourgeois political economists argued, the
rational manner in which he allocates his time represents a natural characteristic of the
human condition and can be generalized to other humans. The fable of Crusoe then
became a way of modeling, as a foundational assumption of economy theory, how every
human chooses to spend their time.
1

On the other side of this feud were historical materialists like Marx and Engels. In
chapter one of Capital, Marx makes light of the fable of the desert island as a fantastical
misreading of how contemporary economies work. Most people, he observes, do not live
alone on a desert island but in a set of already established personal and economic
relationships. Through these relationships, we find that we come to rely on the labor of
others to produce and exchange the varied commodities and services that make up
society. This network of labor and relationships is often politically uneven and subjects
us to inefficiencies of information and labor as well as social bonds that complicate our
behavior. As Marx puts it, “here, instead of the independent man, we find everyone
dependent, serfs and lords, vassals and suzerains, laymen and clergy. Personal
dependence here characterizes the social relations of production just as much as it does
the other spheres of life organized on the basis of that production” (88-89). In other
words, Marx argued, economic production is social, rather than individual, and the fable
of the desert island is a kind of bizarre experiment in which economists create a model of
economic activity without having to think about human society. Or, to put it another way,
the story about a rational economic actor on a desert island was an attempt to naturalize
an image of a person that bourgeois political economists had already decided to
universalize into a model.
My point here is not to celebrate Marx, but to draw attention to how space works
in structuring our thinking. The way we theorize and model a particular activity—be it
writing or general human labor—depends very much on how we imagine the space that
activity takes places in. The desert island metaphor offers a kind of settler-colonial purity,
a white canvas through which to describe and emphasize a particular individual and their
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thought process that can then be imagined as natural. The space that Marx gestures at is
much messier; it is a social space that, at the very least, requires a social theory.
Bourgeois political economists went on to develop a theoretical model that assumes that
all humans act rationally and with perfect information, a model that to this day remains
common in mainstream economic theory. Marx, of course, went on to argue for social
ownership of society’s productive resources. So space matters. And while this debate
between bourgeois political economists and Marx is not about agency, if we were to think
about what “agency” (however defined) means in these competing spaces, we might at
the very least say that what a person’s agency looks like on a desert island is going to be
very different than what a person’s agency looks like as they are embedded in a tangle of
social relations, dependences, and institutions.
I want to take this thinking about space to our conversations about writing and
agency on the digital web. We are in the midst of a spatial reconfiguration of the web:
what is often called “Web 2.0,” or the social web. In the broadest sense, this dissertation
seeks to explain what happens to writer agency when the digital spaces we write in
become “social.” What does it mean for Web 2.0 to be “social”? Writing scholars have
historically approached this word through the social construction lens of the 1980s-1990s,
in which the norms and rules of writing were reevaluated as human-made, historically
contextual, and subject to change. The declaration of a “social” turn allowed writing
scholars to emphasize the community-oriented nature of writing and to identify uneven
experiences of those communities along lines of race, gender, class, etc. But there are
other meanings of “social”: Marx invoked the “social” most often to describe the
historical moment when the mode of production shifts from artisanal domestic labor to
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mass-produced commodities in factories. Marx’s notion of the social is about how the
way we make things is not just “human-made” in the abstract but quite literally
communally made in a shared space: the factory floor. The naming of production as
social/communal creates space for imagining social/communal ownership of
commodities. And as we’ll see, Web 2.0 theorists have a third definition of “social” that
ties the technological capacity for interaction (immediateness of textual response and
engagement) on the web with larger claims to democracy. To write on the “social” web is
to arrive at or depart from (depending on your perspective) an idealized liberal public
sphere.
All three of these definitions, I think, are part of the story of writing on Web 2.0.
This story involves changes to textuality and genre but also to the way writing is
produced as a commodity and the way that commodity production interacts with our
experience of public spheres, democratic or otherwise. Digitality has become transformed
by economics of textuality and how writing circulates and gets valued within information
economies. This spatial change invokes new questions: what new relationships of
production and exchange do writers encounter in the social web? What new kinds of
social dependencies and inequities of resource distribution have we entered into? What
effect has the “social” web had on the way we understand, define, and practice writing?
And above all, what happens to the agency of writers in the midst of this spatial shift to
Web 2.0?
I believe these questions are tied to the political economic position of writers on
the digital web. Writing in Web 2.0 has become tangled up in a novel digital economy.
As we will see, writers are producing new kinds of texts (e.g., data) and new kinds of
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textual values (e.g., networks, centralized information). Nick Srinicek describes this
economy as “platform capitalism,” in which owners of platforms come to constitute a
new ruling class by “extracting and using a particular kind of raw material: data” (28). It
is an economy built around getting users to produce texts (content, data) on centralized
servers and then appropriating the value of those texts on the backend. Writing studies
scholar Christian Pulver describes this as “informational capitalism, a writing economy
built upon a ‘global archive’ of digital data in tension with the writers and environments
it relies on” (5). As a result of this transformation of writing, I argue, in order to
understand the agency of writers, we need to be able to identify, describe, critique, and
advocate for the political economic status of digital writers, especially through the
categories of property, class, and value. The purpose of this chapter is to propose
political economy as a principle theoretical framework for approaching questions of
writer agency. I begin by describing the “spatial” shift to a “social” Web 2.0, with an
emphasis on its key features and on what I identify as the two dominant academic
narratives of Web 2.0. I then map composition and rhetoric’s varied responses to Web 2.0
onto these narratives, emphasizing especially the crisis of writer agency Web 2.0
provoked and the field’s ecological response. This response, I show, hampered our ability
to describe power or enact agency in any meaningful way by ignoring questions of
property, class, and value. I end by defining these categories and modeling why they are
necessary to enact writer agency on the social web.

What is the “Social” Web?
To better understand the space in which the social takes place, it is necessary to
review the changes in digital spaces that contemporary conversations about agency
5

respond to. What does it mean, exactly, for Web 2.0 to be “social,” and what does that
have to do with writer agency? We can start by examining the transition between Web
1.0 and the “social” Web 2.0. Web 1.0 was built on or in response to a print economy of
writing dominated by publishing firms and intellectual property considerations. It was
certainly not not social, but it had more clearly distinguished boundaries between the
author and the reading public. Like the print-oriented, pre-digital era of paper media,
writing in Web 1.0 was “published” on static home pages, blogs, or digital versions of
media publications like NYTimes. The major innovation of Web 1.0, and widespread web
writing generally, was that individuals could easily write and publish on their own home
pages rather than having to go through publishing channels. While this change in the
circulation and distribution of writing allowed writers to reach larger and more diverse
audiences, it did not meaningfully change the print-era relationship between writer and
audience. The writer still occupied a unique kind of subjectivity—the author—as
someone who can be distinguished from readers and celebrated as a “creator.” Likewise,
the audience remained largely a passive reader of published content.
Web 1.0 never disappeared in the sense that authors, home pages, and blogs are
not gone. Instead, the principal tools of textual production and circulation have changed.
After the collapse of Geocities and other tech companies in the dot-com bubble, the web
began to change from the cyberfrontier of 1.0, with its personal, isolated home pages, to a
content-hosting, platform economy. A new wave of tech companies emerged looking to
make the web more participatory, interactive, and user-driven by centralizing writers on
social networking platforms with easy-to-use interfaces that showed them what others
were saying and offered options to respond. At first it wasn’t always clear how these
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platforms would make money, but over time, tech companies learned to maintain a
reasonably sustainable business model oriented around the collection of user data and the
leveraging of that data to sell advertisers access to consumer profiles. The term “Web
2.0,” first coined by DiNucci and popularized in the mid-2000s by Tim O’Reilly, came to
capture this shift. Table 1.1 outlines some of Web 2.0’s characteristics.

Web 1.0

Web 2.0

personal home pages

social networking
profiles

publishing model

participation/platform
model

static web pages

interactive web

user as reader

user-generated content

professional content
writer authorship

public authorship

writer ownership

sharing

“bubble” (aka

data and advertising

nonfunctioning) business

business model

model
Table 1.1: A definitional map of Web 1.0 and Web 2.0.
It is important to note that while the development Web 2.0 can be said to be driven by
social networking platforms like Facebook and Twitter, its two most defining features—
the big data business model and the centering of content that is fully or at least partially
7

generated by users—go beyond social networking sites. Tech platforms like Google,
Turnitin, and even Blackboard also rely on these features; hence Web 2.0 can be said to
represent a general shift in how information is produced, commodified, and circulated
rather than just a change in writing venues. Each of the changes listed in Table 1.1 carries
significant implications for how we imagine and think about what writing is and what it
involves on an everyday basis. For most “everyday” writers, Web 2.0 is perhaps
characterized most prominently by a shift from personal home pages to social networking
profiles. This shift centralized writers and texts in the same space, allowing them to
interact with each other more easily while also permitting the owners of those platforms
to gather and process data across public spheres. All of this led to a more interactive web
specifically designed to generate rhetorical activity. In the early days of Facebook and
Twitter, writers encountered a looser, more fluid definition of texts and were encouraged
by the design of the interface to actively speak back to the writer, to comment, like,
subscribe, etc., and to generally create content themselves. In these new spaces, the writer
does not “publish” a text on a static page so much as respond casually 1 to an ongoing and
evolving conversation on a scrollable and updating news feed. Rather than texts that
could be clearly demarcated from other texts and attributed to a single proprietary author,
Web 2.0 platforms encouraged a more fluid intertextuality of threads, feeds, and
comments. These changes blurred the boundary between authors and readers and
imparted an immediate social character to digital web writing that, while certainly
existing before in the form of forums, email, etc., now became the dominant method of
textual production and circulation. The space of Web 2.0 is participatory, interaction-

1 Or give a performance of doing so since some “casual” posts are, as we know, painstakingly crafted.
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oriented, and dependent on user-generated content: this is in part what it means for the
web to be “social.”
Like the fable of the desert island, Web 2.0’s sociality became a site of competing
ideological narratives among economic and cultural theorists. Two narratives especially
have become popular ways of describing the changes and consequences of Web 2.0. In
the first, progress-oriented narrative, featured most prominently in Yochai Benkler’s The
Wealth of Networks, Web 2.0 represents a way to finally perfect the classical vision of a
liberal, Western, capitalist economy and a free and open public sphere. For Benkler, the
promise of this vision had become corrupted by the “industrial information economy” of
the 20th century, which overly propertized the public sphere and left its control to a
handful of media elites. Web 2.0, Benkler argues, can change this: it is a decentralized,
transparent space where anyone can speak, and where old proprietary interests no longer
exist. Where before the public sphere was inappropriately dominated by big media firms,
for Benkler the new digital economy of Web 2.0 is democratic and participatory,
emphasizing individual choice and organic, uncoerced relationships with others. Web 2.0
is a commons-based peer production, a nonmarket, nonproprietary space that sets the
conditions for a strong, democratizing public sphere. The “networked information
economy,” as he puts it, “holds great practical promise: as a dimension of individual
freedom; as a platform for better democratic participation; as a medium to foster a more
critical and self-reflective culture; and . . . as a mechanism to achieve improvements in
human development everywhere” (2). 2

As I will explore later in future chapters, Web 2.0 is designed to centralize rhetorical
activity in order to generate and appropriate user data as property. Hence, Benkler’s
description of Web 2.0 as decentralized and property-less when it is so very clearly not is

2
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Benkler’s progress narrative for the era of Web 2.0 is countered by a more critical
(though still capital-oriented) narrative articulated by Shoshanna Zuboff’s The Age of
Surveillance Capitalism. Where Benkler sees changing digital space as a democratic
corrective to the status quo, Zuboff sees Web 2.0 and the larger data economy around it
as a corruption of a once well-functioning capitalist economy. Behind the participatory
writing culture and commons-based peer production, she argues, lies a business model
predicated on total information collection and control. The scale of this control includes
writing but stretches to all rhetorical activity. Modern tech companies aspire to record,
appropriate, and process every action we take in order to sell that data to advertisers and
to other more speculative businesses. This goal, Zuboff argues, violates the classical
pairing of liberal democracy and market capitalism. “Surveillance capitalism,” as she
calls it, “departs from the history of market capitalism” in a dangerous way by betraying
the market principles laid out by Friedrich Hayek and Adam Smith, who (in Zuboff’s
reading) ground the individual freedom provided by capitalism in the impossibility of
acquiring total information about the market (495-97). The march by modern tech
companies towards total information, Zuboff argues, threatens the mutual coexistence of
liberal democracy and market capitalism by concentrating knowledge in the hands of a
few corporate actors. 3

a genuine moment of ideology at work. Though beyond the scope of this dissertation, it
would be a worthwhile rhetorical project to historicize and document the origin of this
ideology, the rhetorical work it performs, and the social class whose interest it represents.
3 Zuboff’s Surveillance Capitalism is an impressive critique of the practices of
contemporary Web 2.0 tech companies. However, it is perhaps embraced too holistically
by tech critics. Zuboff in the end pursues the same goal as Benkler: a return to the idyllic
harmony between liberal democracy and market capitalism. While some may find this
goal desirable, for those who think it was never a productive pairing to begin with,
Surveillance Capitalism does not offer a framework for envisioning an alternative digital
10

Both of the two popular and wide-ranging narratives for the Web 2.0 era—
progressive correction vs critical corruption—are directly tied to political economy. In
fact, it is hard to tell the story of Web 2.0 without thinking about its role in a changing
capitalist economy of information and labor. As I will demonstrate soon, it is likewise
equally difficult to think about the agency of particular writers on Web 2.0 without
thinking about how they are positioned in economies of information production and
appropriation.
For now, though, it is enough to say that the two narratives are an excellent
starting point for understanding and mapping composition and rhetoric’s disciplinary
response to Web 2.0. In my reading, much early Web 2.0 writing theory in composition
and rhetoric falls somewhere between Benkler’s theme of democratic progress and
Zuboff’s warnings of a dark side to a participatory tech culture. In particular, composition
was extraordinarily well-situated to partake in an initial Benkler-style response to Web
2.0. Kathleen Blake Yancey’s 2004 CCCC Chair’s Address, “Made Not Only in Words:
Composition in a New Key” probably best exemplifies our initial celebratory response.
Yancey draws attention to the enormous proliferation of writing taking place in digital
publics. This writing, she shows us, is noteworthy both because it takes place in digital
spaces (she draws on Elizabeth Daley’s argument that “the screen is the language of the
vernacular”) and because this writing is occurring on its own terms, outside the context of
a school curriculum or job (800). Yancey rightly calls on writing teachers to celebrate
and teach what Anne Ruggles Gere calls the “extracurricular” genres proliferating in

space. As we’ll see in chapters four and five, such a framework might be useful for
alternative web communities trying to build that space.
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digital technologies, or risk becoming an outdated and devalued field. Similar arguments
can be found by William Wolff’s “Interactivity and the Invisible: What Counts as
Writing in the Age of Web 2.0” and Elizabeth Clark’s “The Digital Imperative: Making
the Case for a 21st Century Pedagogy.”
The resonance between optimistic narratives of Web 2.0 and composition studies
can be traced back to values rooted in the field’s early disciplinary identity formation.
Writing teachers and scholars, as part of a break with literary studies’ emphasis on elitist
categories of texts, have historically valued everyday texts and linked that valuation to a
kind of democratic politics (see Berlin). Web 2.0’s introduction of a wide variety of
everyday texts and digital genres made it a natural site for disciplinary excitement.
Likewise, writing teachers are well-accustomed to a continual struggle against cultural
narratives of literacy decline, usually accompanied by a call to return to older writing
pedagogies we know to be ineffective and harmful to students. The sheer abundance of
literacy activity on Web 2.0 platforms offered plentiful evidence for disciplinary
arguments that writers are becoming more, rather than less, sophisticated over time.
Yancey’s call to value digital texts was thus a necessary correction to popular
cultural narratives that tie the digital to a perceived decline of social or literacy skills.
Writing scholars needed to recognize, early and often, the scale of change brought by
Web 2.0. In the process of recognizing these changes, early Web 2.0 writing theory
resembled a Benkler-style narrative that tied the production of new texts to a flourishing
of grassroots, democratic activity. The tripartite connection between Web 2.0, literacy,
and democracy was not always completely explicit but it was definitely present in
disciplinary metaphors and comparisons; as Andrea Lunsford writes, “we’re in the midst
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of a literacy revolution the likes of which we haven’t seen since Greek civilization . . . the
digital writing tools aren’t killing our ability to write; they’re reviving it—and pushing
our literacy in bold new directions” (qtd. in Thompson). Christian Pulver describes this
interest in Web 2.0 writing as an overvaluing of the abundance and use-value of digital
writing. As he puts it, early Web 2.0 writing theory emphasized a “productivist ethos that
assumes more writing in culture is intrinsically more valuable than less writing” (86). The
mere presence of writing on Web 2.0 became tied to a larger sense of civic and
democratic activity. As Donna LeCourt notes, the web began to be seen as the medium
through which democracy would finally arrive; users were to become actors with equal
agency in a shared public sphere where information flows freely, unencumbered by the
big cable networks and media firms.
Soon after this initial bout of optimism came the realization that Web 2.0 does not
just offer writers more opportunities to speak, but actually changes what writing is and
what it involves in ways that may be troubling, inequitable, and even just plain difficult
to model. At the center of these concerns was the emergence of popular Web 2.0
platforms including Facebook, Twitter, Google, Blackboard, and Turnitin. The social
media/public writing platforms, in particular, became synonymous with the development
of Web 2.0 social logics. These platforms—most notably Facebook—describe
themselves as intermediary and neutral hosts of user content. But rather than being
neutral, as Tarleton Gillespie notes, they actually carry enormous power and influence
over our public spheres (“Platforms Intervene”). Platforms, Gillespie argues, “pick and
choose,” how writing is produced and circulated through the design of the interface, the
bias of content algorithms, and the economic incentive to increase digital activity so as to
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increase digital data production (1). Writing scholars Dustin Edwards and Bridget Gelms
agree. In their introduction to the Present Tense special issue on platform rhetorics,
Edwards and Gelms describe platforms as “rhetorical infrastructures” that “host and
shape the production and circulation of media content.” They point to the growing power
of platforms to spread misinformation, discriminate, create and maintain toxic public
communities, intervene in social problems, and decide how writing circulates (or doesn’t
circulate). They call on rhetoric and composition to play a more active role in platform
rhetorics, to “theorize, study, and account for how digital platforms shape rhetorical
activity and how platforms themselves are rhetorical forces in the world.”
As the medium through which writing is produced and circulated, platforms and
the design of platforms have become important not just because they change our public
spheres, but also because they change what writing is. For example, Lisa Dush has
argued that writing in the new digital age has become content, that is, a type of writing
that is “conditional, computatable, networked, and commodified” (176). The shift from
writing to content means a shift from a focus on crafting eloquent sentences and
considerations of audience appeals (although these are still important) to a focus on
circulation analytics, algorithmic manipulation, human and machine audiences, and
network dynamics. John Gallagher describes this as a change in audience; writers today,
he argues, write not just to people or publics but to “algorithmic audiences,” platformspecific algorithms that determine how our writing appears or doesn’t appear on a given
interface. In other words, platforms are changing what writing means, who writers write
to, and how writing is produced and circulated.
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The implications of these changes should worry writing teachers because they
directly affect the agency of writers. Web 2.0 platforms have embedded writers in new
economies of textual production and value that disempower writers and users by
annulling their right to own their textual productions. Broadly speaking, Web 2.0 has
introduced a shift from the digital user as owner to the digital user as renter. Through
EULAs and other legal and technical means, platforms have quietly enacted large
changes to writers’ relationship to both texts and the value that their texts produce. For
example, a central but understated feature of Web 2.0 is a shift from ownership of digital
texts to licensing of the right to temporarily view that text. From the e-books and movies
we “buy” to the journals and articles we read, more and more texts are claimed as the
property of a platform that merely “rents” access. As Aaron Perzanowski and Jason
Schultz argue in The End of Ownership: Personal Property in the Digital Economy,
“cheap remote storage, high-speed mobile network connections, and nearly ubiquitous
computing devices have facilitated new ways of distributing media” that “physically
separate us from the books we read, the music we play, and the movies we watch” (3-4).
In the shift from analog to digital distribution practices, media distributors and platforms
like YouTube and Facebook have learned that they can reposition the digital user from
owner to renter.
Writers’ loss of ownership extends to our rights to own our own productions.
Composition and rhetoric scholars concerned about the economic changes brought by
Web 2.0 have been especially focused on a new type of digital production: data. As
Jessica Reyman notes in “User Data on the Social Web: Authorship, Agency, and
Appropriation,” writers on contemporary Web 2.0 platforms generate data through their

15

rhetorical activity, but the ownership of this data is claimed by the owners of the
platform. Facebook, she shows us, makes a claim to this data by describing it as a
technological “by-product” of user activity rather than a text that users create, thus not
subjecting data to traditional copyright law (524). This arrangement, Reyman suggests,
fails to recognize the human agency of authors and the “creative and intellectual value”
of digital data (526). Estee Beck agrees, and in “Writing Educator Responsibilities”
points out that university course management systems like Blackboard and Canvas
routinely surveil and gather data on students without consent or acknowledgement.
Writing educators, she argues, need to better engage in the issue of data collection as part
of what it means to be a critical writing teacher. Others, like James Porter, view the issue
in more economic terms as a matter of uneven labor. In “Rhetoric In/As Digital
Economy,” Porter argues that Web 2.0 changes the economy of the writer-audience
relationship. The cost of production and circulation, he notes, is much lower than it was
before and has created what he calls a “long-tail effect” (173). Rather than general texts
written to mass audiences, Web 2.0 makes it easier for writers to create specialized texts
for very local, specific audience. This trend, along with a shift generally to user-generated
content as what drives the web, constitutes what Porter calls the “dark side” of Web 2.0,
in which users perform labor for tech companies without receiving anything in return.
In this way, the story of Web 2.0 is deeply tied to political economy. It begins
with an initial bout of (somewhat wild) optimism for the future of democracy. It then
follows with the realization that what we do when we write has changed dramatically in
Web 2.0. We write differently, we think differently about who or what we are writing to,
we have new genres and spaces to write in, but we also participate in unequitable
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ownership dynamics designed to exploit us. In other words, we no longer can be sure we
know exactly what we’re doing when we write, what effect our writing has on the world
around us. We don’t even really know fully what the platform is doing vs. what we are
doing. All of this is a big setup for a disciplinary crisis of agency.

How Do We Define Agency in the “Social” Web?
The tension between greater access to writing and circulation versus the
exploitation of data, labor, and text that access relies on leaves us in an untenable position
when we try to understand agency. Writing studies ended up in a strange situation where
we could see power being enacted in our everyday digital lives (biased algorithms, toxic
publics, enormous wealth being generated from big data), and we could read rich
accounts of that power in other fields, but our own disciplinary (especially “ecological”)
models of agency were unable to speak to or describe how writers recognized, negotiated,
or resisted that power. The result has been that writing scholars looking to do critical
digital scholarship have mostly chosen to do that work without really engaging with the
category of agency as it currently exists in the field—an unfortunate prospect because
agency is a longstanding core disciplinary category for writing and rhetoric. Ultimately, I
argue that we can use political economic theory to reclaim agency as a category by taking
up questions of value (what is writing worth), labor (how is that worth made), property
(who does that worth end up belonging to), and class (how do patterns of ownership
create inequitable social divisions). By taking up these questions as meaningful and
productive, I hope to help rhetoric and writing studies recapture one of its historically
central categories: agency.
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To do that, we need to understand how we got here: that is, how we got to be a
field without a working model of agency that reflects our liberatory values as well as the
new digital reality for writers. In response to the developments of Web 2.0 that I outlined,
and fueled by larger existential concerns about the relationship between humans and the
planet we live on, composition and rhetoric took an “ecological” turn. The ecological
model of agency enabled writing and rhetoric scholars to express the experience of
writing on Web 2.0 while accounting for new and more complex digital actors. The story
of ecological theory is by now fairly familiar to a lot of folks. In response to a changing
digital world, many composition and rhetoric scholars shifted from the traditional model
of agency (focused on individual human subjects) to an ecological or posthuman model
(distributed among human and non-human actors). The conversations that spurred this
shift trickle from many sources, ranging from complexity theory to political science to
feminist science studies, but for many it was the digital that invites reflection on how we
understand agency. In response to an increasingly complex digital world that seems to
subsume the writer under a larger social and technical digital information structure made
up of platforms, algorithms, and data flows, writing scholars have found that the
traditional model of a single, conscious, and controlling rhetor struggles to describe how
writing on the web now works. By contrast, the ecological model’s explanation of the
web sought to erase or distribute writer agency in a way that seemed to correspond with
the experience of writing on Web 2.0.
Though the ecology metaphor has earlier beginnings (see: Cooper, Syverson), I
want to start the story with Jenny Edbauer to highlight how an erasure of controlling
agency was distributed. In “Unframing Models of Public Distribution,” Edbauer
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questions the rhetorical situation model’s reliance on discrete elements that can be clearly
delineated from one another. The separation of rhetor from audience, audience from
situation, rhetor from situation, etc., Edbauer argues, is unsustainable upon close analysis:
“the elements of the rhetorical situation simply bleed” (9). She offers instead the
metaphor of an ecology as a framework to theorize rhetoric, where elements are replaced
by an amorphous flow, a lived and fluid social process. This sense of flow more suitable
to rhetorics like the one Edbauer studies—the ever-changing and ever-circulating “Keep
Austin Weird” mantra, which has no clear single speaker or rhetorical situation. In
questioning the foundational terms of the traditional model—rhetor, situation—and by
shifting focus instead to circulating affects and actors, Edbauer disrupts the possibility of
an autonomous agentive rhetor shaping the world.
Ecological metaphors have found a ready home in digital spaces, and for many
the development of the theory has been in response to changing digital technologies and
social platforms, even if Edbauer began with a non-digital example. As a networked
space where humans interact with interfaces, algorithms, platforms, and each other in a
swirl of human-machinic activity, digitality makes posthuman ideas easily visible. The
posthuman emphasis of digital ecologies is probably best represented by Laurie Gries’
Still Life with Rhetoric. Gries follows an object of study—the Obama Hope image—as it
flows from one digital community to another, affecting change through a diversity of
rhetorical lives. As an image that moves and changes as it goes, shaping and reshaping
digital and political life, Gries argues, the Obama Hope image is just as rhetorically
active and agentive as the graphic artist who produced its original form.
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Where Gries focuses on the image as agentive, others take up other kinds of
nonhuman digital actors. Reyman, for example draws our attention to algorithms as
rhetorical actors who question the possibility of agency as possessed by a single agent.
Algorithms, she notes “structure (and shape) information, expose us to (and limit
exposure to) domains of knowledge and activity, deliver (and filter) news and content,
connect us to others (and build invisible walls), and ultimately construct our online
experiences” (122). Once we begin to acknowledge the rhetorical work that platforms
and algorithms do, the scale of these systems begins to sink in, as we start to see the ways
in which every inch of digital writing is soaked in code. Daniel Hocutt, in his article in
Present Tense, tries to map a tiny piece of the users and algorithms involved in the use of
a university library’s search engine. Even a simple act as typing something into the
search engine, Hocutt shows, involves a sprawl of actors: programmers, machinelearning software, librarians, cookies, web designers, teachers, server farms, engineers,
layers of references to previous and similar searches, and dozens of algorithms. What’s
more, these are only the actors involved with the search; Hocutt does not mention the
algorithmic influences that might lead a user to arrive at a search term in the first place.
Similar mapping exercises could be done for other digital writing activities: writing a
Facebook post, crafting a lengthy review on Amazon, or uploading a video to YouTube.
As Annette Vee and Tim Laquintano argue in their recent article on fake news
algorithms, “textual writing cannot be untangled from code writing,” or as Vee puts it in
her book, “writing now circulates over a layer of computation” (25).
Ecological theory tries to understand how writers operate within digital spaces
that appear to deconstruct the subject, blurring the boundary between human action and
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algorithmic determination in a way that echoes with the posthuman. In the traditional
model of agency, the subject is stable, coherent, conscious, reflective, and above all
agentive; the rhetor as subject sets out to achieve a purpose, reflects upon the needs of the
situation, chooses a rhetorical tactic, and thereby organizes and controls the world. In
ecological or posthumanist models, this sense of control is not only imaginary, but also
potentially prideful and arrogant. It too easily reduces the world outside the rhetor to a
passive object to be controlled and mastered. By contrast, ecological rhetoric argues, that
world is rhetorically active, full of innumerable human and nonhuman actors that work to
mediate the world via a tapestry of complex and ultimately only partially knowable
processes. The human rhetor—itself continuous with its environment as a bodily
assemblage of nonhuman parts—operates as one small piece of an uncoordinated
ecology. From this perspective, as Casey Boyle argues, rhetoric becomes not conscious,
masterful, and reflective action but rather embedded exercise, a practice that “becomes an
ecology of relations that include but [are] ultimately irreducible to a human’s conscious
awareness of its activities” (29). The act of writing becomes far more complex: not the
work of a single author exercising creativity but rather a weaving, a coalescing of
innumerable bodies, actors, objects, etc., which are variously described as
“overdetermined,” “ecological,” “assemblagic,” and so on. As Gries writes, “it is only via
the divergent intra-actions between humans and nonhuman entities in an unfolding
network of assemblages . . . that an image emerges as a generative, distributed, material
force in the world” (58). Gries prefers Latour’s language of actancy and rhetorical
actancy over the notion of agency, because actancy “reminds us that rhetoric always
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emerges from the relations and activities of mutually transforming entities within
assemblages” (74).
In an ecological model, agency cannot be said to be singularly held as the
“property” of a rhetor. Having lost the subject to which it was originally bound, it is
questionable whether agency in any traditional sense can be said to exist at all. At best, it
becomes distributed into the environment, into the material and the nonhuman. The
appearance of agency becomes something more like an after-the-fact description of the
workings of an assemblage, as particular actors appear temporarily imbued with ecologyaltering potential. Yet, if the strength of ecological theory is its sense of process in
complex systems, its weakness is its ability to theorize power. That is, ecological theory
cannot tell us how and why certain actors in a system come to obtain power and control
over system resources. It would actually be quite difficult to even recognize inequalities
of material resources, literacies, and access to design decisions in an ecological model. In
fact, the heavy hitter theorists that inform ecological theories of writing seem openly
hostile to attempts to think about inequality. Or, more accurately, they are hostile to the
lines of thinking (identity, access, agency) that enable critical scholars to recognize
inequality. Ecologically models of agency are unable to think about power. In fact, they
seem explicitly designed not to. This is a problem because, as I have shown, writers today
are immersed in digital platforms that accumulate and exert power in novel ways. We
need a new framework, a new way of talking about writers and what they can do on the
web that allows us to identify, further define, and resist power. 4

We can see this, for example, in Bruno Latour’s Reassembling the Social, which
introduces actor-network theory and which heavily influences composition and rhetoric’s
ecological turn (see Gries, Lynch and Rivers). In the opening chapter, Latour rejects
4
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Why Political Economy?
In the rest of this chapter (and in the rest of this dissertation), I argue for political
economy as an alternative framework for modeling writer agency in Web 2.0. Where
ecology has failed and where political economy fills in gaps is by addressing materiality
and power relations in ways that explain agency. I find political economy a more
applicable digital framework for several reasons. First, we have already seen, the story of
Web 2.0 is already deeply tied to narratives about information and its role in capitalism.
Both its proponents (Benkler) and its critics (Zuboff) situate Web 2.0 and the larger data
economy around it in narratives of democratic progress or democratic ruin. In this way,
the “space” of the digital, to invoke Marx again, is a political economic one. Second,
underneath the narratives, Web 2.0 involves many real economic changes to how writers
create and share texts. The threat to agency is not only discursive (the nature of
circulation) but also economic (who controls the value of texts). As a result, and perhaps

social methodologies that attempt to think about the world through the lens of gender,
class, race, sexuality, etc. (36). These starting points, which he calls “groups,” simply get
in the way of our ability to recognize how actors “deploy their own worlds” (23).
Latour’s solution is for the researcher to ignore the existence of these categories, to
“render the social world as flat as possible in order to ensure that the establishment of any
new link is clearly visible” (16). In actor-network theory, group categories like gender are
only meaningful if they are brought up and described by actors, and then they only mean
what individual actors say they mean. This is what it means for Latour to “reassemble the
social”: he wants to forget all of the existing theories for how shared social identities
reify and come to structure or negotiate individual experiences. Instead, he asks us to
follow and listen only to localized or ephemeral individual experiences. He seems
unwilling to recognize that existing critical social theories originally emerged from
individuals sharing and drawing patterns across their own experiences.
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most importantly, a political economic analysis is best able to address questions of
agency.
The goal of political economic analysis generally is to describe how individual
actors are situated in systems of resource production and distribution. It then draws
connections across individual actors to form narratives of exploitation, colonialism,
appropriation, etc. Political economy assumes these systems are social and even political
in nature; that is, political economy seeks to identify social-material inequalities and to
juxtapose those inequalities with predominant narratives about how economic systems
work and what values they hold. It is thus an excellent framework for describing Web 2.0
writer agency because it offers a way to critically evaluate how writers are positioned
economically and how that positioning affects our rhetorical agency. As Victor
Villanueva puts it, “the role of rhetoric, according to Burke, is the demystification of the
ideological. The role of political economy is the demystification of relations tied to the
economic. If we’re to understand where we are and what is happening to us—and maybe
even to affect it—we need the tools provided by both” (58).
In the chapters that follow, I identify four features of political economic analysis
that are useful for describing writer agency in Web 2.0: value, labor, property, and class.
To set up that analysis, I offer preliminary definitions here to help develop the exigence
for a political economic analysis, but I will also be complicating these terms as my
discussion of how we might understand digital spaces through them develops in the rest
of the dissertation.
Value is a way of talking about the worth of a particular commodity in a given
space and time. Value has both a quantitative (exchange) and a qualitative (use)
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dimension; a given commodity, like data, can have a quantitative value expressed in a
universal equivalent like dollars, and also a qualitative value in its capacity, under the
right conditions, to reshape how texts are produced, circulated, and imagined (see Dush).
Thinking through value is useful because it invites narrative. To suggest the idea of value
is to then immediately have to ask where it comes from, who produces it; it is to invite
narrative that locates productive power at particular moments in an ecology, an action
that ecological writing theory explicitly tries to move away from. The source of that
value can be narrated in different ways so as to embellish or conceal the contributions of
certain actors. Narratives of value can be worked (and are being worked) to create
justifications—legal, cultural, or technical—for corporate platforms to appropriate the
rhetorical efforts of everyday people (see Reyman). Hence, the textuality of value is a
deeply political process that must be contextualized within economies; when we lose
sight of that context, we create apolitical theory that may in fact be complicit with
unethical and exploitative economic activity.
Writing scholars need to be able to talk about value because Web 2.0 writers
create value. Writers not only produce traditional texts that have currency on the web, but
they also produce new types of texts (data) upon which entire industries and digital
economies run. However, a principal characteristic of Web 2.0 is that while writers
produce value, they rarely have control over its quantitative or qualitative value. Control
over value in Web 2.0 has shifted to the owners of tech platforms and data servers, who
have enormous wealth and unprecedented rhetorical control over our public spheres.
Hence, if writing scholars don’t understand value, then we don’t understand how writers
get separated from it, and how that separation is both an act of economic power and
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economic disempowerment. In short, without value, we lose our perspective on agency. I
will discuss the value of Web 2.0 writing and what it means for writers at length in
chapters 3 and 4.
Labor refers to value-creating activity. It is a way of recognizing rhetorical and
economic influence within an ecology. Labor is sometimes misunderstood as a term that
claims certain types of activity inherently create value and hence are “productive” labor,
while other types of activity do not create value and are merely leisure or “reproductive”
labor. It would be more accurate to say that a given political economy can become
oriented around specific types of labor, thus introducing the temporary (but very
material) division between productive vs. reproductive labor. Industrial capitalism, for
example, was oriented around the average labor it took to produce physical commodities,
consigning domestic and rhetorical labor as “reproductive,” “private,” and non-value
creating. The era of Web 2.0 and information capitalism might be said to orient not
around factory work but rather around rhetorical acts that are appropriately situated in
computer systems that can record and analyze data. From the perspective of this
particular political economy, rhetorical acts become “productive” labor, and everything
else—including traditional work—becomes supplementary or “reproductive” (which
perhaps explains the unusually strong support for universal income among Silicon Valley
tech executives, as anything that makes reproduction easier can only be good for
rhetorical production).
Writing assessment scholars like Asao Inoue have already demonstrated the
usefulness of the term “labor” in valuing the work writers do, and by extension valuing
writers themselves. We need to take that line of thinking to digital spaces. Writers create
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value through rhetorical labor in Web 2.0. They are not simply another node in a flat
ecology of actors, but rather the source of the resources that constitute and drive the
various actors on the web. The entire ecology of Web 2.0 platforms is organized around
cultivating efficient and useful rhetorical labor while staving off lawmakers or social
movements that might interfere. To recognize labor—and to take up political economic
analysis—is to acknowledge writers are the source of value, a necessary political step to
then tracing where that value goes.
Property is a way of talking about who benefits from the creation of value
through labor. Who owns, or should own, the resources and commodities that get
produced? The answer to this question requires justification, i.e., it requires us to name
what counts as labor and to narrate how value is produced and circulated. This is what
makes political economy a useful type of analysis. It allows us to critically interrogate a
particular justification for property and to imagine new, or alternative answers for how
resources are distributed and owned. Through property, we can see how ecologies are
carved up artificially and how boundaries are made between who has access to what
resource.
Like labor, property is often misrepresented as having natural characteristics, or
as a basic and universal right (“I make it, I own it”). As I will discuss in chapter two,
writing scholars have historically been complicit in this misrepresentation of property, to
ill effects. In practice, “I make it, I own it” is not how property works in the vast majority
of cases, including in Web 2.0. The texts and data that writers labor to produce are stored
on data servers owned by Silicon Valley tech companies; hence, the vast majority of
value produced on the digital web is appropriated by the owners of digital platforms and
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digital infrastructures. This arrangement is deeply inequitable and has serious
implications for the agency of writers. However, current ecological models of agency are
unable to recognize this as a problem at all. I will discuss property in great detail in
chapters two and three.
Finally, class is a way of describing patterns of inequality through the enactment
of property. Class allows us to identify the social-material sets of people who, through the
boundaries created by property, are differently positioned to the values flowing through
ecologies. Some individuals—like the industrial bourgeoisie or current day Web 2.0
elites—come to own a majority of a society’s resources, and others—like the proletariat
or contemporary digital writers—produce those resources through labor but do not reap
the rewards or control how they are used. Through the patterns defined by class, we can
talk about how one’s position in an ecology creates shared material interests with some
and shared antagonisms with others.
Altogether, political economy is a way of talking about the production and
distribution of resources within an ecology. It is not a new framework to composition and
rhetoric, but it is a neglected one, especially in digital writing studies which has
historically focused on the rhetorical affordances of new mediums. Ultimately, what
political economy allows us to do is to redefine agency in a way that recognizes, first,
that writers are now an integral part of a digital economy, and second that the agency of
writers is tied to their ability to resist inequitable property dynamics that delegate the
resources of the web to a small, ruling class. Agency in Web 2.0 has to go beyond
rhetorical influence to include economic influence, or control over the economic value of
what writers produce. Another way to put this is that, as writers became economic
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producers of value, what “rhetorical influence” means has changed. Writers make the
world’s data, but they don’t have control over how that data is used, circulated,
leveraged, interpreted, etc. Writers write on platforms, but they don’t have access to what
those platforms look like, how they shape publics, how they determine how writing is
produced, circulated, etc. My hope is that a political economic analysis will allow us to
see how “true” agency might be better developed with digital tools. I will discuss these
tools and the possibilities they offer for empowering writers in chapters four and five.

Conclusion
My overall argument is that in Web 2.0 writing economies, writers have lost
agency even as the ceiling for what we could do or what writing could mean went way up
because the tools that exist are much more powerful. Ecological theories of agency were
a way to try to keep up. But they ended up as expressions of our felt lost sense of agency
rather than representations of the social systems through which writers lost agency. As an
expression, ecological theories capture our living experience of agency as we write on the
web, but they do not catalogue the political and economic forces that brought us to this
point. In the same way that Fredric Jameson once famously described postmodernism as
“the cultural logic of late capitalism,” we might think of ecological writing theory as the
cultural logic of information capitalism. At the very moment that we lost value and
ownership over our textual activities, our theoretical descriptions of agency became
dispersed.
To reclaim ownership over the value over our textual activities, we need a
political economic analysis. This is what my dissertation does: I look at the categories of
property, value, and class to describe digital writing and agency. I argue that a productive
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theory of agency in Web 2.0 begins with writers’ ownership and control over the value of
the texts, platforms, and publics they produce. I’ll elaborate on this definition throughout
this dissertation, but a few brief points to start. First, it specifies writers’ control, not
writer’s control. Web 2.0 creates classes, so we need to think at the class level. Second,
my definition involves ownership and control. My approach to agency is very economic
in nature in the sense that I think about owning the value we make. But that claim to
ownership is attached to a larger point that ownership of value leads to ownership and
control of how publics function, how we relate to each other, how writing is produced,
circulated, etc. Finally, my definition of agency involves not just ownership over texts but
over platforms and publics. Web 2.0 centralizes texts and ties them very visibly to
particular platforms and publics. Texts, publics, and platforms are inseparable and are
essentially all made by writers, and so my definition of agency involves some level of
community control over how those publics and platforms function.
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CHAPTER 2
THE LEGACY CODE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Copyright and Composition
The United States has led in creating companies, creating jobs, because we've
had the best intellectual-property system--there's no doubt about that in my
mind, and when people say they want to be the most competitive economy,
they've got to have the incentive system. Intellectual property is the incentive
system for the products of the future.
--Bill Gates, CNET interview
“Property is theft!”
--Proudhon, “What is Property?”
In her 2013 article, “User Data on the Social Web: Authorship, Agency, and
Appropriation,” Jessica Reyman responds to the mass collection and appropriation of user
data on Web 2.0 by invoking the framework of intellectual property. User data, she argues,
should be thought of as an authored text, and should be subject to ownership and control
by those individuals who create it. In the same way that an author’s published novel is
protected against unauthorized reproductions and distributions, data as intellectual property
would protect from unauthorized collection and circulation. Though she expresses some
hesitation and concern at invoking intellectual property, in making this appeal Reyman is
hoping to empower writers and to protect digital writing from the predatory
commodification practices of Web 2.0 companies.
Reyman’s hesitant appeal to intellectual property is not unusual in composition
and rhetoric’s intellectual property discourse. The field has long had an ambivalent
relationship to copyright and intellectual property. Many writing scholars protest the
propertization of writing through copyright, and yet narratives about the “public good”
copyright offers, when executed well, circulates in our scholarly discourse. We reject the
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authorial subject that underpins copyright even while observing, as Andrea Lunsford puts
it, that the death of the author came only when women and people of color were just
beginning to occupy the subjectivity that authorship affords (531). And while many in
composition and rhetoric (including Reyman) hold strong commitments to open access
and to alternative, commons-based models of ownership, when it appears that writers are
being exploited (especially for the benefit of Silicon Valley tech companies), we find
ourselves appealing to intellectual property as a way to exert writer agency.
These ambivalences make sense for a field that has long negotiated commitments
to two core values: the power of writers to exert agency and ownership over their textual
productions, and the power of publics to read, remix, and share written works. Copyright
has been historically represented as a source of mediation for these values, a way to
“balance” competing interests: hence, our ambivalence. Today, however, I believe that
this ambivalence is now getting in the way of our ability to accurately name and address
the proprietary dynamics that are threatening the agency of writers, especially digital
writers. Part of the issue, I suggest, is that so much of our discourse on intellectual
property is saddled with what I call the legacy code of an earlier economy of writing.
“Legacy code” is a programming term to describe code that is inherited, written by
people who are no longer here, for situations that no longer apply today, and using logical
structures and styles that are now considered obsolete. Legacy code is often obscure and
scary to change because the programmer is never quite fully sure what the code does and
what removing it might do to the rest of the program. To sift through legacy code is, as
computer programmers Andy Hunt and Dave Thomas put it, an exercise in “software
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archaeology,” in reading the past and trying to unpack how the original writers
understood the world, and how they tried to change it (22).
Too much of our cultural and scholarly discourse on copyright and intellectual
property is legacy code. It is legacy code written in an earlier era; or, more accurately, it
is legacy code leftover from a variety of time periods and discourses. These include legal
traditions that go at least as far back as the publishing wars of the 18th century, to cultural
constructs of authorship leftover from certain strands of Romantic literary movements,
and to a “print” writing modality organized around publishing houses, the production of
bound paper books, and “finished” manuscripts written by a single author. All of this
prior sedimentation makes for discourses that tangle together and materialize as legacy
code, as a discursive remnant of past ways of understanding issues of textual ownership
that imprints itself on how we envision the problems facing Web 2.0 writers today
including: appropriation of user data, writers’ disenfranchisement and lack of access to
the full capacities of the digital technologies through which they write. The overall result
is that contemporary intellectual property scholars struggle to identify satisfactory
solutions to proprietary corporate platforms and large-scale data mining. We are caught
in old ambivalences, left attempting to apply legacy constructs like authorship or
copyright to the production and collection of data. We miss the larger property relations
that characterize digital writing today, and ultimately undercut our field’s ability to
advocate for the rhetorical and economic agency of writers.
I believe that appeals to authorial intellectual property are the wrong kind of
argument we should be making to assert writers’ political, economic, and rhetorical rights
in a digital era. That sort of solution effectively represents the agency of writers as linked
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to their capacity to assert property rights at the very moment when we should be
redoubling disciplinary efforts to resist the propertization of writing. While I agree with
Reyman that the issue of textual ownership is crucial to understanding and exerting writer
agency in Web 2.0, I hope to show here that the peculiar phenomena that is intellectual
property is central to how we arrived at the problems of Web 2.0 today. In order to do
that, in this chapter I first draw out and recontextualize some of our legacy code,
specifically composition and rhetoric’s uneven relationship to “authorship” and to the
“public good” interpretation of copyright. I show how these codes are rooted in a
bourgeois understanding of property as, first, ownership of individual commodities, and
second, as an incentive system for innovation and as a necessity for the public good and
for a “democratic” (market) society. I locate the origin of these codes in economic
assumptions derived from the bourgeois and settler-colonial theory of property espoused
by political economist John Locke. A Lockean account of property, I argue, traps us in a
kind of private property framework that makes it very difficult for us to respond
effectively to data collection, and that ultimately undercuts the rhetorical and economic
agency of writers.
If our goal is for digital writers to have more agency, or for the web to become
more democratic, then we need to understand how agency is located in Web 2.0 and how
to support it. Intellectual property scholars have approached agency through either
individualistic terms, as the amount of control and ownership a writer has over their
textual productions, or in collective terms, as the level of access a public has to the range
of texts that make up a cultural commons. In both approaches, agency is always about
access to and control of texts. This emphasis on texts, I argue, keeps us locked in a

34

narrow and defensive understanding of property. As I will show, in positioning agency as
existing in the ownership of texts, we invariably end up defending copyright, the
commodification of writing, and the larger logics of private property. This is troubling for
writing scholars because it is these very logics that have led to the proprietary relations of
Web 2.0.
Before I can get to that argument, I first need to establish a preliminary baseline for
what intellectual property is and what it entails. Traditionally, intellectual property refers
to the legal ownership of ideas—or, more precisely, expressions of ideas—by individuals
or by larger actors. But upon closer analysis it becomes clear that the premise of owning
ideas and their expressions—which are often slippery and diffuse, transformative and
inexplicable—is so unstable as to immediately invite larger questions about social and
textual complexities. These include questions about:
1) the relationship between text and author: what control should a
proprietary author have over a text regarding its appearance,

production, circulation, meaning, content, form, etc.? How long should an
author exercise control over a text, and in what ways? How do authorial
rights relate to theories of textual production? Is a text an expression of
the author’s unique creativity, a communal and collectively produced

labor, a consequence of a particular historical moment, or a literal
extension of an author’s being?

2) the relationship between text and public: what rights does the public have
to access cultural productions? Can literary, cultural, and scholarly

works be ethically withheld from circulation, and on what terms? What
35

rights does the public have to edit, sample, remediate, reinterpret, and
reproduce a text? At what point does a text become so remixed or

remediated as to be a different text, to be disassociated with the original
author? What kinds of value—social, cultural, economic—should “nonauthorial” persons be able to acquire through remediation and
reproduction?

3) the relationship between text and publisher/platform: what rights does
the publisher or sponsor of a text have over appearance, production,

circulation, etc.? How does the publisher’s control relate to authorial

control? Can an author “assign” their rights to a publisher and thereby
alienate themselves from their own work, or is such an action morally

and aesthetically implausible? What responsibilities do publishers and

vectors have to the public, to authorial intentions, and to a profit-motive?

This tripartite tension between the rights of authors, publics, and the publishing

and platform industries dominates discussions of intellectual property. “Strong” copyright
law, which typically grants copyright holders lengthy periods of substantive control over
the economic production and circulation of a text and its aesthetic content and form, is
said to protect the author’s right to the value of their work and to prevent unwanted
appropriations. “Weak” copyright law, or weakly enforced copyright law, is said to
ensure the cultural development of the larger public by granting easy access to cultural
works and by ensuring the movement of texts into public domain. Surrounding and
driving this discussion always are representatives of the publishing and digital platform
industries, who recognized very early on that strong or weak copyright determines what
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kinds of profit and business models can exist via the buying, selling, and sponsoring of
written words.
Composition and rhetoric, historically, has been very successful at theorizing and
describing question set #1 and question set #2. We have a long and rich history of
theorizing the author, the writing and remixing process, and the rhetorical work texts
perform as they circulate through diverse publics. However, we have not paid as much
attention to question set #3. Our values are more likely to take us to writers and to publics
than to publishers. And like many other fields, we are really only just beginning to
understand and theorize the role digital platforms play in our rhetorical lives (for an
excellent example of this initial work, see Edwards and Gelm’s special issue on platform
rhetorics in Present Tense). As I will argue in these next two chapters, this is important
work because it is question set #3—the relation between a text and a platform—that
defines the economic and rhetorical context of Web 2.0. However, especially when it
comes to issues of ownership, the language we use to talk about ownership is often stuck
in question set #1 and #2, and we find ourselves caught up in bizarre ambivalences where
we struggle to escape proprietary frameworks. To demonstrate this, I turn first to the
larger cultural and legal legacy codes from which composition scholars draw.

Legacy Code #1: The Proprietary Author
“The distinguishing characteristic of the modern author, I propose, is
proprietorship; the author is conceived as the originator and therefore the
owner of a special kind of commodity, the work.”
--Mark Rose, Authors and Owners
The story of composition and rhetoric’s disciplinary orientation to property is tied
closely with how we have invoked, imagined, and critiqued authorship. The field’s first
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major forays into intellectual property came in the early 1990s, when English
departments were still in the midst of poststructuralism’s erasure of the author and its
embrace of an unstable and inexplicable textual object, with text’s like Barthes’s “The
Death of the Author” and Foucault’s “What is an Author?” being read widely. Many
English departments approached authorship as a symbol of an older and dated culture of
writing that tied individual writers to their works. Critiques of authorship then became a
means of resisting a world where, through increasingly stringent copyright law, all
writing becomes property. Today, the cult of the author lingers on as legacy code in our
assessments of intellectual property. Curiously, however, the situation has been flipped
on its head; in Web 2.0, the idea of the author has returned as a potential liberating
mechanism for returning textual productions—especially data—to their rightful owners.
In both cases, our dealings with authorship assume that intellectual property law is
influenced by or emerges from cultures of authorship, and that the correct theory of the
author will result in a more equitable relationship between writers, texts, and the public
sphere. These assumptions, I argue, derive from a selective (if not shoehorned) reading of
the history of intellectual property law that elides the role of publishers and booksellers
and that obscures the ideological role the cult of the author plays in issues of textual
ownership today.
To tell this story, we need to understand the conjuncture that characterized early
work on intellectual property in computers and composition scholarship. In the late 1980s
and early 1990s, writing scholars had high hopes for the Web. The Web was going to
eliminate barriers to access, democratize our public spheres, and increase the circulation
of texts. Greater circulation of content leads to stronger democracy—this was the promise
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we learned from Habermas’ bourgeois public sphere. Digital or “electronic” space, with
its open networks, sprawling links, and textual flows, seemed poised to end the social
problems that had dogged the twentieth century. These techno-utopic hopes, as Donna
LeCourt notes, did not last long, “as we quickly realized that power inequities offline
reproduced themselves online—that factors like race, class, and gender were not going to
disappear” (226). But at the time, the Web’s power to collapse space, along with its
imagined flattening of social power and identity, gave some hope that we might finally
achieve through technology itself something like Habermas’ public sphere.
At the same time, however, U.S. intellectual property law was becoming more
and more restrictive. U.S. lawmakers and courts in the ‘80s and ‘90s were moving rapidly
and aggressively to strengthen intellectual property and copyright law. In 1989 the U.S.
joined the Berne Convention, a longstanding international agreement committing member
countries to recognize the intellectual property works of other members. In 1994, the U.S.
signed the TRIPs agreement, and in 1996 orchestrated the WIPO Copyright treaty, which
together helped protect America’s massive intellectual property exports by recognizing
software and databases as literary works requiring copyright protection. And in 1998, the
U.S. passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, enabling copyright holders to use
technical means—digital rights management—to restrict access to content and to threaten
with litigation users who circumvent those means. These initiatives significantly
increased the length of copyright, eroded fair use, and gave copyright holders (especially
corporations) the power to define and enforce copyright themselves through DRM.
Together, they undermined our field’s hopeful visions for the web as an open public
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sphere, contradicted our understanding of the social nature of authorship, and threatened
to spoil our efforts to teach and use the full capacities of new digital writing technologies.
Intellectual property law thus necessitated a disciplinary response. One of the
primary ways we responded, however, was not so much to interrogate the idea of
property and its historical forms, but to aggressively deconstruct the author, especially
the author in its most bogeyman form: the Romantic authorial figure. If we could get rid
of the author—already a comfortable project for English department scholars in the wake
of poststructuralism—then we can get rid of ownership. Or, at least, we could get rid of
the prospect of textual ownership, without having to engage in the question of property at
large. We thought this because we understand property as individual ownership of texts,
and writing as an activity in which production leads naturally to ownership. If we
dispelled the idea that there is something called an “author” that “produces” works, then
there is no one left to own. Get rid of the owner, and ownership goes with it.
An early example of the move to redirect discussions about intellectual property
into debates over authorship is Martha Woodmansee and Peter Jaszi’s 1995 keystone
College English article. Woodmansee—a literary scholar—and Jaszi—a legal scholar—
open their article by citing the essays of Romantic poets like Wordsworth, Goethe, and
Coleridge. Woodmansee and Jaszi argue that intellectual property law of the nineteenth
century emerged out of collaborative philosophical discussions with poets, philosophers,
and publishers, as they set out to determine the nature of composition and creativity
(770). Dominating these discussions was the Romantic authorial figure—the single,
solitary, creative genius from whom all original writing emerges. In this narrative, in
which literature and law intersect, the Romantic authorial figure informed the “law of

40

texts” by making both possible and natural the premise of a single individual who “owns”
a text (771). Theories of literary authorship turned into intellectual property law. In
response, Woodmansee and Jaszi dedicate their article to a critique of the Romantic
authorial figure—and the very idea of an “author”—as a deeply suspicious category
incompatible with contemporary academic poststructuralist and postmodern theory. They
complain of the “long shadow of [the] authorial personae,” which they describe as a
lingering Romantic concept that denies the collaborative nature of writing (777). The
problem, Woodmansee and Jaszi suggest, is that as intellectual property law has become
more complex in the digital era, it has simultaneously become more distant from cultural
and literary theory; they thus call on compositionists to take up conversations on
intellectual property and to play a role in the evolution of copyright laws (781).
The basic problematic offered by Woodmansee and Jaszi—that problems
concerning intellectual property emerge from incorrect cultural theories of authorship and
thereby can be corrected by a more accurate theory of authorship—has become a
common theme in intellectual property scholarship. For example, in their 1996 article, in
response to an ever-tightening intellectual property regime, Lunsford and West call for
the field to “reimagine ‘authorship’ and what constitutes it” (400). They advocate for a
theory of authorship that does not idealize Wordsworth the genius but rather explores the
relationships and conjuncture from which Wordsworth emerges. Here the author is not so
much a permanent owner as a culturally recognized “steward,” someone who has been
granted “temporary appropriation of linguistic territory from the cultural commons” (400401). Similarly, in an article on the file-sharing platform Napster, Danielle DeVoss and
James Porter tie authorship and copyright law to a “print ethic” that celebrates proprietary
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ownership of words but then struggles to adapt to the authorial cultures of digital
technologies, where production and circulation are more fluid (DeVoss and Porter 200).
Writing teachers, DeVoss and Porter propose, should adopt our disciplinary and
pedagogical plagiarism and academic honesty policies to a digital medium and a digital
ethic that encourages the cultures of distributed authorship that we want to see in
copyright law (202). And over the years, as digital data ownership became increasingly a
major intellectual property issue, scholars return to the framework of authorship. In their
2015 article in Culture of Copyright, Timothy R. Amidon and Jessica Reyman call for a
redefinition of authorship to include a wide array of textual-making practices, including
the everyday searches and clicks that produce user data. Understanding these practices as
acts of authorship—or “coauthorship”—they argue, will allow for stronger user
ownership claims and for “protections that would provide technology users increased
agency to manage the content and data they coauthor on the social and participatory web”
(110).
These articles take up different problems: strengthening IP law, file-sharing, and
user data collection. But they share a common theme in that they respond to issues of
textual ownership by deconstructing, cultivating, or appealing to one or another notion of
the author as a solution. In one sense this is quite a curious way to respond; if issues of
textual ownership are economic in nature, why do we turn so readily to retheorizing the
author, of all things? It is tempting to describe this response as yet another example of
what Mike Edwards identifies as a disciplinary habit of translating economic issues and
concerns into cultural ones (15-16). I agree, but I also think there is more going on here.
There are economic premises built into the way we talk about authorship.
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At the center of the way we talk about authorship is the assumption that the
author owns texts. That is, we assume that the author is the sole proprietor of any texts
that are socially assigned to them as the writer or creator. Because the author owns texts,
the logic goes, deconstructions of the author necessarily challenge property, and
invocations of the author necessarily assert the author’s right over the textual productions
they produce. In this narrative, one of the principal purposes of intellectual property law,
and copyright specifically, is to recognize and incentivize the author’s contribution to the
public sphere. Indeed, as Woodmansee and Jaszi’s claim, “authorship and property go
hand in hand . . . we cannot overlook the way in which proprietary authorship shapes the
law governing our textual practices” (770-72).
This depiction of the proprietary author is not only historically wrong, but also
contrary to the lived experience of most people who produce textual commodities, now
and in the past. Worse yet, it functions ideologically to distract from what I will show is
the principal purpose of copyright and intellectual property law: to alienate authors from
ownership of their own textual productions. It is a legacy code that gets in the way of our
understanding the proprietary dynamics of the web and that keeps us returning to
“rethinking the author” as a response to issues of textual ownership. To begin, the notion
that cultural assumptions about authorship—and especially those emerging from the
literary movement of Romanticism—had much to do with the historical development of
intellectual property law is weak, at best. As we know, Romanticism as a literary
movement existed in various forms across the trans-Atlantic hemisphere, from France
and Germany to England and to the States and the Caribbean islands. But as Peter
Baldwin’s exhaustive history of intellectual property in The Copyright Wars: Three
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Centuries of Trans-Atlantic Battle shows, these nations took drastically different
approaches to the formation of intellectual property law in the 1700s and 1800s. While
Germany, France, and the European continentals established a tradition of moral rights
that glorified the genius of the author and seemed quite in line with Romantic cultures of
authorship, the Anglo-American approach was quite different. The U.K., and later the
United States, developed a system of “copyright” that in spirit rejected authorial
ownership and offered copyright holders only a limited, short monopoly on their works.
In practice the Anglo-American approach to authorial ownership was even more
dismissive; indeed, despite its strong Romantic cultural movement, for the first 100 years
of its existence the United States developed a reputation as a “pirate” nation due to its
refusal to sign copyright treaties or to even recognize the copyright of foreign authors
(Baldwin 112-14). Romanticism, then, did not seem to have much effect on American
copyright law. As Baldwin puts it “Romanticism was a cultural constant in all our nations
without leading to the same results. So something else must also have been at work” (94).
This “something else,” it turns out, did not so much involve authors but rather the
booksellers and publishers who initiated the legal battles that led to the cumulative
formation of copyright law. Mark Rose’s Authors and Owners: The Invention of
Copyright offers an instructive history here. As Rose shows, Anglo-American copyright
law developed primarily as a fight between two commercial business models: on the one
hand original publishers and booksellers who wanted perpetual and total copyright to
secure a steady stream of funding, and on the other hand a second group of publishers
and booksellers who made money by reprinting or slightly remixing popular titles and
who advocated for very limited copyright, if at all (4-5). The author here held a curious
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status. As an economic proprietor, they were more or less irrelevant, as the vast majority
of authors sold or signed away their rights to publishers and booksellers. But Rose notes,
in court arguments the author emerged as a kind of mythical lightning rod, a discursive
representation of a person whose ownership rights were being violated by loose
copyright, even though few authors owned any textual rights (120). As Rose puts it, “in
the discourse of copyright . . . the goal of protecting the rights of the creative author is
proudly asserted even as the notion of author is drained of content” (136).
Curiously, despite being a highly regarded authority on the formation of copyright
in literary and historical circles, Rose’s work is rarely referenced in composition and
rhetoric. When it is referenced, it is usually in passing, and the extent to which his
arguments are at odds with the way we talk about authorship are not acknowledged (for a
noteworthy exception, see Deborah Brandt’s “When People Write for Pay”). But his
account of the author as at once inflated and empty should appear as a kind of common
sense. As anyone who has worked as a technical writer or software programmer for an
employer or attempted to publish a book or academic article through publishers like
Elsevier would know, writers rarely keep ownership of what they create. My own
university’s Intellectual Property Policy is emailed to me yearly by the administration to
remind me that anything that I create with university resources (including time, offices,
library materials, equipment, etc.) belongs exclusively to the university (Clause III B). It
just so happens that the kinds of texts I produce—dissertation chapters, research articles,
class notes—are of such little economic value that the University elects not to bother and
simply waives ownership. Rest assured though, that if English department graduate
students and faculty produced the kinds of money-making intellectual property
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(especially software and biological, medical, and technological patents) that other
departments do, that waiver would cease to exist very quickly.
All of this is to say that authors rarely if ever reap the proportionate rewards of
what they create; the vast majority of intellectual property wealth in the world is held by
corporations and employers. The figure of the author in copyright discourse is less of a
person, then, and more of an ideological and discursive construct that distracts us from
the larger property relations between text and publisher and writer and publisher. To
deconstruct the author is not to resist copyright or intellectual property law but to buy
into the terms through which publishers have historically controlled conversation about
textual ownership. We cannot deconstruct a proprietary author that never really existed to
begin with. Likewise, contemporary appeals to authorship over user data in digital spaces
equally buys into those terms by trying to summon some image of a proprietary author
that supposedly once existed. It is a solution built out of the tangled discourse leftover
from commercial battles in 18th and 19th century courts. And it is the first of two legacy
codes that we need to overcome.

Legacy Code #2: Copyright and the Public Good
“Copyright is a limited proprietary entitlement through which the state
deliberately and selectively employs market institutions to support a
democratic civil society” –Neil Weinstock Netanel
A second legacy code built into our disciplinary discourse on copyright and
intellectual property is what I call the “public good” understanding of copyright. The
“public good” narrative, associated most notably with legal scholar and copyleft activist
Lawrence Lessig, maintains that the tightening of intellectual property laws since the
1980s is rooted in a misunderstanding of the original purpose of copyright. The original
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purpose of copyright, Lessig argues, is to work towards the public good. This narrative
has been at times embraced by composition and rhetoric scholars and at other times
merely referenced, but it has certainly become a major avenue through which copyleft
activists at large resist intellectual property. However, this narrative works from some
similar assumptions as the authorship legacy code, and it is ultimately caught in a
bourgeois understanding of property as, first, ownership of individual commodities, and
second, as an incentive system for innovation and as a necessity for the public good and
for a “democratic” (market) society. The effect of our engagement with this narrative is
that we struggle to imagine non-proprietary responses to more complex issues of data
ownership and user agency. We have instead doubled-down on the necessity of
intellectual property and therefore of market-based solutions to Web 2.0. We find
ourselves channeling bourgeois values out of a desire to protect writers, without
recognizing that it was through these values that the issues of Web 2.0 arrived to begin
with. And we misidentify the steps we need to take to reassert writer agency in Web 2.0.
To tell this story, we first need to understand the historical development that is the
American copyright tradition (ACT). The American copyright tradition, best outlined in
Peter Baldwin’s The Copyright Wars: Three Centuries of Trans-Atlantic Battle, is a set of
economic and cultural assumptions about the nature and purpose of intellectual property:
specifically, copyright. These assumptions, I argue, represent more than simply historical
and legal narratives for understanding intellectual property; they embody in them procapitalist values that tie the activity of writing to claims about the relation between the
free market and democracy. Sometimes called the Anglo-American copyright tradition,
ACT is a value system that argues that the purpose of copyright is to advance the public
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good and to ensure a democratic, lively, and expansive public domain. It does this by
creating a market for writing, by introducing copyright to establish the conditions for
proprietary ownership and thereby commodity exchange. Proponents of ACT assume that
achieving a democratic public sphere is best achieved, or can only be achieved, by first
establishing this marketplace of ideas. As former U.S. Register of Copyrights David Ladd
puts it, “the public is best served by regarding copyright as an instrument of property
operating in a free market economy” (qtd. in Brown 303). Only when writers become
proprietary owners, when audiences become markets, and when texts become
commodities, ACT argues, will writers be optimally motivated to produce quality literary
and rhetorical works. But conversely, too much copyright protection—too lengthy a
protected period, too much control granted to the author—hinders the transition of
written works into the public domain and thus stifles the open flows of information
needed for a democratic society.
This appeal to democracy is the distinguishing feature of the American copyright
system. In contrast to the European moral or author’s rights traditions, where authors are
revered as exceptional individuals and endowed with weighty and long-lasting aesthetic
control and economic ownership, the American tradition developed out of a commitment
to the idea of a public good. Texts are meant to flow, and copyright is meant to expire, so
that all works will eventually be made available to the public. Lunsford and West
describe this well: “the Anglo-American tradition has institutionalized limited rights for
writers and creators, aiming for a delicate balance between the public’s need for
information on the one hand, and, on the other, the nature and extent of the rights
necessary to induce creators to produce work” (388). In ACT, then, copyright becomes a

48

regulatory mechanism, a state-created market that purports to “balance” the rights of
copyright holders to make profit and the rights of the public to access cultural and
rhetorical works. Through copyright, writing becomes the site at which market and
democracy meet.
ACT emerges out of a curious mixture of two classical bourgeois values: on the
one hand a belief in the democratizing power of the market, and on the other a
commitment to free flows of information to sustain the prospect of that market in a
democratic society. These values have a long history that can be traced back to the
emergence of a capitalist class and a corresponding notion of a bourgeois public sphere.
As Habermas’ critical history shows us, the principles of free competition, commodity
exchange, and a free market promised to democratize society by eliminating the “extraeconomic agency” of “domination and coercion” characteristic of feudal society’s caste
structure (79). However, this promise relies on the assumption of a free flow of
information to sustain both the notion of a free market and a bourgeois public sphere. If a
few individuals possess by themselves outsize economic information, or if the public
sphere were only accessible to those who could buy written commodities, then the
democratic premise of both free market and public sphere breaks down. Hence, the
activity of writing (especially public-oriented and literary writing) in capitalism finds
itself at the site of a unique contradiction between the pressure to be commodified and
the pressure to circulate freely.
The predominant means of resolving this contradiction, in the American legal
tradition, has been to ignore it: to offer the spectacular argument that the most efficient
and most democratic way to circulate writing is to confine it via copyright. Ever faithful
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to the mystical powers of private property, American courts and lawmakers have time
and again pronounced their allegiance to Madison’s claim that “the public good fully
coincides . . . with the claims of individuals” (Madison Federalist Papers). In the 1954
U.S. Supreme Court case Mazer v. Stein, Justice William O. Douglas writes, “the
economic philosophy behind the [Constitutional Copyright] clause . . . is the conviction
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors.” Likewise, in the 1992
copyright case American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., Judge Jon O. Newmann
argues that “copyright law celebrates the profit motive, recognizing that the incentive to
profit from the exploitation of copyrights will redound to the public benefit by resulting
in the proliferation of knowledge . . . the profit motive is the engine that ensures the
progress of science.” And in her 2003 majority opinion in Eldred v. Ashcroft, Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg writes that “copyright law serves public ends by providing
individuals with an incentive to pursue private ones” (212). In the eyes of the U.S. legal
system, the confinement and commodification of writing under copyright actually
enhances circulation because it creates for authors a profit motive, and the profit motive
leads, on balance, to a greater public good. In short, for the U.S. legal system, American
copyright law is and has always been an attempt to exercise the logic of private property
onto the activity of writing.
In response to this property-oriented legal tradition, a growing “copyleft”
movement has emerged as the principle means of resisting intellectual property law in the
United States. A heterogenous collection of ideas and activists, copyleft looks generally
to protect a careful balance of copyright ownership, to preserve fair use, and to promote
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initiatives like Creative Commons and the GNU Public License in the face of ever more
restrictive intellectual property regimes. Crucial to many copyleft scholars and activists is
an understanding of copyright as informed by the public good; that is, the assertion that
the purpose of copyright is not to reward the author, but to advance the public good and
to ensure a democratic, lively, and expansive public domain. The public good argument is
usually advanced as a counternarrative to dominant legal interpretations of copyright as
overly fixated on the comparison to property rights at the expense of the public good.
Legal scholar and intellectual property activist Lawrence Lessig is a chief proponent of
the public good interpretation of copyright. In his books Free Culture and The Future of
Ideas, Lessig recognizes that copyright is meant to be a market mechanism for facilitating
textual production and circulation by creating economic incentives for writers. But, he
argues, the spirit of copyright law has nothing to do with the profit motive, and that
undue harm to the public good can come of excessively pursuing more and more rigid
copyright laws. To support this, he cites the famous copyright clause of the U.S.
Constitution:
Congress has the power to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries” (qtd. in Lessig 130).
Here, Lessig argues, the Constitution established copyright for a specific purpose— “to
promote the progress of science and useful arts”—and anticipated clear restrictions—“for
limited times.” The current state of copyright, with its erosions of fair use and its regular
extensions for the length of time copyright lasts, has violated this purpose; copyright law
has been inappropriately regulated (Free Culture 131). If we were to regulate the market
for writing appropriately, Lessig suggests, the public sphere and cultural commons would
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be better for it. Where the U.S. legal system reads in the Constitutional copyright clause a
celebration of the profit motive and the power of private property to advance the public
good, Lessig is less sure. He worries that copyright law will overly protect old industries
versus the new and in doing so create monopolies that stifle innovation and thereby
undermine the premise of a free market/free public sphere (The Future of Ideas 6). He
has in his mind a classically liberal idea of a free market, made up of a large number of
small-time property owners, none of which possess monopoly status.
Lessig’s “public good” interpretation of copyright has become a common theme
in scholarship on intellectual property and has been described by, and occasionally
embraced, by writing scholars. John Logie’s “A Copyleft Manifesto,” published in a
recent Kairos special issue on intellectual property, claims public benefit as the
“foundation” of U.S. copyright law, and argues that we need to “rebalance” copyright law
to “maximize the public’s centrality” (8). Lunsford and West argue in their keystone
article that the tradition of American intellectual property began out of an interest among
lawmakers to balance the rights of authors with the needs of the public. The U.S., they
claim, enjoys a “republic” tradition of copyright that views it only “as a means to a larger
public good” (389). And DeVoss and Porter, citing Siva Vaidyanathan’s claim that
copyright “was not intended to be a restrictive property right,” argue that copyright, when
applied appropriately, “serves society” by establishing a “set of guidelines” between
writers, readers, and publishers, the purpose of which is to strike a balance between
rewarding an author’s labor and ensuring the flow of information to a society (185).
While many writing scholars have expressed a desire for Lunsford’s notion of a ”new
rhetoric of authorship” that might get away from “owning” entirely (see DeVoss’
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“English Studies and Intellectual Property” or Reyman’s The Rhetoric of Intellectual
Property), in practice it has often been hard to separate the fight against intellectual
property encroachments from Lessig’s public good interpretation of copyright.
Part of the reason is that the public good interpretation of copyright and the
broader copyleft movement deserve real praise for their policy accomplishments. They
have defended the fair use exemptions that enable writing teachers and librarians to share
teaching materials without committing copyright infringements. They have also
dramatically expanded the public domain through Creative Commons and GNU Public
Licenses. We should not mistake, however, Lessig’s wariness of strong copyright law
with criticism of the private property commitments that undergird copyright law. As he
himself puts it, “to question assumptions about the scope of ‘property’ is not to question
property. I am fanatically pro-market, in the market’s proper sphere . . . Instead, the real
struggle at stake now is between old and new (6). In other words, where Lessig disagrees
with the dominant legal approach to subsuming writing as property, he does not question
the necessity for property itself; he simply has a more restrained approach that draws
from a different understanding of how innovation works. This is perhaps why, in The
Future of Ideas, Lessig’s suggestions for an “alternative” approach to copyright law are
not very different from how they exist now: instead of copyright lasting the life of the
author plus 70 years, Lessig calls for five-year renewable terms for up to 75 years total
(251).
The public good interpretation of copyright, then, does not seek to challenge the
assumption that propertizing writing leads to the public good, but rather suggests a less
expansive version of writing as property. The divide between Lessig’s “public good”
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interpretation of copyright and the dominant U.S. legal tradition’s “public good”
interpretation of private property, then, is not a matter of “public good vs. property,” but
rather two different theories of innovation that are both grounded in the assumption that
writing must be property (i.e. “strong” vs “weak” copyright law). The divide between the
public good interpretation of copyright and the public good interpretation of private
property is an expression of Habermas’ contradiction, where both sides assume the need
to prepare the commodification of writing through copyright but disagree on the
“balance” of property that will lead to the most innovation. In either interpretation, the
larger market system and the property assumptions undergirding it remain unquestioned.
The public good interpretation of copyright, even as it promises a more democratic and
public-oriented economy of writing, remains committed to the property logics that have
troubled writing scholars, albeit in slightly ameliorated form.
This becomes a problem for writing scholars because it warps how we understand
issues of ownership. Copyright in U.S. was built, maintained, and expanded through the
larger logics of private property. It is predicated on the assumption that private ownership
of texts produces wider social value, increases textual circulation, and enhances the
public good. We cannot defend copyright without also, intentionally or otherwise,
defending the institution of private property. When we defend copyright, when we
engage with ACT, we end up channeling ACT’s assumption that the contradiction
between individual ownership and free flows of information can be overcome by
copyright; that the commodification of writing will at once reward authors and advance
the public good. We’re stuck in bourgeois values that link the possibility of democracy to
a market society and to the commodification of writing. And when issues of ownership
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arise, we have difficulty imagining nonproprietary solutions; we debate over and again
how strong or how weak property should be, or we try to avoid the question of property
by pretending that copyright is not a form of property, but we never question property
itself. Even the “critics” of this system limit their dissent to a disagreement over how to
best enact private property for writing—the broader framework of a market system
remains unquestioned.
This might be perfectly acceptable if the vision of a careful balance between
rewarding authors and allowing texts to circulate through the public domain could
actually be achieved. After all, writers need to make a living, too, and there are real costs
to publishing that can be borne by the exclusive licensing that comes with copyright. But
in practice this vision is not possible because it derives from an understanding of the
nature of property that assumes, like our authorship legacy code, that copyright protects
authors. That is, embedded within this framework is not just a rationale for what private
property does, but also a theory of what property is. In the debate between Lessig’s
public good interpretation of copyright and the dominant U.S. legal system’s public good
interpretation of private property, property is represented as the ownership of texts, or
individual commodities. To operate within the terms of this argument is to understand
problems of ownership as having to do with the author’s relationship to texts rather than
the author’s relationship to publishers or platforms. And when we define problems of
ownership this way, we are left with solutions that can only reinterpret the relation
between writer and text, or text and public.
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John Locke and the Economic Premise of Our Legacy Code
“There [exists] no property more peculiarly man’s own than that which is
produced by the labour of his mind.”
–Preamble to the Massachusetts Copyright Act of 1783.
So far, I have identified two legacy codes that I think get in the way of our ability
to understand contemporary property relations on the web. The first—author-talk—pins
the development of intellectual property law to the cultural myth of the author rather than
to publishing firms and booksellers. The second—the public good argument—similarly
describes copyright as an institution dedicated at least in part to rewarding authors in the
interest of furthering the public good. What links these two narratives is a shared
assumption: that property is about the ownership of texts as individual commodities. This
assumption is economic in nature and has its origin in the political philosophy of John
Locke. Locke presents his theory of property in the Second Treatise of Two Treatises of
Government. Published anonymously in 1689, the Treatises were a major refutation of
the tenets of feudal Europe, including the divine right and the notion of an absolute
monarch. In his chapter on property, Locke wonders: if God gave the world to mankind
in common (and not to Adam and his monarchal heirs), how is it that some men come to
have property which is definitively “theirs”? The answer he proposes amounts to what
may be called a labor theory of property:
Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every
man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself.
The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his.
Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it
in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and
thereby makes it his property. 111
For Locke, the foundation of property lies in the body; each man, as Locke says, has a
right to his own person. Labor is the act of applying the body to a commonly owned and
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unshaped nature, whether it be land, material good, or otherwise. Through this process
the entity in question becomes “mixed” with labor, removed from the commons, and
transformed into property. He extends this claim ahistorically across time and space
applying for the “first peopling of the world” through Cain and Abel and for the
American Indian as a “law of reason” or “original law of nature” (112-116).
Here, as Amy Wendling notes, Locke is very much settler-colonial; he has in
mind a notion of nature as belonging to no one, a gift waiting to be claimed (Wendling
30). He continually references the Americas as a largely uninhabited land, an expanse so
vast that no prejudice could possibly emerge from the existence of property, since there is
always enough land for those who exist and those who were “yet unprovided” (Locke
113). Frontier ideology and the colonial relation between Europeans and the indigenous
peoples of the Americas becomes very much a part of his theory of property. But for his
time, Locke was also a revolutionary figure. His description of property as a right
emerging from labor directly challenged the feudal understanding of property as a matter
of birth and heritage. As Wendling argues, Locke upends this logic, repositioning “feudal
relations as ‘artificial’ and the laboring subject as ‘natural.’ By appealing to nature,
Locke tries to reverse the power roles traditionally scripted by the performance or
nonperformance of labor” (30).
The Lockean model of property quietly found its home in descriptions of writing
in Web 1.0. These early days of the web were characterized by a frontier vision of
cyberspace and an amateur, code-it-yourself, design-it-yourself culture (Barlow,
Papacharissi). Individuals who might otherwise not be heard were able to create web
pages to be read by anyone, without needing to go through corporate media’s
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broadcasting and publishing channels. For some, this image of the web as an unowned
commons, a frontier without boundaries, and a space of infinite links and infinite
possibilities, emerged out of a heartfelt desire to get away from a world where writing is
property. It was hoped that the web would be a space that copyright could not enter, a
cultural commons where texts would be shared equally and where we could somehow get
Locke’s “frontier” without the notions of property that came with it. But it turns out that
changes in technologies of writing do not in themselves challenge capitalist economies of
writing. The “frontier” never really happened.
What did happen is that, first, copyright followed writers into digital spaces, and
second, those spaces themselves became proprietary in ways that we are still learning to
grapple with. At first, as the production of web pages grew more complex and
intermediary sponsors became more influential, digital writing scholars lamented the loss
of a user-driven production culture (Arola, Barton). Over time, however, the emergence
of social media platforms and learning management systems has demanded we rethink
digital writing in the context of ownership. In an article from the recent special issue in
Kairos on ownership, authorship, and copyright, Amidon et al. begin by noting that
writing now often takes place on digital platforms that “blur the tidy boundaries that have
separated writers from readers, content from data, even human author from machine.” In
an educational context especially, students and faculty often compose through or with
plagiarism detection services and learning management systems, and many writing
assignments now involve some engagement with social media platforms, forums, blogs,
wikis, etc. However, on these platforms, Amidon et al. argue, students are rarely afforded
authorial rights over the range of their textual contributions. Because students are not
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often given the choice over whether to engage with educational platforms, or over what
the terms of those engagement might be, they enter into asymmetrical and coercive
relations in which much of what they produce is claimed by the platform. This problem is
amplified by the fact that students may not always be aware of the range of their textual
productions; as Amidon et al. observe, much of what they contribute is “invisible” to
them, making it difficult for them to claim authorship of what they do not know they
wrote. Altogether, the authors draw attention to the way educational platforms mediate
and appropriate the textual productions of students.
The article struggles, however, is in its identification of the problem. Amidon et
al. portray issues of ownership primarily as a problem of unrecognized authorship.
Students are not being treated as authors, and are thus not being given the option to claim
copyright for their contributions (even when they know the full extent of those
contributions). As Amidon et al. put it:
Educational platforms that are commonly used for learning and teaching do not
facilitate or allow for student authors to exert ownership and control over their
own contributions. Where the law defines students' legal status as authors in the
same way that it does for any other authors, their authorial rights are often
unacknowledged in educational settings, exposing their intellectual products to
manipulation or misappropriation.
This nonrecognition of authorship, it is suggested, is a violation both of their rights as
student writers and of their rights as authors who are accorded ownership of their work
by copyright law.
On the one hand, then, Amidon et al. recognize the increasing role of the platform
as an intermediary between writer and public, as the proprietary system through which
we now compose. On the other hand, in describing the problem as a misrecognition of
authorship and a denial of students’ rights to copyright, they are invoking that Lockean
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sense of property as a natural reward for labor. The trouble here is that we are still
thinking through Locke, still hoping to retain agency by rediscovering the fable of
frontier labor, here couched in the figure of the author. But the author will get us
nowhere; it mystifies rather than explains the relationship between writer and platform. It
is the legacy code of an earlier economy of writing. In the same way that political
economy can never return to the mythical depiction of an “unowned” commons in Locke,
writing studies post-Web 2.0 will never return to an unmediated digital scene without
platforms.

Moving Forward
I opened this chapter by noting that composition and rhetoric has had an
ambivalent relationship to copyright and intellectual property law. Many writing and
intellectual property scholars want very much to advocate for the agency of writers, and
we have historically lobbied against the propertization of writing as a process that hurts
both writers and publics. Yet, at the same time, it has been difficult for writing scholars to
truly let go of the proprietary author, as shown by contemporary appeals to secure
authorial ownership of user data. As I have argued here, I believe this ambivalence is
rooted in an economic assumption: that property refers to the ownership of texts by
authors. This assumption manifests itself in our appeals to the “public good” of copyright
and in our attempts to retheorize authorship so as to rebalance the scale of ownership
between authors and publics.
This assumption is false. It derives from a Lockean political philosophy that
grossly decontextualizes the property relations that actually-existing writers are in. It
steers us needlessly close to the “private property as public good” American legal
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tradition. It distracts us from the fact that authors, writers, and creators have never really
been the primary benefactors of intellectual property law; rather, intellectual property law
serves corporate actors like Elsevier and Disney. But my goal here has not been just to
point out the false assumptions of old legacy code; my goal is to work towards a
satisfying framework for agency.
To that end, the argument of this chapter goes something like this: private
property is not the answer to the problems of agency in Web 2.0. It was never friendly to
writers before Web 2.0. If we are going to solve the problems of Web 2.0 and
information capitalism—appropriation of user data, writers’ disenfranchisement and lack
of access to the full capacities of the digital technologies through which they write—then
we need to find solutions that challenge private property, not appeal to it. We need to
think bigger.
In order to do that, we need to better understand the property dynamics that face
writers on the web today. Locke’s theory of property doesn’t work—so what does? What
other theories of property exist in the world, and how can we apply them to Web 2.0 to
find more meaningful solutions the problem of agency? In my next chapter, I explore
these questions in the hopes of better understanding how writers can make a space for
themselves in response to Web 2.0’s digital platforms.

61

CHAPTER 3
FINDING AGENCY IN THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION

Taking Stock
So far, my argument has been destabilizing. I have shown why we cannot locate
agency in authorial ownership of texts; that is, we cannot attempt to increase the control
writers have over textual production and circulation by appealing to their right to
individually own their textual productions. Any attempt to do so necessitates a reliance
on private property institutions—copyright—and private property rhetorics—the profit
motive, authorship—that commodify our public spheres and ultimately undermine the
autonomy and agency of writers. These institutions & rhetorics are built not for writers
but for those who circulate writing and profit from it. This move away from authorial
appears is a disorienting one for writing studies, which has historically valued authorial
agency, especially now in the face of a digital environment that seems to take away
writers’ ownership of their textual productions. If we cannot argue for an individual
writer’s ability to own their texts, then how can we find a meaningful response to Web
2.0? How do we address, as Amidon et al. put it, “the imbalance of control and agency
over users’ contributions”?
In this chapter, I argue for relocating agency in ownership of the means of
production. By means of production, I mean the infrastructure, facilities, and machinery
necessary for generating textual productions in Web 2.0. Shifting attention away from the
ownership of texts and towards ownership of the means of production allows us at once
to identify private property as the governing logic across issues of ownership, from
copyright to big data, while positioning us to challenge, and not draw from, that logic. In
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order to assess what agency might mean in Web 2.0, and to challenge the propertization
of writing, however, we need to first understand what property is and how it is related to
the means of production. This chapter draws on classical and contemporary political
economists to arrive at a critical theory of property that best describes the property
dynamics of Web 2.0 and that offers us new avenues of resistance. Property, as I will
show, is a social mechanism for dividing the world into hierarchical economic classes in
which one class appropriates the labor of another and then uses state violence (or the
threat of state violence) to protect inequalities in wealth and resources. Writing studies
scholars and teachers interested in asserting the agency of writers in digital environments
must learn to identify and challenge property in the context of an information capitalism
that brings the operative logics of property onto more and more rhetorical acts. I will
explore what it means to challenge property below and in subsequent chapters, but it
involves learning what it would mean for writers to own the means of production in
digital spaces, and to take the technical, organizational, and rhetorical steps needed to
assert that ownership. To make that argument, I first need to explain why we need to turn
to the means of production. To do that, I need to turn back to property.

Adam Smith and Why the Means of Production Matter
Part of the challenge in addressing issues of textual ownership is that we have not
yet changed how we understand property to match how it actually affects writers today.
Property today is not simply a commodity that an individual produces and owns, and the
problems of ownership facing writing today do not stem from an incorrect prevailing
cultural theory of authorship, nor from a misunderstanding or misapplication of copyright
law. Rather, problems of ownership have to do with the uneven relation between a writer
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and a sponsoring—and usually corporate—platform. When a student writer submits their
work to Turnitin, they also submit their rights to exclusive ownership of their writing.
When a user of social media participates on a platform like Facebook (and, increasingly
when they simply scroll the web without visiting Facebook) the data they produce is
extracted and claimed by the platform they are using to speak. In order to participate in
public spheres, or to meet the literacy conditions set by universities or by professors
teaching writing, writers increasingly find they must concede ownership of what they
produce. Hence, in Web 2.0, writing now more often occurs in conditions of alreadyestablished property relations. That is, we write using someone else’s materials, on
someone else’s platform, drawing from and using the circulatory infrastructure created by
others. These spaces are owned by others, who exert proprietary control over our
productions. Consequently, our understanding of property and of writing’s embeddedness
in economic systems and property relations needs to change; we need to recognize and
name these infrastructures as the means of production, as the sites through which issues
of ownership congeal.
To demonstrate this, we need to get away from John Locke, but not away from
political economy. It has become clear that our disciplinary theories of ownership and
authorship contain within them an account of what property is and what its function is in
a democratic society. If that account of property is in fact undermining the agency of
writers on the Web, then we need new accounts of property; that is, we need to turn to
other theories of political economy. Doing so allows us to see how Web 2.0 writers might
exert agency over their textual productions without appealing to intellectual property,
bourgeois values, or settler-colonial ideology instead. As Victor Villanueva puts it, “the
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role of rhetoric, according to Burke, is the demystification of the ideological. The role of
political economy is the demystification of relations tied to the economic. If we’re to
understand where we are and what is happening to us—and maybe even to affect it—we
need the tools provided by both” (58).
The political economic theorist who is perhaps most useful to begin with here is
Adam Smith. In The Wealth of Nations, published in 1776, Smith complicates Locke’s
understanding of the “unowned nature” condition in which labor occurs. He agrees with
Locke that “in that original state of things” the result of labor onto unowned nature
belongs completely to the laborer (30). But he notes that this rarely occurs; more often,
labor takes place in conditions of already accumulated property, as people work on the
land and with the tools owned by others. The owners of these spaces and tools exert
proprietary claims. As Smith puts it, “as soon as land becomes private property, the
landlord demands a share of almost all the produce which the labourer can either raise or
collect from it (56). Property thus shifts from a recognition of labor in an unowned,
ecological commons to a mechanism for capturing the labor of others and appropriating
it as one’s own. That is, property becomes upon first appearance the opposite of what it
was originally “intended” to be. This recognition creates a major problem for political
economy because it questions the holistic sense of property found in Locke’s formula. To
what extent does the result of labor belong as property to the laborer, and to what extent
does it belong to the owner of the tools, land, and capital? Smith “solves” (or more
accurately, deflects) this question by suggesting that the wage is the return, guaranteed to
the laborers, for their contributions. But, he argues, the result of labor, or the material
product created, belongs to the owner of the tools, land, and capital.
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Smith offers a starting point for understanding how the contemporary digital
platform positions writing. We now produce in other people’s already established
proprietary spaces, through which they can appropriate any textual production. Data and
writing—whether it be a course teachers develop through a university CMS, software
created on company computers, essays students write and submit to Turnitin, or
responses and posts we write on social media platforms—all of this data is written and
stored in someone else’s space, and thus subject to a property claim that alienates writers
from the value of their textual productions. In other words, writing, data, text, all become
assignable; the terms of use agreements on these platforms become comparable to a
worker’s contract, a document that sets the wage rate and the terms through which value
is appropriated by the proprietor. At present the parallel to Smith’s return to labor, the
wage, does not exist, and executives of Web 2.0 companies will suggest that the reward
for our data is the social networking offered by the platforms we use to write on: the
public sphere itself. This is disputable. But my point here is that the essential nature of
property in capitalism—its function as a mechanism for capturing labor rather than for
rewarding it—finds itself expressed through Web 2.0, and ultimately defines the relation
between writer and platform.
We can look to Facebook’s policy on ownership for an example. Facebook claims
that users own any content they create and share on Facebook. But it also claims a “nonexclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, and worldwide license to host, use,
distribute, modify, run, copy, publicly perform or display, translate, and create derivative
works of your content”—in effect rendering our ownership rights moot (Facebook). More
importantly, built into the Facebook Terms of Service is the assumption that Facebook
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will track, store, and own data that users create as part of their rhetorical activity and
participation in digital writing publics. As the owner of the interface through which we
input data, of the algorithms that process our data, and of the data servers that store our
data, Facebook is the only actor in a position to collect and realize the value of data.
Hence Facebook in effect appropriates and owns our data in any meaningful economic
sense. As Smith would say, they own the tools of production through which a great deal
of web writing now occurs, and they thereby appropriate the results.
Writing scholars have until now only sporadically had to contend with these kinds
of proprietary relations. Historically, our disciplinary imaginary is rooted in a classroom
essay-writing context, where third parties who might own our texts seem far away (even
when they are not actually far away). As a result, we remain within what I am loosely
calling a Lockean, industrial capitalism understanding of writing economies, where
writing is produced by authorial writers (or small groups of writers) who then claim
ownership of a text. But with the now near ubiquitous spread of corporate digital
platforms like Facebook, Turnitin, Google, and Blackboard, combined with the scale of
planetary computation and data storage and processing power, writers now find that they
must engage with the proprietary tools of others to write, to participate in public spheres,
and to pursue literacy education. And when they do, they discover that they no longer
own what they produced: that it has been claimed by the owners of the platform. This is a
new economy of writing—what I call information capitalism—that requires a disciplinary
reevaluation of our relation to property, to authorship, and to capital.
Writers, however, have long operated in conditions of already-accumulated
property. Technical and professional writers find their work appropriated by their

67

employer; universities demand cuts of their faculty’s intellectual property earnings;
novelists assign ownership of their work to publishers for use of their production and
circulation infrastructure. For these writers, intellectual property has never been simply a
“bad metaphor,” as some intellectual property scholars suggest; it has always been a very
real and very material form of property. The conditions set by Web 2.0 are not new. What
is new is the scale of this condition. Where before the property relationship described by
Smith only applied to specialized, professional writers of one sort or another, in Web 2.0
this relationship is extended to everyday writing, to writers who are talking about their
day, or discussing among friends the latest political debate. Indeed, to the extent that the
platform—its record-keeping and computational power—becomes more and more a
regular part of our daily life, everyday writing and rhetorical activity become capturable
as property.
Smith, then, takes us on the first step towards a more critical and social theory of
property. The lesson of Smith is not to appeal to the rights of workers to own the
commodities they make, but to shift our focus away from the ownership of commodities
and towards the ownership of the land, tools, machinery, etc. through which commodities
are produced. As writing teachers, we need to get away from trying to individualize and
assign data contributions to particular users—the legacy of American copyright—and
start thinking about ownership of the digitally networked platform, because it is there that
textual circulation and production occurs and issues of ownership congeal. To do that, we
need a theory for why and how agency resides in the platform (or, why the potential for
agency exists in user ownership of the platform).
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Digital rhetoric’s accounts of agency in the past five or ten years have
documented the growing rhetorical power of platforms in our lives and in our felt sense
of agency. Drawing from scholars like Gries and Edbauer, digital rhetoricians turned to
theories of distributed or ecological agencies in response to an increasingly complex
digital world that seems to subsume the writer under a technical stack of platforms,
algorithms, and software. In a recent Present Tense special issue on the rhetoric of
platforms, editors Edwards and Gelms describe the powerful role that digital platforms
now have on rhetorical activity. As they put it, platforms act as “rhetorical forces in the
world,” as “infrastructures that host and shape the production and circulation of media
content.” Writing on the rhetorical power of algorithms, Reyman suggests that “human
and machine are indistinct in the performance of rhetorical acts online; digital rhetoric
relies on human intentional choice contiguous with algorithms that carry out
computational processes” (“The Rhetorical Agency of Algorithms” 122). Beck likewise
weighs the implications of assigning agency to non-human objects like algorithms.
Agency, she argues, is built first into the encoding act of the programmer, but once
executed the algorithm becomes what she calls a “quasi-agent,” a force that at once
carries human action but also “go[es] deeper than agency and cut[s] at persuasive
design.” And Hocutt, drawing on Rice’s notion of agency as “a matter of complex
aggregation,” positions agency in the “ecologically shared enactments . . . that emerge in
online search, combining programmer encoding, computational procedures, algorithmic
matches, and user activities.” In all, contemporary scholarship on agency in digital
rhetoric has catalogued the writers’ felt dispersal of agency as writing becomes embedded
in layers of platforms, algorithms, and software.
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To these insights I would add one more. Given that the Web 2.0 platform, the
code that underlies its workings and interface, and the data servers it relies upon are all
proprietary (that is, owned by others), our understanding of agency must account for the
economic role that these digital actants play in appropriating the value of writers’
rhetorical activities. That is, agency is caught up in not just the human/nonhuman
assemblage but also in the economic and proprietary relations that organize and direct
interactions between human and nonhuman objects. From this perspective, agency is not
so much dispersed in an assemblage of nonhuman digital objects as it is concentrated in
the ownership of the digital technologies that mediate our relationship to texts and to each
other. In other words, when the web becomes centralized—when control over its design,
its value, and its functions become centralized—then at least a part of agency, too,
becomes centralized. The challenge for writers and writing scholars, in my view, is
finding ways to challenge private ownership and the concentration of power in platform
and software technologies.
This is where Adam Smith’s framework of property begins to fail us. Smith is not
interested in offering a theory of agency; he thinks of the relation between worker and the
owner of tools as a kind of economic transaction, in which the goal is not so much to give
workers more control over the production and distribution processes in which they work,
but to understand what a “fair deal” might be in terms of a return on their work. At best
we might say that agency for Smith is located in the wage, in negotiating for an
equivalent return on the value of the contribution of one’s labor. We see contemporary
expressions of Smith when academic writers, Silicon Valley moguls, or politicians call
for a wage return from Facebook (see Fuchs “Labor in Informational Capitalism”;
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Hughes). But rhetorical agency is not the same as economic equivalency. We need a
different political economist—Marx—to get us to agency.

Marx, Class, and Value
Marx takes Smith’s social, rather than individual, understanding of property as a
means of appropriating the labor of others and develops this analysis into a framework
for agency. The Marxian framework for agency introduces two considerations: class and
value. Together they lead us to a model of agency that is useful to those whose work is
appropriated as property by the owners of the means of production. In this section, I will
arrive at this model of agency, which is a model in response to property relations rather
than relations involving writing. In the next section, I will show how to take Marx’s
model and apply it to contemporary digital writing.
In Capital and in The Communist Manifesto, Marx argues that private ownership
of the land, tools, machinery, etc.—what he calls the means of production—creates a set
of relations between those who own and those who don’t, those who labor and those who
appropriate labor. He calls this set of relations class, and he was particularly interested in
two classes he saw as central to the emergent form of industrial capitalism of his time: the
bourgeoisie, who own the factories, harbors, financial capital, etc., and the proletariat,
who own nothing but their labor-power, and so must sell this commodity to survive. The
proletariat and bourgeoisie exist in a state of contradiction, or conflict; the bourgeoisie
seeks to increase the rate of exploitation, or the amount of unpaid labor they appropriate
against the amount of wages paid, and the proletariat seeks to decrease it.
Class becomes crucial to understanding how property functions. Property enables
the bourgeoisie to privately own the means of production and thereby appropriate the
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labor of others. It functions as a means of defending structural wealth inequalities through
state violence (or the threat of state violence), where the state becomes an instrument of
class power whose primary function is to protect the institution of private property. This
relationship reproduces itself endlessly; because the proletariat must labor just to live,
they are enmeshed in an asymmetrical class relationship and compelled to the wage
relation, even though the wage relation is what keeps them from realizing the full value
of their labor.
What defines a class, in the Marxian framework, is a shared relationship to the
means of production and a shared position in the chain of value. Value is a notoriously
difficult term, and it is not my goal here to cover the many iterations of value theory in
Marxist and economic thought. But it’s necessary to talk about value if we are to really
account for the inequities writers face in Web 2.0. Value as a theoretical category
emerged out of political economy (and, originally, from Aristotle) as a way to try to
account for why some commodities are worth more than others, e.g. why commodity X
can be exchanged at a two-to-one rate for commodity Y. Part of the point of a theory of
value is to suspend local considerations of price, as the price of a commodity can vary
enormously for all sorts of circumstantial and trivial reasons (e.g., a person may really
like the color purple and spends more on purple items, or someone goes to the grocery
store hungry and buys more than they need). Value, in classical political economy, does
not care about local fluctuations and reasons but tries to account for why the average cost
of one commodity, across thousands of transactions in many different places, is higher
than it is for another commodity. One of the principles tasks of political economy has
been to try to answer: what is the source of value? What makes something worth more?
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Marx argued that the answer to that question is social in nature, and in Capital he
set about trying to capture and extrapolate the logic of valuation that was emergent in
certain industrial parts of the 19th century European capitalist economies. He ultimately
arrived at the famous labor theory of value. In a capitalist economy, when all labor
increasingly becomes wage-labor and all products of labor become a commodity, Marx
argued, the source of value is labor. The proletariat labors, and through that labor
produces value. That value takes material form in the commodity, which is appropriated
by the bourgeoisie, moved to market, sold and transformed into money, and either
pocketed by the owner of the factory or reinvested into new capital, new machinery, and
new funds to buy labor. This process makes up the value-chain; an elaborate (but also
fairly simple) economic system in which private ownership of the means of production
enables a small few to become wealthy off of the labor of others. 5

There are two ways to draw implications for agency from Marx’s descriptions of

class and the value-chain: one narrow and one broad. A narrow implication for agency
might see the value-chain as a kind of economic injustice, where workers are producing
the wealth of society but are not enjoying the full benefits of their labor. They get a
portion of the economic value they produce through a wage, and this may be just enough
to live off of (maybe), but the rest is taken by the ruling class. This is a kind of labororiented injustice, a social process founded essentially on theft. Fredric Jameson

I am simplifying this history a bit here. In truth, Marx’s labor theory of value was at
least partially if not fully formulated by Smith and Ricardo. And there have been many
additions and transformations of the labor theory of value since Marx, most notably the
Wages for Housework movement and the feminist critique of the role of domestic labor
in classical value theory. I am simplifying to get to my point quicker, but I thought them
important enough (to me) to note.

5
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describes this as a particular form of alienation, in which the worker “alienate[s] [their]
own production by producing it as separate from [themself] in the first place, so that it
comes before [them] as a properly alien object and force” (131). It disempowers workers
economically; a more just world, then, would return to workers the full value of what
they produce. Agency within an economic system is expressed in the struggle to reclaim
the value that workers produce.
Marx, though, often had a broader view of alienation that I think is useful for
writing scholars and teachers to consider. Labor, like writing, is a world-building activity.
In a society in which the means of production are privately owned, the workers who labor
in those sites are not just alienated from the value of their labor, or from the commodities
they create, but also from the means of producing the world. Through labor, workers
make and remake the world of commodities, the social relations embedded in those
commodities, and the social, technological, environmental, and economic relations that
make up the production process. However, the world they make is mediated by private
ownership of the means of production, and by the terms set by the ruling class. What
happens is that workers make a world not for themselves, but for the ruling class, where
the means of production are primarily used for the purposes of benefiting the ruling class
and its profit rather than for social good. 6

The ruling class is fond of burying this class relationship through the abstract metaphor
of “the market.” Since, in the long run, members of the ruling class remain members of
the ruling class only so long as they perform their self as capital embodied (that is, so
long as they continually reinvest their capital to accrue more value, continually pursue
more ownership of the means of production, continually grow, etc.), they are wont to
think that they, too, have no agency; that the whole of social existence is defined by the
natural and unbeatable laws of the “market.” It just so happens that the market benefits
them over others—a point that leads to a range of ideological justifications.
6
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This shift represents not just an economic injustice, but also a change in the
subjectivity of the worker, in the capacities and literacies they use on a daily basis, and in
the worker’s relationship to social power. Amy Wendling describes this as “technological
alienation,” or “a situation in which the practical life activity of the vast majority of
human beings is undertaken as labor on machines that they neither own nor understand.
Such labor is characterized by the reduction of the worker to an extremely partial use of
his or her faculties” (56). What happens is that agency as a critical category, for these
workers, becomes tied to their position in the value-chain and to their alienation from
what they produce and from the means of production. While we can still talk about the
agency of a particular worker in their daily efforts to live life and negotiate the
circumstances and institutions around them, that agency is necessarily tied to the agency
of workers as a class. Efforts to advocate for and increase the agency of workers cannot
neglect the class character of agency, or the structural context in which labor occurs.
Marx’s solution to the question of agency was to intensify class conflict so as to
end it. He advocated collective, or social, ownership over the means of production—not
individual ownership of individual commodities. Agency for Marx was tied to the
revolutionary end of private property; to seize the means of production was at once the
climactic expression of agency by workers and the beginning of their agency, as now
they could democratically make and share the world on their terms. Incorporating class
into a definition of property thus invites a theory of agency, or perhaps a direction for
agency: the resolution of class conflict, the prospect of shared ownership and the end of
property.
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Ultimately, then, what Marx gets us is a theory of property that redefines what
agency means in economic systems. He does this by spelling out some of the social
implications of Smith’s theorizing of the means of production. A privately owned means
of production means that society is organized around class, where class refers to
differently positioned actors in the chain of value. In the conjuncture from which Marx
writes, the proletariat class labors to create value, and that value flows to a ruling
bourgeois class that owns the means of production. We end up with a society where
workers are making someone else’s world, or a world in someone else’s image. The path
to agency is for the working class to engage in class struggle and change the relations of
production: to overcome property.

McKenzie Wark and Web 2.0 Information Capitalism
The trouble with Marx, of course, is that he is quite dated. Like all of us, he is a
thinker of his time, and his time was 19th century European industrial capitalism. He has
little to say about writers, the economic role of writing, and the role of information in the
capitalism either of his day or of ours. What’s more, the capitalism of his time—
characterized by large factories, a newly created proletariat class, and an economy
peculiarly occupied by the production of physical material goods—looks very different
from the capitalism of our time. The industrial proletariat and the bourgeoisie don’t seem
to mean the same thing or have the same social roles as they once did. While the world is
still full of factories, located mostly in the Global South, other types of information and
service-related industries have emerged that muddle or eclipse the narrative of factory
work as central to an economy. To put it simply, the world looks and feels very different
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than it did some 150-200 years ago, and the description of capitalism that Marx gave in
Capital in some ways seems far away from the lives of writers and writing scholars.
However, we can still learn about what agency for writers in economic contexts
looks like from Marx’s theory of property, and from the social relations (especially class)
that emerge from his description of property. While the particular actors and
characteristics of the class society of his time have evolved, Marx’s theory of property
provides a framework for reading the dynamics of writing in information capitalism. He
ultimately gives us a useful model for figuring out what a theory of agency in relation to
the platform might look like. If we understand property the way Marx does, then we can
read the platform as inaugurating a new form of the means of production. The platform as
an institutional intermediary becomes the tool, land, machinery, etc. necessary for
writing, for education, and for and engaging with public spheres in Web 2.0. Our task
then becomes learning to describe the emergent class relationships that the platform as a
means of production inaugurates.
To do that, I turn to one final political economist: contemporary Marxist and trans
media scholar McKenzie Wark. In her books A Hacker Manifesto and in Capital is Dead,
Wark takes up the peculiar phenomena of “intellectual” property and the changing role of
information twenty-first century economies. Drawing from Marxist and Situationalist
theory, she argues that information and writing have become a third stage in the historical
development of the property-form as it moves to encompass first land, then capital, and
finally information (A Hacker Manifesto 18). Each successive stage subsumes a greater
portion of the world to the property-form even as that form becomes more abstract, as
property loses first its fixity in space and then its fixity in a particular object (33).
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As the property-form changes and new kinds of activity become subject to
property, Wark argues, new class relations develop between those who create information
and those who own it. As such, a new class dynamic has emerged around the production
of information, a struggle between what Wark calls “hackers” against “vectoralists.” A
hacker in Wark’s terminology has nothing to do with password cracking, but rather refers
to anyone who produces intellectual property: writers, software engineers, musicians,
scientists, graphic designers etc. However, while hackers may produce intellectual
property, they rarely enjoy the benefits of it. As an exploited and producing class, hackers
have built-in solidarities to other exploited classes—tenants and workers—in that they
share similar roles in the value-chain, even though their exploitation revolves around a
different material form of property. A major difference is that hackers produce an
object—information—that today is trivial to copy and reproduce. Unlike physical
commodities or land, which are limited in supply by material constraints, information is
abstract; hence, Wark notes, its scarcity must be manufactured by ever expanding legal
(intellectual property law) and technical (DMCA) means (79). The result is that the
hacker’s role is to “produce difference out of sameness,” or to weave through existing
informational works and create something new enough to be recognized as intellectual
property (Capital is Dead 33).
Hackers are in a constant struggle against what Wark calls the dominant ruling
class of our time—vectoralists. She describes vectoralists as those who own and control
the vectors through which information travels and through which it is produced,
processed, and distributed. As an abstract term, the “vector” is Wark’s way of describing
the variety of intermediary and proprietary writing technologies that function as a means

78

of production for information capitalism, including software, data servers, network
infrastructures, patents, fiber-optic cables, and media firms. These spaces are owned by a
kind of digital-technical ruling class that has found power by channeling writing through
proprietary mediation. The vectoralist class, like any ruling class, is not wholly unified,
and we see the material results of its internal struggles in legal battles between, for
example, the media content industry (music studios, Disney) and tech/data companies
(Google, Facebook). Tech companies sometimes seek to reduce the scope of intellectual
property law over content so as to increase the circulation of writing and generate more
data (see, for example, the Google Books copyright war). But as a class, vectoralists are
united in their role as appropriators of value. In their relationship to the vectoralist,
hackers (writers) find that they rarely control the value of the information they produce.
As Wark says, “You make the information, but like some kind of info-prole, you don’t
own the information you produce or the means of realizing its value. You don’t get to
benefit from its predictive power, although you will likely suffer the downside when
those predictions prove spurious” (4).
Wark’s depiction of a “hacker” class, formulated first in 2004, can today seem
somewhat narrow and formal. It focuses especially on professional writers and
intellectual property creators (software engineers, artists) of one sort or another who are
in some kind of proprietary relation vis a vis their employer and their intellectual
productions. It predates the development of Web 2.0 and the extension of proprietary
relations to “everyday” writers who are just writing on social media or through
educational platforms. With respect to writing itself, the property relation between user
and Web 2.0 platform represents a development in terms of the efficiency and ambition
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of informational property. Formal, copyrighted works—what we typically call
“intellectual property”—can now be read as an early and limited effort to incorporate
writing into the property-form. The effort is early and limited because it largely only
applies to full, formally copyrighted works that can be bound and sold as print
commodities. But the platform captures much more; by combining planetary-scale
computation with a vectoral monopoly, Web 2.0 platforms are able to appropriate a far
wider range of everyday writing and rhetorical activities. What was once before
considered non-commodifiable noise becomes a productive and valuable commodity, the
“oil” of the internet, as it is often said. On the one hand this is cause for appreciation, as
capitalism has found a new and productive way to fuse writing and rhetorical activity to
economic production: Big Data. On the other hand, it is cause for concern because like all
commodities in capitalism, information is produced (in this case, “mined”) not to benefit
society but to acquire profit.
It is important to recognize that these developments are directly related to the
original premise of copyright, and in fact are natural or logical extensions of that premise.
The original premise of copyright, as a form of property in a Lockean or ACT schema, is
to reward labor, and in doing so to contribute to a marketplace of ideas that benefits the
public good. It was not “meant” to deny labor its reward or to distort ownership of ideas
and information into the hands of those few who own the major vectors of
communication. But as Marx puts it in Capital “no matter how severely the capitalist
mode of appropriation may seem to slap in the face of the fundamental laws of
production of commodities, it does not arise from a violation, but from an application of
these laws” (640). At first, Marx demonstrates, property appears as the natural reward for
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one’s labor. Two producers meet in the market and trade commodities in proportion to
their exchange-value. They conduct their exchange irrespective of the use-value of the
commodities, requiring only that their exchange-values be equal. But as soon as
ownership of the means of production becomes privatized, and workers come to own
nothing but their labor-power, labor-power itself becomes a principal commodity. The
worker is compelled to offer to the capitalist their labor-power in exchange for a wage,
the capitalist acquires a commodity that possesses the unique ability to create value and
to produce other commodities. In consumption of this commodity, the capitalist receives
not just what they paid for in wage, but an additional surplus value, which they pocket as
property. Hence, as Marx argues, “the separation of property from labour has become the
necessary consequence of a law that apparently originated in their identity” (640). The
rights of property based on labor become “by their own inner and inexorable dialectic,”
the capitalist method of accumulation (639).
Copyright, likewise, proceeds by its own inner and inexorable dialectic to become
Web 2.0 and information capitalism’s method of accumulation. To be sure, the
relationship between writer and platform is unique in that there is no purchase of laborpower for the digital; users instead are required to offer their activity in exchange for
access to professional and social public spheres. 7 This has not stopped digital capitalists
from reproducing in practice the same proprietary relation.

It is tempting to linger too long on the different roles labor and value play in industrial
vs. information capitalism. It is true that while “labor” in industrial capitalism referred to
paid work in designated spaces, measured by time, “labor” in information capitalism is
no longer paid, does not take place in any specific physical space, and cannot be
measured by time. Likewise, “value” in information capitalism cannot be reduced to time
but rather has something to do (probably) with aggregate and kairotic information. These
differences, while interesting theoretically, make little difference for my purposes. It can
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Still, Wark’s overall description of a new form of class struggle playing out over
the production and circulation of information and writing gets us out of the flat and
unwieldly descriptions of agency in new materialist and ecological writing scholarship.
Web 2.0 writing scholarship needs to better understand the kinds of class and property
dynamics Wark talks about if we are to theorize and advocate for digital writers. By
dragging Marxist theory out of the 19th century and into the 21st century, she offers the
beginning of a framework for the agency of digital writers rooted in a critical theory of
property. In this framework, the agency of digital writers is tied to their relationship to
the vector and to the level of class consciousness that enables writers to realize a shared
exploitation. She offers a vision of agency that involves hacker-writers realizing their
shared class interests, finding solidarity with workers and tenants, and working to end the
set of relations that enable their exploitation. Agency becomes a collective and
intersectional act of solidarity, in contrast to the principled individualism of the American
copyright tradition. I have tried to make a case for why we should understand agency and
property the way Marx and Wark do—namely, because property creates class relations,
those class relations are by nature inequitable, and solutions to that inequity require
collective action. If we accept this as a premise, the next step is to turn our attention to
the ownership of the platform and the set of relations that sprawl forth from it. We need
to find ways to alter the structural relationship between user and vectoralist beyond
appealing to intellectual property or tinkering with individual terms of service. We need
to find ways for writers to own the vector.

be said, simply and clearly, that writers (like workers) generate value but do not
appropriate the full rewards of that value, and that this recognition is a sufficient starting
point for trying to reorganize that relationship.
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Consequently, I argue, Web 2.0 writing scholarship must identify, theorize, and
participate in ways to resist propertization of the vector. This means that we must also
identify and better theorize what a vector is, what social, legal, and material forces make
up the vector, and how those forces might be organized differently. We need to move
away from the abstract language of ecological writing theory and into concrete
descriptions of the vectoral technologies that organize writing today, including digital
platforms, the algorithms and code that underlie them, and the data servers and network
infrastructures. Writers’ rhetorical and economic control over the design and maintenance
of these spaces, I argue, is where agency congeals in Web 2.0 and information capitalism.
We (writers and writing scholars) need to better understand vectoral spaces, including
their technical designs, the social/rhetorical relations they enact, and their world-building
implications, so as to build and work toward nonproprietary versions of the vector.

The Vector
A little over twenty years ago, before Web 2.0 and the emergence of the digital
data industry, Andrea Lunsford called on rhetoric and composition scholars to “identify,
theorize, and begin systemically practicing and teaching alternative forms of subjectivity
and alternative modes of ownership” (“Rhetoric, Feminism, and the Politics of Textual
Ownership” 541). At the time, she was responding to the erosion of fair use and a
tightening of an older intellectual property regime that was still primarily organized
around the production of professional products by what Wark would call the hacker class.
She offered as models examples of professional-class writers, scientists, and
programmers, including Esther Dyson and Richard Stallman, who sought to give back or
de-propertize their textual productions through acts of philanthropy or other legal
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measures (534-37). Finding alternative ways to talk about, practice, and share writing as a
collaborative act, Lunsford argued, was crucial for writers to relate positively to their
communities through the texts they create.
The purpose of this chapter has been in a sense to revisit Lunsford’s call, but also
to update and revive it to match the proprietary dynamics of Web 2.0. As I have shown,
in Web 2.0 property no longer refers simply to ownership of texts but to the means of
production, or to the vectors (especially platforms) through which most textual activity
must now flow. Drawing on a series of political economic thinkers, I have shown that as
the nature of and social function of property changes, writing becomes an activity
organized around the production of value by one class and its appropriation by another,
and that the agency of writers is tied to their structural relation to the vector.
What this means is that Lunsford’s call is more important than ever, but what it
looks like in practice has changed dramatically. We need to continue the work of
exploring and teaching new models of ownership, but doing so in Web 2.0 means shifting
our focus from philanthropic acts or from models for shared textual ownership to models
for shared platform ownership. That is, new models of ownership in Web 2.0 might look
less like philanthropic gift economies and more like shared and collectively owned web
infrastructures. To borrow some of Lunsford’s language, writing scholars now need to
identify, theorize, and begin systemically practicing and teaching alternative forms of
vectoral ownership, including the literacies—technical, rhetorical, social—involved with
collectively owning and maintaining vectoral infrastructure. Only by doing so, I argue,
can we advocate for and increase the agency of writers in Web 2.0’s information
capitalism.
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This is a major project, and the rest of the dissertation is dedicated to this work. I
have split it into two parts. In chapter four, I move from theory to practice to survey a
variety of already-existing writing platforms and network infrastructures that are
attempting to create alternative models of ownership in response to the data-oriented
business models of major Web 2.0 platforms like Facebook and Twitter. I devise an
analytic, informed by this chapter, for reading these platforms and for assessing the
rhetorical-economic agency of the writers who occupy them. As I go, I show the kinds of
technical and infrastructural decisions that writers, technical writers, and programmers
are grappling with as they try to carve out alternative spaces. In chapter five, I move from
the technical and economic design of alternative platforms to the social and rhetorical
experience of participating in the design of these platforms. I examine the governance
and development protocols of alternative platforms, with a special focus on: 1) the
relations between writers, technical writers, and programmers with an eye towards whose
voices are valued in design and development decisions and what effect that has on
agency; 2) the experience of specific users in the development process; and 3) the
literacies—both technical and social—that are involved in the design, development, and
maintenance of at least one kind of alternative web infrastructure: the social networking
platform. The challenges and literacies involved with participating in these communities,
I argue, are what writing scholars need to take up today.
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CHAPTER 4
AGENCY AND PLATFORM MODELS

Revisiting Agency
For comp/rhet scholars, agency is traditionally grounded in notions of access,
action, and self-determination. That is, agency is about what writers can do: what
technological systems they have access to, what levels of access they have to those
systems, and how they exert their personal and social goals through rhetorical action in
those systems. Here, a pedagogical approach to increasing the agency of student writers
looks to help students identify the features and affordances of the technological systems
they write in, to increase their levels of access to those systems through literacy practices
that include but go beyond encoding and decoding, and to allow student writers to
develop the technical, rhetorical, and critical capacities needed to enact their goals.
I argue that, in a digital Web 2.0 era, grounding agency in what writers can do and
how they are embedded in communications and circulation technologies needs to include
looking at the platform. As I showed in chapter 3, the platform functions as a new,
proprietary means of production that alienates writers from the full value of their textual
activity and from the ability to build the world on their own terms. If we are to approach
some semblance of agency, I argued, writers collectively need to own not just their texts
but also the means of production through which they generate texts. In this chapter, I aim
to work through just what it means to for writers to “own” those digital technologies that
make up the means of production.
In composition and rhetoric, we often talk about our relationship to digital
technologies through the language of access. Adam Banks’ highly regarded taxonomy of
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access in Race, Rhetoric, and Technology recognizes five kinds of access: 1) material
access, or physical proximity to technological devices; 2) functional access, or the
knowledge and skills needed to use the device at a minimal level; 3) experiential access,
or the degree to which a technology is embedded a community and is regularly involved
in meaningful parts of people’s lives; 4) critical access, or the ability to critique, resist,
compare, and avoid technological devices, to be intelligent users; and 5) transformative
access, a more comprehensive form of access that positions people as genuinely involved
in the creation and design of technological products. Banks’ description of multiple
layers of access was a much needed improvement over simplistic notions of simply
physical access to computers or to “mere internet connectivity.” His notion of
transformative access as a fifth, holistic sense of access has been widely taken up as a
social and pedagogical goal of many writing scholars and teachers.
To Banks’s taxonomy, I want to argue for adding a sixth form of access,
economic access. All five of Banks’ forms of access assume a certain type of subject: one
who relates to the technology through consumption or utility. This is a problem because it
ignores users who relate to technology through other means, like labor and ownership. By
adding the lens of economic access, we can better take into account the divergent and
often unequal economic relationships people have to technology, and that serves as a
built-in premise to Banks’ notion of transformative access. By economic access I do not
refer to whether someone can afford to buy a technology, but to the idea that writers hold
a particular kind of subject position in an economy that determines the way they relate to
a technology and thus determines their experience or nonexperience of their material,
functional, experiential, critical, and transformative access. For example, not everyone is
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set up to engage with a laptop in the same way, economically. Some people labor as
white-collar workers to design the laptop’s specifications and operating system; others
labor as factory workers to physically craft the components, or as miners and extractors
of the raw materials—copper, iron, petroleum—used to make the laptop, or as workers in
the shipping industry that moves the laptop supply chain; others purchase and use the
laptop as consumers; and still others (the ruling class) own the factories, the mines, the
refineries, and the tech companies that hire these assorted laborers. Some of these people
engage with the laptop only in the sense that it is a laptop, a technological device that will
run software programs for them. For others, such as manufacturers, the specific utility of
the laptop does not matter so much as its status as a commodity, one among many, being
produced and moved to make a profit. From the perspective of political economy, then,
the laptop has a near-global presence, existing in a dualistic state as at once a laptop but
also as something more abstract: a commodity.
This double quality of the laptop has not yet been well-accounted for by many
digital scholars writing about access. We tend to think about access to digital
technologies predominantly through the terms of its consumption, and only as regards to
its status as an object with a specific utility (that is, only as a meaning-making tool, and
not as an abstracted commodity). As Pratistha Bhattarai writes, working women in
factories in China may produce the MacBook laptops that others use, even if they don’t
go on to buy one themselves. Their interaction with technology is “not representable as
‘access’ (or at all) within the discourse of haves and have nots because they entail neither
consumption nor ownership” (7). But they do engage with the technology: they have
material access to the laptop (they make it), the technology is embedded in their
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community as a source of work and income, and they are in a very fundamental sense
involved in the creation of the technological product. However, as wage laborers, they do
not have economic access to the laptop; they occupy a subject position that denies
ownership of the laptop, that denies control over its design, and that denies their ability to
“use” the laptop in its full capacity as both laptop and commodity. That is, as wagelaborers dispossessed of the means of production, they can neither use the laptop and its
software programs or realize the full value (in money terms) of its production; that value
instead is pocketed by an employer. Their subject position restructures what some kinds
of access (“material” or “experiential”) means for them, and it completely forecloses
other kinds of access (functional, transformative). Restructuring social relations in order
to grant them transformative access would mean changing their economic access such
that they would no longer be wage laborers; they would instead participate equally as
shared owners of the means of producing (both physically and conceptionally) the laptop.
A similar dynamic is occurring for digital writers on the web. Writers occupy
economic subject positions that deny ownership of the platforms they write in, of the
texts they produce, and of the value that those texts accrue. They are thus shut out of
economic access to the digital technologies that make up the web. If our goal is to
increase the agency of writers, or to approach what Banks’ calls transformative access—
genuine involvement in the design, production, and integration of technological
products—then we need to attend to the economic access of writers and the ways that we
talk about ownership and economy.
To tie agency to a notion of transformative and economic access means
articulating agency along class lines. As I showed in chapter 3, the relationship between
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the writer and the platform is a property relationship that inaugurates a new class relation
between writers and a vectoralist class. Digital writers currently produce a variety of
textual objects—conventional discourse and data—that generate value for a vectoralist
class who then appropriate textual objects as property because they own the means of
production—the platform—through which textual activity is mediated. If we are to
increase the agency of writers, we need to change this relationship in such a way that
textual activity cannot be appropriated as property; in other words, we need to change the
social relations of digital writing such that a vectoralist class no longer exists. My
definition of agency, then, involves writers (users) banding together to exert collective
power and take control of their textual productions, and over the environments through
which they write and create the world. Only by doing so, my dissertation argues, can
writers have access to and make use of the full potentialities of digital technology.
In order to do that, we need to first identify the dual character of “writing” in Web
2.0. Like the laptop in the example above, the textual objects that writers produce
(especially data) now exist in a dualistic state as both a social utility and commodity. In
political economic terms, we might say that data contains a use-value (sometimes
described as qualitative value), where “use” refers to its ability to satisfy a want or need,
or to work towards some social purpose, and also an exchange-value (sometimes
described as a quantitative value), or the economic value of that data, expressed in priceterms. Together, they constitute what in political economy is called the value-form, or
just value. Though we are often accustomed to thinking of value through the terms of its
use-value alone (in much the same way that we think of access to digital technologies
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only through the terms of its consumption), the full value of our textual objects lies in
both use and exchange.
The use-value of our aggregated data is novel and is not to be understated. Data
about writing has of course always existed in that readers have always been able to track
how texts are constructed, observe trends, and interpret a text with or extract from that
text procedural operations—algorithms—for producing more texts. 8 But Web 2.0
platform technologies, by layering writing in software and computation, have changed
the scale of this practice so drastically that what we might have called “data” pre-Web 2.0
is nothing like what we call “data” now. Today data is “big data,” a powerful, novel, and
transformative tool for making and understanding the world. Corporations, for example,
have used it in in machine learning models for natural language processing, in climate
science to track weather and climate shifts, and in supply chain industries to manage
inventory and predict consumption and production rates.
However, writers and writing scholars do not have access to this tool. Despite
generating through rhetorical activity effectively all of the raw data that platform
companies like Google or Facebook collect, writers have little access to the
technologies—the source code for Google’s search protocols, the algorithms that control
Facebook news feeds, and the enormous data sets on 21st century public spheres—that are
changing how and what it means to write. Writers are stuck in a very passive role, left to
simply work with the severely limited interface and circulation tools that the vectoralist
class offers us. And the vectoralist class is wasting these resources; to date, the most

For a good account of the historical relation between procedural arguments in classical
rhetoric and contemporary digital algorithms, see chapter two of Kevin Brock’s
Rhetorical Code Studies.
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imaginative use they have been able to cobble together for our data has been to pair
advertising more effectively. Or, to put it another way, the vectoralist class has not yet
figured out how to monetize our data beyond advertising, as their imagination is limited
to their business model. This has left writers in a disenfranchised state, where we are so
alienated from these new and potentially very powerful tools, or so removed from the
subject positions that have access to these new kinds of use-values, that that it can be
hard to even imagine the ways they might be used by us for purposes beyond making
money off advertising (because both of a lack of access and a lack of practice).
Money represents the second part of writing’s newly acquired value: exchangevalue. Exchange value is the economic value, expressed in price terms, of our digital
writing and textual activity. Speaking broadly, the economic value of big data and data
science is about as incalculable as trying to assess the economic value of the steam
engine. But the value of the data generated by writers on specific digital platforms is
much easier to calculate: Facebook made 70.7 billion dollars in 2019, most of it from
data metrics and advertising; Google made a staggering 113.26 billion, again mostly off
of its data and advertising operations; and in higher education Turnitin was recently
bought for 1.75 billion by Advance Publications off of the value of its student essay
database. The vectoralist class is now quite comfortably among the wealthiest and most
well-positioned sectors of the ruling class, having eclipsed the print and television media
giants of the 20th century or the industrial bourgeoisie. Writers, of course, enjoy none of
this wealth. By leveraging their ownership and control over the platforms necessary for
21st century literacy and pedagogical activity, the vectoralist class has managed to
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appropriate, seize, or otherwise steal the value of our writing—both use and exchange—
for themselves.
We cannot look at agency and access to technological developments (platform
software, computation, data) without also considering the political economies those
technological developments are embedded in. If writing scholars are serious about
improving the agency of writers on the web and giving writers transformative access to
the technologies that mediate digital writing, then we need to recognize and address the
lack of economic access writers have to those technologies. In other words, if the goal is
for writers to take advantage of the full possibilities that digital technologies offer, then
they need to be in a position to take advantage of the value—use and exchange—of their
textual activity. Right now we are not in a position to take advantage of the full value of
our textual activity because the platforms we use are proprietary; and the use and
exchange values of digital writing are pocketed by a vectoralist class.
We can see examples in the world already of what social or collective control
over data might offer us. Outside of writing studies, organizations like the Worker Info
Exchange and the Open Data Institute advocate to give workers and people access to data
infrastructure and ecosystems so that they can make more informed arguments to change
their workplace or affect the world. In writing studies, we might imagine similar benefits
if we had access to the data collected on and about us. Laurie Gries’ iconographic
tracking method, essentially the practice of using Google’s basic search tools and
interface for acquiring data on circulation, while a useful tool now, would seem
downright rudimentary and archaic if writers and writing researchers had access to
Google’s full data servers and data processing tools. As writing scholars, we would have
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a rich repository of information about how public spheres operate, what rhetorics
circulate and to who, and ways to describe how rhetorical ecologies operate beyond
gestures towards “complexity.” As writers, we would better understand the rhetorical
situations and ecosystems we operate in, we would be able to make better and more
effective appeals, and we might develop new forms of argumentation unique to a big data
world. Collective control over our textual activity would allow us to take full advantage
of the world-building potential of the vector.
It is an open question whether writers and/or writing scholars, if given access and
control over big data, would be at all interested in authorizing the types of data collection
that currently exist. It is my personal position that it is both interesting and useful for
individual writers and writers collectively to generate, aggregate, and analyze such data.
Data, as even the most critical data scientist will say, can be transformative and
empowering, under the right circumstances and when used for the right purposes. I
remain somewhat dissatisfied with popular sentiments that react to vectoral control by
attempting to erase the vector, either by (as we will see) decentralization or by
foreclosing all data collection. This response seems to me like an attempt to reduce,
rather than treasure, the full value of writing. And it surrenders the world of Web 2.0
entirely to the vectoralists under the logic that because the current political and economic
relations of vectors are unequal, vectors themselves cannot be equitable. I do not think
this is true, anymore than the existence of inequitable relations surrounding factory
machines makes factory machines necessarily problematic. 9 At the same time, my

Note: this is not an argument that “technology” is an inherently neutral tool. Just the
opposite: it seems to me that we should chart the social-political relations entangled with
9
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argument for agency is for writers collectively (not writer, Thomas) to control their
textual production and environments. Hence, I am interested in all existing efforts that
attempt to empower writers, not just those that conform to the future I see. And in fact, as
we will see, many existing efforts seek to empower writers without engaging in big data
as a tool.
As I showed in chapters two and three, owning our texts alone does not allow us
to control our textual environments. Appealing to data as the intellectual property of
writers misunderstands the nature of property, ignores the existence of the platform as a
development of the property-form, and generally reenforces the property relations that we
are actually embedded in. The property-form and its expression in writing as copyright is
not a tool that serves writers. To achieve economic access and to increase the agency of
writers on a digital web, we need to develop anti-property theories of writing that demand
ownership over the means of production. I am proposing that such anti-property theories
would focus on production, making agency a class issue, a matter of resisting the
vectoralist class’ power to appropriate the value—both use and exchange—of textual and
rhetorical activity.
Defining agency in this way begs the question of whether any platforms exist to
help us leverage our agency. Some in composition and rhetoric, like Estee Beck, tout
alternative platforms where we are paid for our data; others have found the gift economy
of open source to be an alternative (Mike Edwards 180). In the rest of this chapter I turn
to living efforts to respond to mainstream corporate platforms like Facebook, Twitter,

vectors and attempt to change them in ways we see as just. The tool is social; we can and
should remake it in ways that build the world we want to see.
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Google, etc. by building alternative platform spaces. Alternative platforms take a wide
variety of forms and can be organized by very different actors, but the common theme
here is that they represent an attempt to build a counterplatform where writers retain or
achieve some kind of agency, however defined, that mainstream corporate platforms do
not offer. These platforms often represent themselves as offering a solution to one or
more exploitative practices on mainstream corporate platforms, along with a vision of
how both public spheres and the relation between writer and communications technology
might be different if writers flocked in large numbers to the alternative platform.
Being alternative in itself will not necessarily generate economic agency. Instead,
this model of agency leads to the following questions for analyzing the affordances of
any of these alternative platforms:
1.

What textual objects are created on the platform as a result of rhetorical

activity, and what access do writers have to the use-values of those objects? Who
decides how these resources are used, and for what purpose?
2.

What is the exchange-value, expressed in price, of the collective textual

objects generated through the platform? What access do writers have to this
value?
3.

Who owns the platform? What model of ownership exists, and how are

writers positioned in this model?
4.

To what extent is writing on a platform a commodified, propertied

activity, i.e. something that occurs in order to generate income for a class of
individuals other than writers?
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5.

Finally (and this question will make more sense as I go on), how do these

economic relationships—the relation between a vectoralist and writer class, for
example—express themselves in the infrastructure and design of the platform?
Or, in political economy terms, how do the relations of production express
themselves in the forces of production, and what can that tell us about agency?
With these questions for evaluating platforms in mind, I examine three specific platforms
in this chapter:
1) the corporate privacy model, which promises to refrain totally from data
collection out of respect for user privacy.
2) the wages for data model, which offers writers a wage for their textual activity.
3) the free and open source, decentralized and/or federated model, which
represents a loose collection of platforms that offer writers varying degrees of
ownership over the platform.
Together, they represent the vast majority of alternative platform models that exist today,
and so are a good barometer for the forms of resistance that writers and developers are
taking up in response to Web 2.0 and the vectoralist class. Each of these platform models
attempts to define and then solve the problem of digital data and writing in a particular
way, and each promise to enhance the agency of writers through their solution to the
problem.
I will argue that the first two models fail to offer economic access or
transformative access and thus do not represent a meaningful sense of agency.
Alternative corporate platforms thus far do not offer the kinds of agencies writers need in
a digital era. They may pursue different business models than Facebook or Twitter, and
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they may offer benefits to writers that mainstream platforms do not, but they do not
challenge either the centralized network or the proprietary nature of the platform, along
with the class relations that follow from centralized proprietary platforms. Until these
features of the 21st century digital web are challenged and wrested from the vectoralist
class, writers will not have access to the full value (use and exchange) of their textual
productions, nor will they have a meaningful say in the design decisions of the textual
circulation systems they operate. They will not have, in disciplinary terms, transformative
or economic access to their texts and to the technologies they write through, qualities
which I have identified as critical to writer agency in the web.
The third—the free and open-source model—is much more promising, and I will
discuss at length its most popular platform: Mastodon.

The Corporate Privacy Model
Probably the most common type of alternative platform fits into what I call the
“corporate privacy model.” In this model, the problem of writers’ alienation from the
value of their digital data is represented as an invasion of privacy. Drawing on 20th
century technology standards of what “privacy” means, the corporate privacy model
portrays writers as having “rights” that have been violated by an intrusive and
economically vulgar surveillance platform looking to make a cheap buck. The data
collection practices of Facebook, platforms fitting this model argue, violate a user’s right
to privacy by aggressively tracking users to learn everything about them. The privacy
model offers a solution of new corporate product—the alternative platform—through
which writers can retain their privacy rights and restore the positive relationship between
consumers and companies that mainstream platforms like Facebook have made
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untrustworthy. To assure that privacy rights are kept, alternative corporate privacy
platforms promise to refrain from collecting or sharing user data and work from a
business model other than advertising (usually paid subscriptions) to make money.
Examples of the corporate privacy model include Vero, MeWe, and Are.na. Vero
is a social media platform founded by billionaire Ayman Hariri in 2015. It promises to
create a more “authentic” network that addresses the “imbalance . . . between the interests
of the platforms and the best interests of their users” (Vero). To accomplish this, Vero
claims to refrain from ads, data mining, and from selling access to users’ data, instead
requiring users to pay a monthly subscription. In a similar fashion, MeWe (founded in
2012) takes a page from the gaming industry to offer a “freemium” model, where users
can use some basic features of the platform free of cost, but must pay for a premium
subscription for advanced social networking features. See Figure 3.1 for a screenshot of
the MeWe interface. MeWe’s founder, Mark Weinstein, pitches the platform through the
framework of privacy: “Privacy is not something anyone should have to pay for, ever.
There are no ads, no fake news, no newsfeed manipulation, no facial recognition, and
MeWe members are #Not4Sale” (Weinstein). Are.na, created in 2012, functions through
the same freemium model, with a special focus on building a community demographic of
professional designers, artists, and architects. As such, Are.na functions almost like a
blend between a social network and an industry workflow and inspiration tool.
The business model of these platforms is not necessarily new; they all follow an
established practice by some tech companies, most notably Apple, of offering more
expensive, luxury commodities to a small subset of tech-savvy, professional-class users,
emphasizing privacy options and a revolutionary user experience. They tend to reinforce
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American cultural assumptions that we can buy our way out of social problems by
“taking our business elsewhere,” or by making politically conscious consumer decisions.
Writers become conflated with consumers, and agency becomes a matter of ethical
consumption.

Figure 3.1: The MeWe interface upon joining
This already is not a very convincing narrative, but I want to take a moment to
look closer at the way corporate privacy platforms rhetorically construct the problem of
user data. According to these platforms, the problem is not one of property or political
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economy but of privacy and surveillance. This shift in vocabulary has enormous
consequences. Users in this model are seen not as economic producers but as passive
victims whose rights are being violated by new technologies (tracking mechanisms, big
data, surveillance algorithms). These technologies are designed and controlled by Silicon
Valley companies, but in the privacy-oriented rhetorical situation it is not so much the
companies that are the problem as it is the technology that creates the opportunity for
companies to intrude upon the privacy of writers. Technology alone, outside the context
of the political economy surrounding it, becomes the source of disempowerment. Hence
the solution, in a somewhat Luddite-fashion, is to shut it down; to forego the data
collection and processing technologies of Web 2.0 entirely: to return to or create a world
in which they do not exist.
In a political economic sense, corporate privacy platforms attempt to redefine the
economic terms through which we understand the platform. First, the act of writing gets
redefined such that it does fewer things, that it creates fewer use-values. If we don’t
create the use-values tied to data, the logic goes, then we don’t have problems, and if
writers want to not have problems, then they need to pay up. Hence writers, too are
redefined. In mainstream platforms, writers are economic producers, in that the act of
writing produces commodities, use-values (data), and exchange value that it did not
before. In the corporate privacy platforms, writers are economic consumers who purchase
access to software that connects them to public spheres and to communities of likeminded people. And finally, the platform itself is redefined; where in mainstream
corporate platforms it works as the information-economy version of the means of
production (the vector) through which writers produce commodities and values that are
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appropriated by a propertied class, the corporate privacy model attempts to portray the
platform as a luxury commodity.
This redefinition of the rhetorical-economic situation, from writers as economic
producers that create value for a vectoralist class that owns the means of production, to
writers as economic consumers making savvy choices about which commodity to buy, is
a much more comfortable narrative for the ruling class. I suspect that comfort probably
has something to do with the sheer number of corporate privacy-style platforms. The
three I have mentioned—Vero, MeWe, and Are.na, are just a sample; Silicon Valley is
littered with start-up social networking companies funded by millionaires and billionaires
who think they will heroically fix the wrongs of Facebook by getting rid of data and by
following Apple’s luxury commodity business model.
We should not be so convinced. Despite its claims, the corporate privacy model, I
argue, does not increase the agency of writers or fundamentally change the economic
relations of Web 2.0. It does not offer writers economic or transformative access, and in
fact the case could be made that they leave writers worse off than they were before. At
issue here is that the relationship between the writer and the platform has not changed in
any meaningful way. Even if we accept these platforms’ claim that writers are merely
consumers, as consumers writers on Vero or MeWe do not own the platform or any part
of it in, nor do they have control over the design of the platform: its interface, its
algorithms, its data collection policies, etc. Writing on corporate privacy platforms is still
a commodified, propertied activity in that it functions as a means of moving value from
writers to a vectoralist class who owns the platform, in this case usually a small handful
of millionaires and billionaires.
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To be sure, corporate privacy platforms have a different business model than
Google or Facebook, and by moving away from big data their owners look like they are
trying to create distance between them and, say, Mark Zuckerberg. But they are all
members of the vectoralist class. The source of vectoralist class power derives not from
one business model or type of information product, but, as McKenzie Wark puts it, “from
ownership and control of the vector of information,” where the vector represents “the
capacity to transmit, store, and process information” (A Hacker Manifesto 13). We might
compare this logic to the industrial bourgeoisie; members of the industrial bourgeoisie
class might represent different industries and business models (i.e. the steel industry vs.
the railway industry, the oil industry vs. the toymaking industry), but they remain part of
the same class because of their shared economic status as owners of the means of
production for material commodities and as purchasers of wage-labor. Likewise,
members of the vectoralist class might produce different commodities (big data vs.
software vs. social networking site), but they are linked in that they control the flows and
mediums through which information travels. Writers on these platforms, then, have not
escaped the class dynamics of mainstream corporate platforms; they have only moved
from one sector of vectoralist class power to another.
Furthermore, it is not clear that the narrative of writers moving from exploited
producers of value to consumers of the commodity that privacy platforms offer is true at
all. Even if we accept that these platforms no longer capture the data that writers produce
(or, to put it differently, that writers no longer produce data on these platforms), it is
questionable whether the social networking on these sites is really a commodity offered
by a corporate firm or whether it is created by the users themselves, using the tools
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provided by the platform. Digital public spheres are, after all, public, and created at least
in part by the people who write and participate in them. And if users are helping produce
a public sphere or social networking service that is then packaged as a commodity, then
their economic subject position is really no different than users on mainstream corporate
platforms who produce data that is packaged as a commodity. Yet again, we have not
escaped the class dynamics and limitations to access that make up Web 2.0.
Finally, to make a quick parting point, it seems bizarre to me that corporate
privacy platforms attempt to solve the inequities and information asymmetries of
mainstream corporate platforms by ceasing collection of some of the types of information
that are then distributed unevenly. Big data, as I said, is potentially a very powerful and
transformative public resource. It makes little sense to try to “turn back the clock,” to
create or return to a world in which big data does not exist, simply because the current
political economy that big data is produced in is an exploitative one. If our goal is indeed
transformative access and for writers to have access to and make use of the full
potentialities of digital technology, then we should work to imagine new economic
relations that digital technology might exist in, rather than to reduce those potentialities.
Corporate privacy platforms, then, do not offer writers transformative or
economic access. They do not give writers control over the use or exchange values of
what they produce. They keep writers like in an exploitative dynamic with a vectoralist
class that owns the means of production. They offer a false narrative of resistance
through consumerism, or agency through consumption. If we want platform models that
work as a starting point for increasing the agency of writers, then we need to look
elsewhere.
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Wages for Data
A second platform model that has generated some discussion among digital
communities and digital rhetoricians is the wages for data model. Like the privacy model,
wages for data platforms are run by corporate actors, but they operate on a very different
business model. The wages for data model posits that Web 2.0 has created a new type of
information economy, but that we have to adjust the way we share the rewards of that
economy to make it more equitable. To do this, the model begins by recognizing the
economic value of writing and seeks to reward writers by paying them for the economic
value they produce through textual activity. Here, the problem of Web 2.0 social media
platforms is rhetorically constructed not through the language of privacy and surveillance
but through a sense of unpaid labor and economic unfairness. To ensure that writers are
not being exploited by the Silicon Valley elites of Web 2.0, wages for data platforms
argue, they need to receive their fair share of the profits.
The wages for data model is perhaps best exemplified by the social media
platform Tsū. Founded in 2014 by Evacuation Complete LLC, Tsū grew quickly but was
forced to shut down in 2016 due to financial costs and the collapse of its user base. It was
relaunched in 2019 with a reduced payout structure, a new marketing pitch, and several
new features. Central to Tsū’s pitch is its assertion that writers are being cheated on
mainstream Web 2.0 platforms. As Tsū puts it in their marketing video, on the Web
today, “everyone is a content creator,” but creators never receive the money platforms get
for advertisements (Yormak). Tsū claims to address this problem by “[putting] content
creators first,” offering them 50% of the advertising revenue generated from their
content, the option to sell personal brand products through the Tsū platform, and the

105

ability to make money by inviting new writers to the platform via a multi-level marketing
system.
Tsū and the wages for data model is at first glance compelling in that it starts by
acknowledging that writing on the digital web is both a rhetorical and economic act, in
that writers offer unpaid labor that deserves renumeration. Agency becomes the
recuperation, or at least partial recuperation, of the value of that labor in the form of a
kind of rhetorical-economic dividend. In political economic terms, the model is very
much reminiscent of how Adam Smith would see writing on the digital web, as discussed
in chapter three. Writers labor through the proprietary tools of others—in this case the
platform—and as a result have the value of their productions appropriated by the owner
of those tools. When the means of production are proprietary, a kind of inequality and
inequity is created where the people who produce and labor are not the ones who reap the
reward. For Smith, the solution to this problem was to return the proper portion of that
value to the laborer; agency becomes economic equivalency, an exchange of labor-power
for a wage. By paying writers a fair wage, the logic goes, the relationship between a
vectoralist class and writer class can be justified and even encouraged as an engine of
economic growth and a new source of jobs.
The depiction of agency as economic equivalency, as expressed by Tsū and by
Smith’s political economic theory, runs deep in the Western psyche and in mythical
depictions of the liberalizing and liberating power of capitalism. Wage labor and the
social relations that presuppose it (a privately owned means of production and a class of
workers who have no security and must find work to survive), have since at least the 18th
century been described as a progressive force that liberates feudal or noncapitalist
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peoples from serfdom and poverty. Opportunities for wage-labor are celebrated by the
ruling class and their political representatives (now often called “neoliberals”) as sources
of income that will elevate or even “save” the workers, families, and towns they operate
through. Wages for data platforms like Tsū appeal to this story about how capitalism and
agency work, offering to effectively “liberate” writers from what many have described as
the “feudal” economic relations of Web 2.0 by extending the wage-form to writers on
their platform.
A wage, however, does not fundamentally transform the relationship between
writers and writing technologies, or more accurately between writers and the vectoralist
class who owns writing technologies. Writers in a wage-relationship on platforms like
Tsū are still alienated from the full value of the vector. They have no access to or say
over how the commodities they produce are used (use-value) or how the profit generated
from their writing is shared (exchange-value). Writing on the wages-for-data platforms
remains an activity designed to generate value for a vectoralist class. Dividends offered
by wages for data platforms are simply a recognition that this is happening and an
attempt to justify it by subjecting Web 2.0 to the economic relations that make up the rest
of capitalist society—the wage—with the implicit assumption that those economic
relations are a just standard to pursue. They are not; they offer writers neither agency nor
equivalency. As Marx demonstrated, two essential features of the wage-relation are that it
first divests workers from meaningful control over the production processes and
commodities that make up their life, and second that it returns to the worker only a
portion of the value generated by labor. The rest gets pocketed by the owner of the means
of production as surplus value. When applied to the digital platform, these two features of
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the wage-relation alienate writers from their textual activity and foreclose the possibility
of full and meaningful access to the writing technologies. In short, as we saw with the
example of the laptop above, the wage does not grant economic or transformative access;
it precludes it.

Imagining the Vector
To recap, then: corporate privacy platforms attempt to pin the problem on
platform technology irrespective of political economy; wages for data platforms celebrate
platform technology but pin the problem on unfair distribution of the economic reward of
that technology. They seem very distinct, but I believe they are actually quite similar.
Both of these responses maintain commitment to the property-form through which
platform technology has thus far been embedded in and to writing as an activity that
extracts value from writers and gives it to the vectoralist class. To put it more concretely,
Vero, MeWe, and Tsū all position the platform as owned and controlled by a corporate
office, a business firm, usually working out of Silicon Valley. The platform—the
information economy’s means of production—remains a proprietary product, its design
and economic model decided by a CEO or board of directors looking to make the
sponsoring of written and rhetorical activity a business model. So long as the platform as
a means of production is privately owned, the prospect of achieving transformative and
economic access appears dim. We need new models of ownership.
A relevant question then becomes: what would it mean for writers to “own” the
platform? What, exactly, does Facebook, Vero, Tsū, or any other Web 2.0 company own?
Clearly, the platform is more than a website or web domain. The code that makes up the
platform interface, the algorithms that control how users function, and the physical data
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servers that store account info, user content, and user data, are all owned by the firm that
developed the platform. We might break the platform down into two components:
intellectual property and physical assets. Intellectual property refers to any software,
code, algorithm, etc. produced by professional workers employed by the firm. Physical
assets refer to the offices, physical commodities, etc. owned by the firm, but also the data
servers, cables, and computational tools used to store and manipulate the textual products
writers create. As we click, scroll, write, read, and move on the web, our activity
compiles into binary code, transforms into light signals, moves through fiber optic cables
to Facebooks data servers, and gets retranslated into a human programming language like
JavaScript or PHP, which software engineers and data scientists at FB can aggregate to
form narratives about us and to offer narratives back to us. Because they own the
intellectual property and physical assets that make up the platform, only the owner of the
network is able to easily track and record data about writers in the network. This data
exists, as Dustin Edwards shows us, in massive data storage sites like Facebook’s New
Mexico data center, which draws from the surrounding desert up to 4.8 million gallons of
water a day to cool its servers (“Digital Rhetoric” 67). Networks like this are material,
infrastructural, embedded in local ecologies of drought, climate, and land. As Edwards
puts it, “the foundations of rhetoric in a networked world are inseparable from conditions
of environmental, ecological, and cultural damage” (60).
The connection between proprietary platform and the network it operates through
is key. Proprietary platforms like Facebook, Twitter, Vero, and Tsū all operate through
centralized networks. On a centralized network, all users interact with a single server, or
a single set of servers controlled by one entity. Anytime we access the site, scroll through
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a feed, or write a post, we open a connection to that server. This connection is on the one
hand a technical relationship, a matter of information packets organized with a predefined internet protocol, moving through routers and fiber optic cables. But on the other
hand it is a social relationship, a means of organizing publics and the people that make
them up. Centralized servers create asymmetries of agency and information that can be
hard to see for many users. Only the owner of the network—Facebook, for example—has
the power to determine what kinds of content circulate, what counts as deliberative
discourse vs. hate speech, which content is prioritized, and which is hidden deep in an
interface.
There is a common theme here between mainstream platforms, corporate privacy
platforms, and wages for data platforms: they all work out of a centralized network in
which they own the physical assets that make up the network and also the software/IP
that was produced to create the network. Property and centralized network go hand in
hand. As we learned in chapter 3, the essential nature of property is that it functions as a
means of appropriating the labor of others; hence, when the centralized network is
proprietary, the content and especially data that writers create in that space is always
subject to a potential property-claim, and oftentimes a very real and immediate propertyclaim.
They appear together in Web 2.0, and when they do, writers are removed from the
kinds of transformative, economic, and critical access that our field values. They are left
out of the design and programming decisions that make up how platform interfaces and
algorithms function. They do not have access to the full use-value of the data they create.
Instead, it sits on some Silicon Valley data server, to be used for advertising and other
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unknown purposes. Writers also do not have access to the full exchange-value of this
data; at best they get some partial return of the value of their unpaid labor. And as
Edwards shows us, there are larger environmental and cultural concerns over the effects
of centralized networks.
The question of how to realize user/writer agency is caught up in this assemblage
of writer, network, and property. If writers are to achieve economic access, then they
need to either break into these spaces or otherwise change the way this assemblage is
organized. A question here is the extent to which the struggle for writer agency is a
struggle against the centralized network structure or a struggle against the proprietary
writing economy that centralized networks are situated in. Do the social relations of a
proprietary writing economy necessarily follow the technical structure of a centralized
network? Or is the structure of a centralized network merely a manifestation of the social
forces, especially property-relations, already established in U.S. society? These questions
will become more and more important as 1) the web continues to “mature” through
propertization and centralization, and 2) that maturity gives rise to countercultural efforts
to create spaces that follow other logics, like crypto’s libertarian scene or the pseudoanarchist FOSS spaces. What we have yet to see (as far as I know) is a response to the
web that data as a novel and inherent value for writers/users and seeks to empower
writers/users to own and use that data.
For now, however, we can simply say that the platforms mentioned above do not
engage in the issues of networks and property at all really. Neither Tsū nor Vero nor
MeWe, nor mainstream platforms like Facebook or Twitter, question the centralized
network or the proprietary nature of platforms and digital data; in fact, they depend on
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one or both of these as a business model. Second, as we’ll see in the next section when I
turn to the free and open-source software movement, the question of network vs political
economy becomes important for how other platforms and their writer communities
choose to deal with issues of digital data and writer agency.

Free and Open-Source Platforms
In this section, I turn to a very different type of alternative platform: free and
open-source software. Free and open-source software (often referred to as “FOSS”) are
computer programs with source code that is free for the public to access, edit, and share.
Unlike proprietary corporate platforms, free and open-source software tends to be written
not by a single firm but by a loose community of interested individuals, and cannot be
said to “belong” to a single individual or company. In the past ten years, FOSS users and
developers have begun creating free and open-source social networking platforms
designed to offer community alternatives to mainstream corporate platforms like
Facebook and Twitter. Because they are community created, because they often
challenge proprietary ownership structures (oftentimes explicitly), and because they are
populated by users and developers with a high level of political consciousness on issues
of big data and textual appropriation, FOSS platforms, I argue, represent a much more
promising (though, as we will see, not perfect) space for asserting the agency of writers
than mainstream corporate platforms.
In order to understand contemporary FOSS platforms and their potential as
agentive spaces, it is important for writing scholars to get a sense of the cultural and
political development of FOSS communities. These communities developed explicitly in
response to the propertization of software and are a good model for understanding the
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current problem of property for digital writing. In the early years of software, between the
end of WWII and the early 1980s, U.S. programmers enjoyed a high degree of solidarity
and a communal, collaborative (though especially white and male) culture. Computer
programs were seen as mathematical innovations, and were often shared openly and
widely to anyone interested. As software historian and philosopher Wendy Chun writes,
computer programs in this early era were seen as “natural mental processes,” as a kind of
mathematical innovation that might be developed by specific individuals but that
belonged widely to the programming community (4). In other words, programming in
this era was pre-proprietary, an activity that capital had yet to learn to commodify.
By the early 1980s, this began to change as software companies grew more
ambitious with their business model and more protective of their products. In 1980,
largely spurred by corporate actors in the software industry, Congress passed the
Computer Software Copyright Act, recognizing software programs as “literary works”
protected by copyright. Slowly, and then all at once, companies began requiring their
programmers to sign non-disclosure agreements and intellectual property agreements that
prohibited them from sharing programs with outside parties. And in 1983, IBM ceased
releasing the source code (the code that humans write and understand) with its software
products, instead offering only machine-parsable object code. Other companies quickly
followed suit, and in less than a decade the cultural and legal status of software had
changed from communal knowledge to the proprietary product of competing firms. The
collaborative culture surrounding the production and circulation of software collapsed
overnight, and programmers moved from producing mathematical innovations to be
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shared with all to producing jealously guarded copyrighted secrets. The property-form
had come to software, and with it the social relations it embodies.
Faced with software’s transformation into a proprietary product, programmers in
the early 1980s had few options. As Richard Stallman, then a programmer at MIT, puts it
(somewhat dramatically), “with my community gone, to continue as before was
impossible. Instead, I faced a stark moral choice. The easy choice was to join the
proprietary software world, signing nondisclosure agreements and promising not to help
my fellow hacker . . . another choice, straightforward but unpleasant, was to leave the
computer field” 17). In many ways, Stallman’s dilemma is similar to the one writer’s face
today. Like software, writing has become an activity through which the property-form
evolves and transforms. It sneaks into where it did not exist before, and once there
compels us to choose between a proprietary present or no present at all. Writers are
increasingly left with the choice between using proprietary digital platforms, and thereby
subjecting their textual productions to a proprietary claim, or “leaving”: not using these
platforms at all, instead attempting to retreat (in both time and space) to some predigital
era.
Though Stallman today is not a praiseworthy figure 10, his response in the early
1980s is both noteworthy and instructive for writing scholars today. Unsatisfied, Stallman
began development on the GNU project, an operating system that he hoped to develop
outside the sponsorship of a software company, and that he might share widely across the
programming community for any programmer who still wanted to write open-source

For more on this, see Danny O’Brien’s “Statement on the Re-election of Richard
Stallman.”

10
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software and to participate in a community of “hackers.” The GNU project marked the
beginning of what became the free software movement. To outline the philosophy of the
free software movement, and to call other programmers to help him with GNU, Stallman
published a GNU Manifesto in March of 1985. In it, Stallman lays out his vision of what
free software is and what responsibilities programmers and users have to each other. Free
software, as he puts it, “is sometimes misunderstood—it has nothing to do with price. It is
about freedom” (18). Among the freedoms he describes are the freedom to run the
program for any purpose, to modify the program (and have access to modification tools),
to redistribute copies, and to circulate modified versions. Users may charge a nominal fee
for these services—they may solicit payment for a CD-ROM, or in these days to
download a program—but this charge is very different from wholesale proprietary
ownership of the program entirely. Motivating Stallman is a sense of responsibility he
feels as a creator. As he puts it, “I consider that the golden rule requires that if I like a
program I must share it with other people who like it. Software sellers want to divide the
users and conquer them, making each user agree not to share with others. I refuse to
break solidarity with other users in this way” (32).
The GNU project is noteworthy for several reasons. First, it recognizes that the
collective agency of software writers and users was challenged by, and not strengthened
by, the enclosure of software as property. It does not conflate the interests of software
companies with the interests of software writers; while companies may make more
money with proprietary software, in doing so they dispossess users and programmers of
many of the rights they enjoyed before. This kind of recognition has been uneven for
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composition and rhetoric scholars who, as I showed in chapter 2, often get bogged down
in ideological arguments about the proprietary author or the public good of copyright.
Second, Stallman recognized that the proprietary software creates a novel
relationship between software writers and employers, where any software produced by an
employee is subject to a proprietary claim by the employer. Fearing that the GNU project
would be undermined by his employment at MIT, Stallman left his job as a programmer
there so that GNU could not someday be subject to MIT’s intellectual property rights. In
effect, Stallman recognized what I argued in chapter 3: that the essential function of
property is not to reward labor, but to enable a ruling class like the vectoralists to
appropriate labor. Writing scholars advocating for assertions of authorship and
intellectual property over user data and content have missed this point, to the
disadvantage of writers.
My point here is to suggest that the free software movement’s analysis of the
property relations software writing is embedded in was highly sophisticated at an early
stage, and that this sophistication had long lasting effects that are still with the movement
today. The GNU project eventually became the GNU/Linux operating system, and the
free software movement became what is now known as free and open-source software
(FOSS). FOSS today has grown into a large and diverse set of software programs used
and developed by an eclectic bunch of people. And though the movement’s description of
itself (“free software” to “free and open-source software”) and the way it describes the
value of FOSS to the public has changed, there still exists in the FOSS community today
a community of radical, anti-capitalist programmers who want to wrest software (and
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now social media) from the property-form and from the centralized networks that make
up mainstream corporate platforms.

Mastodon and the Fediverse
The presence of this community, the fact that FOSS platforms are not “owned”
and are often explicitly anti-proprietary, suggests that FOSS platforms are a promising
exploration of what it might mean to own the means of production in Web 2.0, and
thereby to approach writer agency as I have defined it. Thus, I take up one example of a
free and open-source social network platform—Mastodon—as one model for increasing
the agency of writers by undermining proprietary platforms. Mastodon is a free and open
source, federated, decentralized social networking site. It was created by German
computer science and philosophy student Eugen “Gargron” Rochko in 2016. In terms of
functionality it is similar to Twitter: users write and post messages, called “toots,” that
can be read, responded to, “boosted” (or “retweeted” in “bird-talk”), and “favorited”
(“liked”) by other users. Toots appear on a scrollable news feed in reverse-chronological
order and can be indexed and searched for using the #hashtag and @handle systems that
many of us are familiar with. A screenshot of the UI is visible in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: The Mastodon UI
Mastodon was developed independently by Rochko, but like many free and opensource social networking platforms, it has its origins in a platform called GNU Social.
GNU Social was a GNU-based social networking platform developed in 2013-2014 by
Mikael Nordfeldth, Matt Lee, and Evan Prodromou. Still partially active today, GNU
Social was/is an early attempt to create an alternative to Facebook based off FOSS
principles. It promises to “create software for the web that respects your freedom”
(GNU). GNU Social became somewhat infamous in FOSS circles for its small
community of technically skilled and highly political users. It is/was often explicitly
antiproprietary and political; one of its primary servers, Qvitters, represents itself as “a
federation of micro bloggers who care about ethics and solidarity and want to quit the
centralized capitalist services (qtd. In Karpinec).” Mastodon’s creator, Rochko, was an
early user of GNU Social. According to some accounts of the development of GNU
Social, at some point a heated debate emerged over the direction of the platform. Some
users, including Rochko, wanted to rehaul the UI, make the platform more user-friendly,
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and aggressively expand the base of users to include a broader, non-“techie” public, and
thereby situate GNU Social as a viable alternative to Facebook. Others felt that the
platform’s value was in its small, focused community and saw little point in trying to
attract users who do not share similar political values or technical background (see, for
example, Karpinec). The platform began to stall, and, frustrated with (among other
things) GNU Social’s resistance to change, Rochko “forked” and began development on
Mastodon.
Today Mastodon represents the largest and most refined (user-friendly) free and
open-source social network. It has around 2.2 million users split between its various
instances. Slightly more popular in Europe and Japan than in the U.S., Mastodon contains
a number of particularly vibrant communities, including its tech community, its
socialist/anarchist community, and its queer community. Built into the social rules of the
platform is a strong stance against the posting of pro-fascist or alt-right content, a unique
feature of Mastodon that is partly a product of the political orientation of its community
and partly a product of the anti-Nazi laws its German founder, Rochko, was influenced
by. Also prevalent on the platform is a hesitation towards posting or consuming “news”
content; many users, wary of Twitter’s political, news-oriented culture, ask others to hide
news content behind a trigger warning.
What is perhaps most interesting about Mastodon, however, is its network
structure and the effect that network structure has on writers. While users and developers
turn to Mastodon for a number of reasons (many are just as interested in getting away
from Twitter’s white supremacists or Facebook’s misinformation problems as they are in
securing their own data), they have abstracted these problems into a single cause:
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centralized corporate networks. Built into the design of Mastodon is the argument that
centralization of servers is centralized power, and data collection/surveillance is an
exertion of that power. As an alternative, Mastodon uses what is called a “distributed” or
“federated” network structure. Federated networks allow users to create, maintain, and
moderate their own server (or “instance”), to which other users can connect. Upon
joining Mastodon, rather than connecting automatically to a central server, users must
choose which server to connect to and participate in. Often these servers will be created
with a specific community and content theme in mind: for example, I am part of a
community called “Fosstodon” created by Kev Quirk and Mike Stone. It has around
8,200 users (as of February 2020) and allows posts of any kind but has a special focus on
free and open-source software (hence “foss”-todon).
Rather than a central server that oversees all activity, a federated network consists
of clusters of servers that talk to each other with the ActivityPub protocol. Just to give an
idea of how it works, a user has effectively three timelines—a “home” timeline that
shows people I individually follow, a “local” timeline that shows posts from everyone in
my server, and a “federated” timeline that lists posts from everyone in my server plus
posts from everyone that a person on my server follows. Users are thus not limited to
seeing posts from only their server—you can follow users whose accounts are on another
server. Servers talk to each other using the ActivityPub protocol, which works very
similarly to email (i.e. a Gmail user can send and receive email from an outlook user
because they work from a shared protocol). This is the first part of what it means to be
“federated.” What federated also means is that any platform besides Mastodon that uses
the ActivityPub protocol can also communicate with a Mastodon server. A user on
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Mastodon, for example, can follow a user on Peertube, another free and open-source
federated site that offers video hosting. This kind of direct engagement across platforms
is impossible on centralized networks, as each platform runs its own proprietary
communication protocol. Together, each federated platform makes up what is called the
“fediverse,” a loose collection of free and open-source social networking and content
hosting platforms developed by volunteers and community members and not controlled
by a single entity.
The point here is not to advocate for all of us to use Mastodon or the fediverse,
but to draw attention to these platforms as spaces where users and writers are responding
to problems of textual ownership in a big data age and forming highly sophisticated
solutions. Part of the appeal of a federated network is that large scale data collection is
impossible; because a federated network is split up into many different servers, no one
entity is able to trace and record the data of all users. Individual servers and their
administrators in principle have access to the account, profile, and activity data of the
users on their local server, but because this data lacks scale (and because it goes against
the community ethos of Mastodon), there is no profit incentive or business model to
create around Mastodon.
Mastodon’s design recognizes a central idea that I think scholars of technical
communication and digital rhetoric who write about textual ownership can learn from:
networks are proprietary. That is, it is not just the platform website itself that is owned,
but also the larger material network: data servers, software code, information protocols.
Proprietary networks mean proprietary texts. FOSS communities, with their historical
origin in struggles against the property-form, recognized and responded to this
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connection between network and property much earlier than writing scholars. What
Mastodon also shows us is that writers looking to resist proprietary networks increasingly
need to be able to identify, critique, and participate in network structures. That is, part of
what it means to write today is to engage in questions of the network: of information
flows and server relations.
The importance of networks for contemporary digital writers has been described
by other composition and rhetoric scholars. In his 2015 book, Ethical Programs:
Hospitality and the Rhetorics of Software, James J. Brown Jr. argues that rhetorical
situations are now networked. To be networked for Brown means to be shaped by
software and by the protocols that determine how information flows, and to who.
Likewise, in his recent article “Writing at the Interface: A Research and Teaching
Program for Everyday Digital Media Literacy,” Matthew Overstreet describes a
disciplinary shift from interest in “computer literacy” to a need for “networked literacy”
(49). He calls on writing teachers to “help students design healthy information
ecosystems” (48). Both Brown and Overstreet tend to think of networks as referring to
social networks, to webs of individuals that have access to the writer and that the writer
has access to at any given point in time. What I think Mastodon shows us, however, is the
importance of material, technical networks, especially in regard to their implications on
proprietary relations, textual ownership, and agency.
At question, then, is the kind of agency Mastodon’s network structure offers to
writers. Or perhaps more precisely, what kind of agency are writers who switch to
Mastodon enacting? What access do they gain to the economic value of their textual
activity? What access to communications technologies do they gain that they would not
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otherwise receive elsewhere? Here the answers are decidedly mixed. Mastodon’s design
emerges from a highly sophisticated understanding of the problems that emerge when
digital writing meets the property form, and it explicitly attempts to undermine the
property-form by moving away from centralized, proprietary data servers. In doing so
Mastodon offers a model that effectively eliminates the vectoralist class; the platform is
no longer a place where writers transfer value to a ruling class that owns the means of
production.
But it seems that in replacing the vectoralist class, use- and exchange-value may
have been lost. Mastodon’s approach was to decentralize so as to make a vectoralist class
impossible, and this decentralization renders the use- and exchange-value that writers
produce on Web 2.0 inert. That is, Mastodon’s federated network structure tends not to
recognize that Web 2.0 writers are now active producers of a new resource, data, that has
social uses and economic value. By fragmenting one centralized server into many, it also
fragments the ability to aggregate data collection, undermining the social utility of that
data in a manner not unlike corporate privacy platforms. While it is technically possible
that a server administration could offer participants public sphere data, in practice this is
not known to be done, and would occur on a small scale at best. Hence Mastodon, even
as it struggles against proprietary platforms, does not offer writers the use-value of the
data they collectively produce, nor does it offer them any kind of exchange-value for that
data. Like the corporate privacy platforms, it shies away from offering writers access to
and the ability to make use of the full potentialities of digital technology.
On this point, it should be noted that Mastodon’s decentralized, federated network
structure is not the only FOSS alternative to mainstream corporate platforms. Other
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platforms, like Scuttlebutt, adopt Mastodon’s decentralized network structure and take it
one step further, using a fully distributed network. Where a federated network consists of
clusters of small servers operated by a class of advanced, tech-savvy writers, a distributed
network uses peer-to-peer communication protocols to ensure that every writer is also a
server (see Figure 3.3). In practice this is not unlike the infamous Napster of the early
2000s, except that instead of sharing music, writers are sharing posts, thread chains, and
likes using a more complicated data security protocol. In the context of writer agency and
economic and transformative access, a fully distributed network is in practice not too
different from a federated one, except that even the theoretical ability to gather data on a
smaller server is not possible.

Figure 3.3: Network structures: centralized (left); federated (center); and
distributed (right)
FOSS platforms like Mastodon and its distributed/decentralized counterparts,
then, offer something that the other models do not. We might say, optimistically, that
Mastodon writers “own” the network—sort of. In truth, the network is fragmented into
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servers, each owned by one or more members of a small class of tech-savvy users who
create, maintain, and moderate a community. Whether this constitutes writer ownership is
unclear and perhaps doubtful. On the one hand, any given writer can, with the right
technical knowledge, resources, and time, create and own a server. On the other hand, the
owner of a server is not really responsible to or representative of the writers who join that
server. And the larger decisions about how servers work and interact with each other
through the federated network are, as we’ll see in chapter 5, primarily determined by
Rochko, and not by the writers on the platform, regardless of server. While we may not
on FOSS platforms get the full vision of economic or transformative access outlined at
the beginning of this chapter, at the very least they get us to a point where we can
potentially benefit from the products of our own labor. That is, they at least get us out of
the exploitative class dynamics of mainstream and alternative corporate platforms. The
challenge for FOSS platforms, then, lies not so much in its ownership structure, but in its
governance. The free and open-source spirit embodied in platforms like Mastodon seem
to run up against the technical and labor demands of running the platform, and result in a
small subset of tech-savvy server hosts or programmers like Rochko who effectively
control the platform’s direction, appearance, network structure, etc. In my next chapter, I
will explore the governance practices of popular FOSS platforms, with an eye towards
interrogating not just whether writers “own” the platform, but whether they have
meaningful and substantive say in the design, production, and maintenance of the
platform itself.
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CHAPTER 5
WRITING FROM BELOW

What is Writing From Below?
So far in the dissertation, I have developed a definition of agency that pins writer
agency to the power of a collective writing class to collectively control their textual
productions, the value of those textual productions, and the environments through which
they write and create the world. I have talked through this definition through different
lenses— “economic” access; value; property—and argued that agency like this cannot be
reduced to individual ownership of each person’s own textual productions. Like the
production of commodities in the 19th century, the production of information has become
socialized; hence our understanding of writer agency on a “social” Web 2.0 must
understand both ownership and agency as social categories. The previous chapter sought
to take this theoretical argument and see what alternative spaces writers and developers
are building to assert their collective agency. There are plenty of faux solutions—spaces
that may look a little different but operate out of the same vectoralist logic as the
dominant tech platforms. There are also some really novel and interesting FOSS
platforms, like Mastodon, that make new choices about how writing circulates or doesn’t
circulate on the web.
The goal of this chapter is to further explicate what I mean by “writer agency” in
concrete terms. Or, in other words, what my definition of “writer agency” might look like
in practice. There are a lot of open questions here. What might it mean for writers to have
“control” over the environments in which they write? The notion of “control” here is a bit
blurry and glosses over a lot of complexity. After all, when are we ever really in
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“control” of something, especially a complex system involving digital publics and
platforms? And who is “we”? The obvious answer—writers—is a generic term that hides
a lot of differences in goals, identity, technical expertise, and base-level interest in how
platforms work. So far, my approach to control and writer agency has been economic in
nature, but the economic and the rhetorical on Web 2.0 are deeply entangled; control over
value comes paired with platform-level decisions about how platforms mediate our
rhetorical relationships to each other and our public spheres. Thus, the central question
is: what decisions are being made or could be made about how platforms function, how
writing is produced and circulated on them, and how value is accrued and distributed? In
sum, what might “control” actually do for writers?
It is important to note that it is already a success to even ask these questions. In
the current structure of Web 2.0, they are questions that writers are never asked. They are
decided internally at the platform-level by the vectoralist class and answered not
according to some sense of social good but according to what will aid in the extraction of
value. It is already a step towards writer agency to open up these questions. This chapter
is an exploratory effort to answer some of them, and also to make a definitional
argument. Given how the inextricability of the economic and rhetorical when discussing
platforms, I offer an initial approach to answering the question of what we “should do”
by considering the question in class-based terms. Specifically, I propose the idea of
“writing from below.” Writing-from-below is the act of writers making claim to, or
reclaiming, design-level decisions over texts and publics that are currently outsourced to
vectoralists. It is the exercise of distributed control over Web 2.0 infrastructures. By
extension, it is also the reflective practice of exploring and iterating what it means to
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conduct “distributed control” or design-level decisions equitably. This interplay between
exercise and reflection—what traditional socialists might call “dialectics” or what
composition and rhetoric teachers might call “praxis”—constitutes writing-from-below.
To practice or to teach writing-from-below, I argue, is to participate in exploring the
questions about “control” that I outlined above, and to explore what it means to practice
agency. Without writing-from-below, we will remain stuck in a vectoralist economy of
writing, one oriented around restricting writing to the production of textual artifacts that
can be appropriated as property, and restricting writers to the social relations that
property makes manifest.
Writing-from-below comes from Hal Draper’s canonical argument for “socialism
from below.” In his 1966 article “The Two Souls of Socialism,” Draper distinguishes
between two types of socialism: socialism-from-above, and socialism-from-below.
Socialism-from-above is characterized by a ruling elite who “collectivize” ownership by
concentrating power in the state and running the economy via a centralized, authoritarian
regime. Draper describes this as the “dominant” strand of socialism, characterized most
prominently by Stalinist Soviet Union. Socialism-from-above, he argues, disempowers
workers by delegating the responsibility of their agency to a ruling elite. This elite can
vary in form—technocratic, bureaucratic, vectoralist—but the point in all cases it
removes decision-making power and responsibility from the daily lives of the majority.
By contrast, Draper’s “socialism-from-below” describes a consensus-oriented approach
that collectivizes ownership by distributing decision-making powers broadly and locally.
The idea is that by placing a higher burden of knowledge (knowing what makes decisions
equitable, knowing what healthy deliberate processes look like, and even knowing what
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there is to be decided) on more people, we might construct a more equitable or
democratic world. Draper’s goal in proposing this term was to show that distributed
decision-making is desirable and is a feat that should be attained “from below,” or
through the actions of the working class.
We need to enact writing-from-below at the level of digital platforms. This means
not waiting around for the state to pass gestural reforms like GDPR or data privacy laws.
It also doesn’t mean waiting around for someone to create the “perfect” alternative social
media platform that ethically empowers writers. Both of these are writing-from-above
attitudes that hand off responsibility to other actors. To practice writing-from-below
means to take these matters into our own hands, to the extent that we are locally able.
This notion is not a totally new idea to composition and rhetoric. Certain pockets of
critical or socially oriented writing teachers have explored what are effectively writingfrom-below pedagogies. Anytime writing teachers have cocreated a syllabus, collectively
decided on how a class negotiates language rules, grades, or assignments, the class is
practicing writing-from-below (or attempting to; obviously the academic space of the
classroom and the institutional authority of a teacher complicate the organicness of these
processes). The deliberative nature of distributed decision-making also has long roots in
rhetorical values (that is, there is at least one narrative of rhetorical history that correlates
the development of meta-reflective knowledge on persuasion with deliberative
democratic institutions). Even if many writing teachers do not identify as “socialist,” the
spirit of writing-from-below is not unfamiliar to composition and rhetoric.
To identify writing-from-below practices and pedagogies on the digital platform
means first exploring what it means to participate equitably in the design of use of the
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platform. To develop such a practice, I work inversely, examining Mastodon as a site that
attempts such equitable practices but fails. From its failure, I believe we can extract more
positive suggestions for how to move forward. Looking at this case study illustrates how
Mastodon’s governance model is both typical of many FOSS platforms and antithetical to
the project of writer agency and writing-from-below that I am advocating.

Governance in Action: Mastodon
Since its beginning, Mastodon has grappled with tensions over how the platform
should be run and designed. Mastodon’s tensions are instructive for those of us who want
to think through what writer agency looks like in nonproprietary digital spaces. As I will
show, a major takeaway here is that creating a nonproprietary writing platform means
very little for writer agency if writers do not have meaningful say in how the platform is
designed or maintained. While disentangling platforms from the vectoralist class is
necessary to make it possible for writers to have control over the value of their writing
and the design of the platform, doing so is no guarantee of equitable governance models.
The actual experience of writer agency changes very little if design decisions and value
decisions shift from vectoralists to a handful of perhaps well-intentioned but idiosyncratic
software developers. Especially given that software developers tend to skew heavily
white, upper-middle class, straight, etc., this kind of writing-from-above is not desirable
for many.
The source of the tension between Mastodon’s developer and its users is rooted in
the platform’s “benevolent dictator for life” (BDFL) governance model. BDFL describes
a governance structure in which the original developer of the project, who often feels a
sense of authorial ownership, retains permanent control over changes to the code, as well
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as to the direction and values of the project. Though these developers may be quite goodnatured (indeed, they often begin the project in response to a social problem or
community need), the “authoritarian” nature of their control can create tensions between
themselves and the community that the project intends to serve. As a project grows and
its user base becomes more complex, more varied, and more engaged, conflicts can
emerge between users and developers that are not appropriately mediated by a single
person’s communication strategy, however well-intended they are. In short, software in a
BDFL structure very quickly becomes subject to the whims of the creator rather than the
needs or wants of its users.
While Mastodon operates as free and open-source software, the developer of the
platform, Eugen Rochko, must approve each pull request to the platform. This BDFL
model worked well enough when Mastodon was quite small, but as it attracted more
users with varying interests (including some who disagree with Rochko’s original vision
of the platform), tensions over key design decisions emerged between its users and its
developer. We can sort these issues into three categories: disagreements over design
decisions, frustration with the platform’s governance structure, and feature recognition.
Rochko’s original vision of the platform was as an alternative to Twitter that
would not become inundated with the latest political news and hot takes, and that
explicitly banned hate speech. To accomplish this, Rochko fostered a platform culture
that encouraged users to hide political news under content warnings or to not post them at
all. As the digital journalist Ana Valens writes, “Visiting Mastodon feels like strolling
through the first ‘apolitical’ social network. There’s no urgency to talk about the Trump
administration’s policies or break down ongoing political events.” Early users on
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Mastodon took pride in the platform’s apolitical circulation policy; the space came to be
seen as a kind of safe reprieve that, by disinvesting from political content, also
disinvested from toxic and politically oriented users. Rochko also—to much praise from
its users—aggressively banned far right Nazi’s from the platform long before Twitter
would admit to even considering that kind of content moderation. And so Mastodon came
to be known as a kind of alternative space where one could practice social media without
being bombarded by a toxic news cycle and without engaging with the worst users of
corporate platforms.
This kind of public may have been nice for some, for a while, but for other users
the deemphasis of political discussion made it difficult to write about important events
affecting their lives. This sentiment became especially strong among the vibrant
community of queer users and servers that were a large portion of Mastodon’s users and
that over time grew uncomfortable with Mastodon’s apolitical feeds. For these users,
Mastodon’s circulation policy became a much-discussed design feature that denied them
the ability to write about crucial events that impacted their lives (see Valens; Hart;
Cassian). As Valens puts it, queer users “cannot be apolitical by nature. Being queer isn’t
a hobby; it’s a political identity. And so while Mastodon seems fine on the surface,
there’s a much larger schism at play.”
In addition to circulation policy, Rochko pursued a number of design decisions—
specifically, anti-harassment design decisions—that queer users like Cassian became
uncomfortable with. As Cassian writes in a much-circulated Medium blog, queer users
who came to Mastodon to escape harassment commonplace on mainstream platforms
found themselves having to continually block what Cassian calls “White Guy Avatars,”
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users who offer unsolicited criticism or make abusive comments. But they found that
after blocking abusive users, they continued to see posts from those users in other
timelines. When the community brought this up as an issue with Rochko, Cassian writes,
they were met with ridicule and dismissed; Rochko believed that this is a positive feature
that comes with the server-oriented communities on Mastodon. Likewise, when Rochko
proposed a “trending tags” feature that would work similarly to Twitter’s, users
expressed concerns on GitHub that the feature is too often used on Twitter to attract and
abuse vulnerable people. These concerns, Cassian argues, went unheard.
In short, queer community concerns were not always heard by Rochko, who
gained a reputation for being dismissive and for pushing his own vision of the platform.
The disparity between Rochko and the platform’s queer community was especially
noteworthy given the size of that community. As Allie Hart writes, while the queer
community “made up a significant portion of [Mastodon’s] early adopters and have
contributed to the project in meaningful ways, they have never had any real decisionmaking power.” In other words, while queer writers like Cassian and Hart were engaging
quite meaningfully in the platform’s development and were practicing what I would
describe as highly sophisticated forms of platform-level design-thinking 11, their status as
“agentive” writers was very much in question in a BDFL governance structure.

Finally, this sense of being “left out” extended to recognition. Rochko became
notorious on Mastodon for refusing to credit writers for development or feature ideas. He
is known to ignore features requested by users for some time until later implementing

By “design thinking,” I refer not to the IDEO-related heuristic for business innovation,
but to a general set of digital literacies that writers should have in Web 2.0. I will explain
this set more later in the chapter.

11
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them and attributing them in release notes to himself (or, on one occasion, to “community
consciousness.” See Valens). In an interview with the Dailydot, Rochko defends this
practice, arguing that he doesn’t credit writers with feature ideas because they don’t
actually design the system or write the code (Valens). He also defended his BDFL model
and decision-making practices as more “efficient” that other forms of governance. As he
puts it:
When you separate the decision making between different people that can
come and go, you sort of have a tragedy of the commons where nobody is
fully responsible for it and people have disagreements over all sorts of
things, and you add the bureaucracy of [a] voting system, etc. . . . Often
times you’ll get requests from the community that are directly mutually
exclusive to each other, and you have to make a choice, like, which
direction will you go or how do you make a compromise. Valens
For writers who come to Mastodon seeking to exert more control over the “social” nature
of the spaces they write in, these kinds of responses can be quite alienating. Rochko’s
apparent division between programmers who contribute to a project and writer/users who
consume a project, I believe, is a direct cause of this alienation. By suggesting that only
those who write code can have a sense of authorial ownership over a feature or platform,
Rochko has effectively divested Mastodon’s nonprogramming writers from meaningful
agency (an attitude not uncommon in tech circles). These decisions have had
consequences; while Mastodon is relatively successful among alternative social media
platforms, it experienced a kind of exodus of queer users who have sworn off the
platform until its governance structure changes (Hart, Cassian). As Valens puts it,
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Mastodon’s is at a kind of crossroads. It has to choose what kind of platform it wants to
be: a “community-driven government system to protect vulnerable users,” or a BDFL
governance model that matches Rochko’s vision of the platform.
In this situation, the question of governance becomes central to the experience
and expression of agency. Writers like Cassian and Hart clearly felt that their input,
expressed as a community concern in response to oppressions and experiences they felt
on other platforms, was devalued and unrecognized on Mastodon. They ultimately left
the platform for it. Their story suggests that there is quite a bit for users, writers, and
developers to figure out if we are to enact equitable governance practices on writing
platforms. The next section explores what it is we can take away from this story.

Lessons to be Learned
It would be easy to see Cassian and Hart’s frustrations and departure as yet
another failure in the history bin of overly ambitious, obscure, and alternative tech
projects. It seems almost instinctual to do so; however much writing publics criticize
Web 2.0 corporations, when I mention Mastodon to people, the initial reaction is often
dismissive. How could any platform contend with Facebook and Twitter? There is a logic
to this response, but for writing scholars it misses the point. Cassian and Hart’s story is in
many ways a resounding success, both for them and for the platform. Mastodon set out to
center the rights of its users in response to the failures of mainstream, centralized
platforms. In doing so it created the space for writers to engage with platform literacies in
ways they never could on Facebook or Twitter. Cassian and Hart employed a number of
highly sophisticated critical literacies, including:
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•

applying a combination of technical and design thinking needed to understand
platform decisions.

•

evaluating the implications of these technical design decisions across identity
categories, including and especially queer users.

•

pursuing productive communication practices between developers/users/writers of
different knowledge backgrounds and skill sets.

•

articulating a critique of the design decisions of Mastodon when the platform
failed to suit their needs.

•

reflection on how to theorize and assess governance in particular spaces and for
particular purposes, etc.

When given the chance to engage with platform design as a practice of agentive writing,
Cassian and Hart did so until their ambitions exceeded what the platform had to offer.
As Cassian and Hart’s story shows, part of participating in a digital space wrested
away from a vectoralist class is that writing shifts beyond just writing texts to writing
publics, platforms, interfaces, networks. Together these literacies constitute what we
might call a technics of platform governance, a set knowledge practices and habits that I
argue 21st century digital writers increasingly need to learn to partake in. These new
forms of writing specific to a digital era have always been “social” in a generic sense but
now must become social in the very specific sense that means purposefully and
collaboratively designed, which also means we must learn how to write collaboratively in
equitable and meaningful ways. I call this set of knowledge practices and habits platform
literacies, and identify (for now) five directions for effective platform literacy in Web
2.0:
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•

Platform geographies

•

Platform design

•

Technics reasoning

•

Platform governance

•

Platform identities

I call these “directions” rather than “components” of platform literacies to emphasize
their exploratory nature. In the next section, I further describe the five directions and
ground them as necessary for writer agency in Web 2.0.

Platform Literacies
Jim Brown has described a version of these literacies in his notion of “ethical
programs.” Ethical programs, as he describes them, are ways in which individuals or
communities make protocol decisions about how information flows to them and through
what channels (160). We make and modify our own ethical programs daily anytime we
choose who to follow, choose what to read, choose where we go, etc. To make an ethical
program is a procedural and deliberative practice, a means of practicing agency by
controlling a local interface with others. I want to take Brown’s notion of an ethical
program and expand it to include a broader set of writing-from-below and platform-level
design decisions that we might call “platform literacies.” My central argument is that
writing with agency in Web 2.0 requires platform literacies, and that as writing teachers
we should commit to theorizing and teaching these literacies. Without these literacies, it
is difficult to imagine writers having the tools they need to create, participate in, and
maintain equitable platforms that are not designed for a vectoralist elite. My vision here
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is that they involve teaching not just passive user roles (“how do I write effectively on
this platform?”) but active design thinking and contribution (“how do I effectively write
the platform?”). To do this, writers need to be able to do some new things:
Platform geographies: First, writers need to be able to think through how
platform design impacts communities and publics. How does the design of the platform
create or cultivate certain kinds of publics or ways of relating to each other? Benjamin
Bratton calls this method of inquiry “platform geography”: the mapping of design
decisions onto social relations (110). There are many illustrative examples. To return to
Mastodon, for instance, the platform’s interpretation of a news feed creates new
rhetorical dynamics for users and their communities. Where Facebook has a single feed
dictated by the content friends write, Mastodon has multiple feeds, including a serverwide feed that displays not just content you follow but content others on your server
follow. This creates a new rhetorical consideration in which choices about who to follow
become not just a matter of personal interest but an interpretation of community values.
Users must learn to cultivate an awareness of community interests and then contribute to
or perform those interests through their everyday follows. Different servers on Mastodon
have their own ways of dealing with this, from anything-goes to community-drafted rules
for what kinds of content users are encouraged or discouraged from following. In other
words, the design of the platform—its decentralized server structure and feed design—
creates ways of relating to each other that require different rhetorical considerations and
literacies.
We can find similar considerations of platform geography in the design choices of
mainstream platforms. How does Facebook’s closed network of friend-only, personal

138

posts change how writers engage or imagine publics in comparison with Twitter’s more
open, public-oriented follow and hashtag system? How might a platform’s content
moderation policy—say, Reddit’s empowered moderators vs. Facebook’s algorithms and
hired screeners—affect the kind of content that circulates? We can also extend design
thinking beyond cloud or interface architecture to the physical geographies of place: as
Dustin Edwards has shown, the centralized servers of mainstream platforms demand
large-scale data centers that demand millions of gallons of water a year but are built in
dry, drought-stricken areas (“Digital Rhetoric on a Damaged Planet”). The network
design of the platform, then, creates new relations between the writers of the platform and
people who live near the centers where the writing is stored, relations that may be
inequitable or unsustainable.
Composition and rhetoric scholars have mostly worked with platforms through a
form of critical interpretation. Michael J. Faris in “How to Be Gay with Locative Media,”
examines the rhetorical effect of Grindr’s homonormative advertising given its unique
power as popular a platform for gay men. Michael Trice and Liza Potts in “Building Dark
Patterns into Platforms” show how determined Gamergate activists disrupted publics on
Twitter, Reddit, and GitHub through an organized communication strategy. We need to
take this work further and “get under the hood” in more direct ways. Scholars outside
writing studies—Safiya Noble’s Algorithms of Oppression or Cathy O’Neils Weapons of
Math Destruction—have begun this work, but there is still a lot to think through. As
Bratton puts it, though platforms like Facebook and Google may operate at the scale of
historical institutions like the state or market, we have yet to fully attend to them. “As
opposed to the public rights of citizens of a polis and the private rights of homo
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economicus in a market, we are severely lacking in robust and practical theory of the
political design logic of platforms, even as they remake geopolitics in their image (or
demand a different language to describe what the political is now or ever was)” (44). The
ability to identify and critically assess the social relations that follow from design
decisions is a new, high-level, and iterative literacy that writers who want to wrest control
from a vectoralist class must develop and practice.
Second, writers need to be able to identify a range of key decisions about platform
design if they are to participate in conversations about platform geography. I identify five
types of higher-order decisions that writers and writing teachers should pay more
attention to (there may be more, but this is a start):
A. Server structure, or the computing architecture and protocols for data
storage, data collection, and database access. Writers should be aware of
the differences between a centralized vs. decentralized vs. distributed
server structure, as well as their effects on relations within the platform
(circulation) and outside the platform (computing resource distribution).
B. Data policy, or the control-level decisions about how users access (or
don’t access) data collected (or not collected) on servers and what
purposes that data is put towards. Writers should be informed about the
potential use-value of different types of aggregated data in order to make
decisions about how community data is collected and leveraged (note that
this is different from the “no data collection ever” sentiments of many
“anti-surveillance” writing scholars).
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C. Circulation protocol, or design-level decisions about how writers access
texts on a platform (e.g., what types of feeds exist), how texts circulate, to
who, and when. Writers should cultivate a sense for how design decisions
about how texts circulate impact publics, platform cultures, and user
experience. This may mean discerning such protocols through practice
(Gallagher Update Culture) as so many of these choices are “black-boxed”
(Pilsch).
D. Interface design, or the tools and systems through which writers engage
with a circulation protocol. Writers should develop a critical capacity for
the cultural values built into interfaces (see Selfe and Selfe) as well as the
effects of different interface decisions for information indexing, like
hashtags, follows, retweets, etc.
E. Content moderation, or decisions about how to define, identify, and
respond to undesirable community content. Writers should be aware of
different models of content moderation and the effect they have on users
and the writing process (see Gillespie Custodians of the Internet).
These five higher-order platform decisions are currently made “from above,” by the
vectoralist class or by professional developers working for the vectoralist class. To write
against the vectoralist class on open-source Web 2.0 platforms, by contrast, is to
participate in these decisions “from below.” The building of this knowledge as a part of
what it means to write offers both critical and transformative access. Critical access in the
sense that writers now better know the range of relations they are entering into when they
write, and thus have the language and context to articulate their own vision of platform
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writing. And transformative access in that writers who have this background can then
operationalize it in contexts—present and future—that have the space for them to do so.
Note that it is not in the spirit of “writing-from-below” to wait passively for the right
platform to emerge to practice these literacies. Rather, the distribution of these literacies,
I argue, should be actively pursued. This is a kind of civic-rhetorical logic: that
distributing platform literacies will help foster the conditions for their use (not unlike
Annette Vee’s approach to coding as a literacy), and by doing so foster writer agency.
Third, writers need to be comfortable engaging in technical discourse without
necessarily fully understanding everything about platform design. I see this as a technical
writing skill that is becoming more broadly necessary now. For example, I don’t know
how to set up a server or how to create an information protocol. But to participate fully
on an equitably governed open-source platform, I would need to know what a server is,
what a protocol does, where computation occurs, and where data is stored in order to
have some sense of what the effects of a design are. A little bit of technical knowledge
about computer systems can go a long way towards understanding the social impact of
those systems, and thus to making informed decisions about the appropriateness of a
system for a given platform or user. At a logistical level, a question that arises here is
where writers (or students) are expected to get this knowledge. My sense is that we can
teach it as a part of what it means to teach writing at every level, including and perhaps
especially first-year writing.
A noteworthy example is in the history of writing, computing, and space. One
way of thinking about Mastodon is to contextualize it in the lengthy digital history of
users grappling with the social relations embedded in the spatial configurations of a
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computing system. As Joy Rankin’s A People’s History of Computing in the United
States shows us, the questions of where computing happens and where data is stored are
technical design questions but also questions of social relations. In the late 50s and early
60s—the very early years of public computing in the United States—computers were
primarily located in large, room-sized towers in research facilities. Computing time was
so precious that users had to physically submit their programs early in the day and then
wait for all day for the most efficient batch processing to be conducted to get their results.
The result was a very isolated computing community, one that maximized computing
efficiency over users (27). As computing became more accessible, Rankin shows,
universities like Dartmouth developed a timesharing system in which faculty and students
shared local computing resources and received results more quickly, with longer
programs being interrupted by shorter ones. The result was a local computing community
in which writing norms arose in a bid to equitably share computing power while
achieving user goals promptly. In other words, as computing became spatially distributed
to more communities, user control over the system’s resources increased, and
communities had to invent ways of managing that control equitably.
Rankin’s book is largely about computing power, but I think the same principles
apply to data storage and server creation. As these activities grow more distributed (e.g.
Mastodon), writers have more control over their design, but must understand the
consequences of their design decisions without needing to know everything the system.
Just as students at Dartmouth did not need to know everything about how a timesharing
computer network is designed and organized in order to create community norms around
its use, writers today do not need to know everything about data storage protocols or
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server maintenance in order to understand how different server configurations create or
negate forms of power.
Fourth, writers need to be able to negotiate writing-from-below across different
levels of technical knowledge. Writers working on or with open-source platforms come
with a variety of technical backgrounds. Some have programming backgrounds, others
design backgrounds, and many (most) are simply everyday users looking to read and
produce content. But every writer, I argue, should have a sense for what a productive
deliberative relationship is between people writing code for a platform and people talking
about what they want the platform to do but who don’t necessarily know how to create an
interface. This does not mean that everyone needs to be able to code for the project or
develop assets, but rather that writers should be involved in the governance and design of
the platform, or at least know what models of governance exist and which might suit their
needs as writers. The idea is to avoid the “Mastodon” model, where expertise is assumed
to lie only with those who have technical knowledge, and where developers only listen to
developers because they feel everyone else doesn’t count as a knowledge producer. As
writing teachers, we are well positioned to offer strategies for identifying and practicing
productive deliberative discussions that overcome the expertise/ignorance binary.
Historically, achieving distributed governance in the context of software
development has been quite tricky. In some ways, shared governance or distributed
decision-making seems to match software quite well, as software (especially modern
software) is almost always collaboratively made and, as Kevin Brock’s Rhetorical Code
Studies shows, involves a rich and deeply rhetorical development process. In a typical
open-source development context, developers make changes to a project by submitting
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“pull” requests (modifications to the code) for the community to review. As Brock shows
us, these pull requests are highly rhetorical acts (95). In order for a pull request to be
accepted, the developer must make a case, in both the new code and supplementary text
describing the exigence and purpose of the change, that the changes solve a real problem
and, more importantly, that they are in accord with the overall values of the project, code
structure, and writing style. If the developer can persuade the community on these
accounts, the changes will be accepted. If not, they will likely be rejected, even if they
solve a real bug or offer a new feature.
This account of software governance, in which decision-making is tied to
rhetorical prowess, sounds vaguely democratic. However, as Brock notes, in practice
development is much more hierarchical (78). What tends to happen over time is that a
small number of developers (those who are more active or, especially in corporate
settings, those who are assigned as project managers) come to acquire the most decisionmaking powers while most users become shut out. This process is exacerbated by a
pervasive attitude in software development that privileges those with technical coding
knowledge (or, as Brock notes, those who are perceived to possess coding knowledge)
over other users (82). The result is that decision-making in development communities
tends to skew to those who appear to have the most coding experience, regardless of their
other qualities.
Developer communities have attempted to solve their one-sided governance
problems in a variety of ways. The Debian/Linux community most famously elects a
yearly project leader by vote. Others perform outreach to their users and technical writers
in an attempt to get them more involved with development. Brock, for example, mentions
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the Red Hat Fedora project, a Linux development community that labels all users as
“friends” in an effort to foster a less hierarchical relationship (81). Others have stressed
the importance of user feedback during various stages of the production cycle (this trend
is becoming much bigger in computer science as it grapples with the ethical implications
of computer systems/software: see Hovy and Spruit, D’ignazio), much like architecture’s
participatory design movement or 4th generation writing evaluation (see Guba and
Lincoln). Whether or to what extent these efforts work to distribute decision-making
power is unclear. Certainly programmer bias still exists, and there are technical
requirements that restrict certain kinds of engagement; not every user, for example,
knows their way around GitHub or can create pull requests that materialize their vision of
the program. But my point here is that writers stand to benefit from these governance
models that distribute design decisions beyond a narrow class of professional developers.
Writing-from-below enacts a twofold challenge. As a concept it challenges a political
economy of writing oriented around the propertization of writing and a vectoralist/writer
contradiction. But it also challenges a technocratic ethos that, while not totally reducible
to vectoral capital, is caught up in the logic that separates design-level decisions from
writers. The technocratic ethos asserts that only those equipped with a full kit of
professional expertise and technical knowledge are suitable to design platforms. 12

Writing from below echoes an emerging trend in professional writing and technical
communication scholarship to challenge professional expertise and technical knowledge.
As part of the social justice turn of the last few years, technical communication scholars
have identified the potential of “professional expertise” to devalue already-existing
technical literacies among “nonprofessionals” and thereby justify their exclusion from
design-level decisions (see Walton, Moore and Jones).
12

146

Finally, writers need to be able to negotiate writing-from-below across different
identity backgrounds. As we saw with Cassian and Hart, there’s a continued need to think
through how identity mediates platform design, how experiences on a platform are
uneven, and what design decisions can be made in response. Writing and literacy studies
folks have a long tradition of scholarship linking identity and literacy to build on here
(see Royster, Villanueva, Brodkey, for starters). We can link that work to contemporary
design there. Here, enacting writing-from-below well means going beyond the true but
trivial observation that design impacts different writers differently; rather, it means
contextualizing design affordances within larger contexts social inequities and historical
trajectories. Critical design theorist Sasha Costanza-Chock, drawing from sociologist
Patricia Hill Collins, offers a “matrix of domination” framework for identifying how
design principles “erase certain groups of people, specifically those who are
intersectionally disadvantaged or multiply burdened under white supremacist
heteropatriarchy, capitalism, and settler colonialism” (19). Costanza-Chock argues for
what they call “design justice,” or a “framework for analysis of how design distributes
benefits and burdens between various groups of people . . . focus[ing] explicitly on the
ways that design reproduces and/or challenges the matrix of domination” (23). If writers
are to practice writing-from-below and participate in design decisions, I argue, they need
to frameworks like design justice to identify the causes and consequences of design
decisions across identity categories.

Futures
These ideas represent an expanded and ambitious idea of what it means to write
We’ve already seen arguments that Web 2.0 has changed definitions of writing (see
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Dush’s writing as content, Vee’s coding literacies, Gallagher’s writing to algorithmic
audiences). What we might call “platform writing” is no different.
Admittedly, there are a lot of new literacies here. It’s easy to react by saying “I
don’t need this because when would I use this knowledge.” But what I am getting at is
that we don’t use this knowledge on vectoralist platforms because they are designed from
above to funnel writing through the property form and to divorce writers from these
agencies. I see in open-source platforms like Mastodon the potential to challenge this
funneling, but even there it is only a potential because of the inequitable governance
policies that exist on Mastodon. But still we saw users like Cassian and Hart engaging in
many of these literacies on their own as writers. As writing teachers we have the unique
power to model and teach the activity of “writing” in a way that corresponds with our
vision of how the web should be structured.
We can do this, first, by studying in more details those writers, like Cassian and
Hart, who are already pushing the bounds of literacy in digital context. Ultimately, I
think, we learn what Web 2.0 writing is by looking at what writers are doing and why.
But we can also begin formalizing what we do know to prepare writers for the digital
literacies I have discussed. We can do that by building better relationships with computer
science, data science, and informatics departments that are closely tied to the task of
design in Web 2.0. We can reimagine our teaching of technology and writing to be more
ambitious by building in these five directions.
The five steps I have outlined above are just a beginning. A great deal of work
remains to think them through more thoroughly and to realize their potential in practice
and in pedagogy. To do this work, writing scholars will need to continue to reimagine
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what it means to be a writer across changing digital contexts, mediums, and political
economies. This work is very much worth doing, though, if writers are to take ownership
in the production and circulation technologies through which we write and share texts.

149

150

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Amidon, Tim, et al. “Copyright, Content, and Control: Student Authorship Across
Educational Technology Platforms.” Kairos: Rhetoric, Technology, Pedagogy,
vol 24, no. 1, Sep. 2019.
Amidon, Timothy, R and Jessica Reyman. “Authorship and Ownership of User
Contributions on the Social Web.” Cultures of Copyright: Contemporary
Intellectual Property Law. Peter Lang, 2014.
Arola, Kristin L. “The Design of Web 2.0: The Rise of the Template, The Fall of
Design.” Computers and Composition, vol. 27, 2010, 4-14.
Baldwin, Peter. The Copyright Wars: Three Centuries of Trans-atlantic Battle. Princeton
University Press, 2014.
Banks, Adam J. “Oakland, the Word, and the Divide: How We All Missed the Moment.”
Cross-Talk in Comp Theory: A Reader. Ed. By Victor Villanueva and Kristin L.
Arola. NCTE, 2011, 827-868.
Barlow, John Perry. “A Declaration on the Independence of Cyberspace.” Electronic
Frontier Foundation, https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence
Barthes, Roland. “The Death of the Author.” Image, Music, Text, translated by Stephen
Heath, Hill and Wang, 1977, pp. 142–48.
Barton, Matthew D. “The Future of Rational-Critical Debate in Online Public Spheres.”
Computers and Composition, vol. 22, 2005, pp. 177-90.
Beck, Estee. “A Theory of Persuasive Computer Algorithms for Rhetorical Code
Studies.” Enculturation, Nov. 2016.
---, Estee. “Writing Educator Responsibilities for Discussing the History and Practice of
Discussing Surveillance & Privacy in Writing Classrooms.” Kairos: a Journal of
Rhetoric, Technology, and Pedagogy, vol. 20, no. 2, 2016.
Benkler, Yochai. The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets
and Freedom. Yale University Press, 2006.
Bhatarrai, Pratistha. “Algorithmic Value: Cultural Encoding, Textuality, and the Myth of
‘Source Code.’” Catalyst: Feminism, Theory, Technoscience, vol. 3, no. 1, 2017.
Boyle, Casey. Rhetoric as Posthuman Practice. The Ohio State University Press, 2018.
Brandt, Deborah. “When People Write for Pay.” JAC, vol. 29, no. 1, 2009, pp. 165-195.
Bratton, Benjamin. The Stack: On Software and Sovereignty. MIT Press, 2015.

151

Brock, Kevin. Rhetorical Code Studies: Discovering Arguments in and around Code.
University of Michigan Press, 2019.
Brodkey, Linda. “On the Subjects of Class and Gender in ‘The Literacy Letters.’” CrossTalk in Comp Theory: A Reader. Ed. By Victor Villanueva and Kristin Arola.
NCTE, 2011. 581-596.
Brown, James. Ethical Programs: Hospitality and the Rhetorics of Software. University
of Michigan, 2015.
Brown, Michael F. “Can Culture Be Copyrighted?” Current Anthology vol. 39, no. 2,
1998, pp. 193-222.
Cassian. “I Left Mastodon Yesterday.” Medium, 2018.
Chun, Wendy. Programmed Visions: Software and Memory. MIT Press, 2013.
Clark, Elizabeth J. “The Digital Imperative: Making the Case for a 21st Century
Pedagogy.” Computers and Composition, vol. 27, 2010, 27-35.
Cooper, Marilyn M. “The Ecology of Writing.” College English, vol. 48, no. 4, 1986,
364-75.
Costanza-Chock, Sasha. Design Justice: Community-Led Practices to Build the Worlds
We Need. The MIT Press, 2020.
Daley, Elizabeth. “Expanding the Concept of Literacy.” Educause Review 38.2, 2003, 3340.
Dalla Costa, Mariarosa, and Selma James. The Power of Women and the Subversion of
the Community. Falling Wall Press, 1975.
Defoe, William. Robinson Crusoe. Signet, 2008.
DeVoss, Dànielle Nicole. “English Studies and Intellectual Property: Copyright,
Creativity, and the Commons.” Pedagogy: Critical Approaches to Teaching
Literature, Language, Composition, and Culture, vol. 10, no. 1, 2009, pp. 201-15.
DeVoss, Dànielle Nicole and James E. Porter. “Why Napster Matters to Writing:
Filesharing as a New Ethic of Digital Delivery.” Computers and Composition,
vol. 23, 2006, 178-210.
D’Ignazio, Catherine and Lauren Klein. Data Feminism. The MIT Press, 2020.
DiNucci, Darcy. “Fragmented Future.” Print, vol. 53, no. 4, 20, 1999, 221-220.
Doctorow, Cory. “Lockdown: The Coming War on General Purpose Computing.” Jan.
10, 2012, https://boingboing.net/2012/01/10/lockdown.html.

152

Draper, Hal. “The Two Souls of Socialism.” New Politics, vol. 5, no. 1, 1966, 57-84.
Dunbar-Hester, Christina. Hacking Diversity: The Politics of Inclusion in Open
Technology Cultures. Princeton University Press, 2020.
Dush, Lisa. “When Writing Becomes Content.” College Composition and
Communication, vol. 67, no. 2, 2015, 173-196.
Edbauer, Jenny. “Unframing Models of Public Distribution: From Rhetorical Situation to
Rhetorical Ecologies.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly. vol. 35, no. 4, 2005, 5-24.
Ede, Lisa S. and Andrea A. Lunsford. Singular Texts/Plural Authors: Perspectives on
Collaborative Writing. Southern Illinois University Press, 1992.
Edwards, Dustin W. “Circulation Gatekeepers: Unbundling the Platform Politics of
Youtube’s Content ID.” Computers and Composition vol. 47, 2018, 61-74.
---. “Digital Rhetoric on a Damaged Planet: Storying Digital Damage as Inventive
Response to the Anthropocene.” Rhetoric Review, vol. 39, no. 1, 2020, 59-72.
Edwards, Dustin W and Bridget Gelms. “The Rhetorics of Platforms: Definitions,
Approaches, Futures.” Present Tense, vol. 6, issue 3, 2018.
Edwards, Mike. “Economies of Writing, Without the Economics: Some Implications of
Composition’s Economic Discourse as Represented in JAC 32.3–4.” Rhetoric
Review 33, 2014.
Facebook. Data Policy. facebook.com. 10 Jan 2020.
https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/update
Faris, Michael. “How To Be Gay with Locative Media: The Rhetorical Work of Grindr as
a Platform.” Present Tense, vol. 6, no. 3, 2018.
Foucault, Michel. “What is an Author?” The Foucault Reader. Pantheon Books, 1984.
Fuchs, Christian. “Labor in Informational Capitalism and the Internet.” The Information
Society, vol. 26, no. 3, 2010, 179-196.
Gallagher, John R. Update Culture and the Afterlife of Digital Writing. Utah State
University Press, 2020.
---. “Writing for Algorithmic Audiences.” Computers and Composition, vol. 11, 2017,
25-35.
Gere, Anne Ruggles. “Kitchen Tables and Rented Rooms: The Extracurricular of
Composition.” College Composition and Communication, vol. 45, no. 1, 1994,
75-92.
Gillespie, Tarleton. Custodians of the Internet. Yale University Press, 2018.
153

---. “Platforms Intervene.” Social Media and Society, vol. 1, no. 1, 2015.
GNU Network Services. “Web Services that Respect Your Freedom.” GNU IO.
https://gnu.io/. Accessed 2/21/2022.
Gries, Laurie E. Still Life with Rhetoric: A New Materialist Approach for Visual
Rhetorics. University Press of Colorado, 2015.
Guba, Egon and Yvonne Lincoln. Fourth Generation Evaluation. Sage Publications,
1989.
Habermas, Jurgen. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a
Category of Bourgeois Society. The MIT Press, 1991.
Hart, Allie. “Morning Mastodon.” Medium, 2017.
Hocutt, Daniel L. “Algorithms as Information Brokers: Visualizing Rhetorical Agency in
Platform Activities.” Present Tense, vol. 6, no. 3, 2018.
Hovy, Dirk and Shannon Spruit. “The Social Impact of Natural Language Processing.”
Proceedings of the 54th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational
Linguistics, 2016, 591-98.
Hughes, Jason. “Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: of Piracy, Propertization,
and Thomas Jefferson.” Southern California Law Review, vol. 79. No. 5, 2006.
Hunt, Andy and Dave Thomas “Software Archaeology.” IEEE Software, Mar/Apr. 2002.
Inoue, Asao B. Labor-Based Grading Contracts: Building Equity and Inclusion in the
Compassionate Writing Classroom. The WAC Clearinghouse; University Press of
Colorado, 2019.
Jameson, Frederic. Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Duke UP,
1992.
Kanellos, Michael. “Gates taking a seat in your den.” Interview. CNET 2005.
https://www.cnet.com/news/gates-taking-a-seat-in-your-den/
Karpiniec, Thomas. “From GNU Social to Mastodon.” Tinkering Down Under.
https://thomask.sdf.org/blog/2018/08/19/from-gnu-social-to-mastodon.html
Accessed 2/21/2022.
Latour, Bruno. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory.
Oxford University Press, 2005.
Laquintano, Timothy and Annette Vee. “How Automated Writing Systems Affect the
Circulation of Political Information Online.” Literacy in Composition Studies, vol.
5, no. 2, 2017.

154

LeCourt, Donna. “Habermasochism: The Promise of Cyberpublics in an Information
Economy.” Economies of Writing: Revaluations in Rhetoric and Composition. Ed.
by Bruce Horner, Brice Nordquist, and Susan M. Ryan. Utah State University
Press, 2017, 225-37.
Lessig, Lawrence. Free Culture: The Nature and Future of Creativity. Penguin Books,
2005.
---. The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World. Vintage, 2002.
Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration.
Digireads Publishing, 2015.
Logie, John. “A Copyleft Manifesto.” Kairos: Rhetoric, Technology, Pedagogy, vol. 24,
no. 1, Sep. 2019.
Lunsford, Andrea. “Rhetoric, Feminism, and the Politics of Textual Ownership.” College
English, vol. 61, no. 5, May 1999, pp. 529-44.
Lunsford, Andrea A. and Susan West. “Intellectual Property and Composition Studies.”
College Composition and Communication, vol. 47, no. 3, Oct. 1996, pp. 383-411.
Madison, James. “The Federalist No. 43.” The Federalist Papers, edited by Ian Shapiro,
Yale UP, 2009, pp. 219-27.
Marx, Karl. Capital, Vol. 1: A Critique of Political Economy. Ed. by Friedrich Engels.
Dover, 2011.
---, Karl and Friedrich Engels. The Communist Manifesto. New American Library, 1998.
Netanel, Neil Weinstock. “Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society.” The Yale Law
Journal vol. 106, no. 2, 1996. 283-387.
Noble, Safiya. Algorithms of Oppression: How Search Engines Reinforce Racism. NYU
Press, 2018.
O’Brien, Danny. “Statement on the Reelection of Richard Stallman to the FSF Board.”
Electronic Frontier Foundation.
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/03/statement-re-election-richard-stallman-fsfboard
O’Neil, Cathy. Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and
Threatens Democracy. Crown, 2016.
O’Reilly, Tim. “What is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next
Generation of Software.” Communications and Strategies, vol. 65, no. 1, 2007,
17-37.

155

Overstreet, Matthew. “Writing at the Interface: A Research and Teaching Program for
Everyday Digital Media Literacy.” Literacy in Composition Studies, 8(1), 47-66.
Papacharissi, Zizi. “The Virtual Sphere: The Internet as Public Sphere.” New Media and
Society, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 1-9.
Perzanowski, Aaron and Jason Schultz. The End of Ownership: Personal Property in the
Digital Economy. MIT Press, 2016.
Pilsch, Andrew. “Events in Flux: Software Architecture, Detractio, and the Rhetorical
Infrastructure of Facebook.” Computers and Composition, vol. 57, 2020.
Porter, James E. “Rhetoric in (as) a Digital Economy.” Rhetorics and Technologies: New
Directions in Writing and Communication. Ed. by Stuart Selber. University of
South Carolina Press, 2012, 173-97.
“Preamble to the Massachusetts Copyright Act of 1783.” Journals of the Continental
Congress, 326-27.
Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph. “What is Property? An Inquiry into the Principle of Right and
Government.” Translated by Benjamin R. Tucker.
www.marxists.org/reference/subject/economics/proudhon/property/. Accessed 6
Jan 2020.
Pulver, Christian. Metabolizing Capital: Writing, Information, and the Biophysical
Environment. Utah State University Press, 2020.
Pulver, Christian. “Web 2.0 Writing as Engine of Information Capital. Economies of
Writing: Revaluations in Rhetoric and Composition. Ed. by Bruce Horner, Brice
Nordquist, and Susan M. Ryan. Utah State University Press, 2017, 191-202.
Rankin, Joy. A People’s History of Computing in the United States. Harvard University
Press, 2018.
Reyman, Jessica. “The Rhetorical Agency of Algorithms.” Theorizing Digital Rhetoric,
ed. by Aaron Hess and Amber Davisson. Routledge, 2018.
---, Jessica. The Rhetoric of Intellectual Property. Routledge, 2012.
---, Jessica. “User Data on the Social Web: Authorship, Agency, and Appropriation.”
College English 75.5 (2013), 513-33.
Rose, Mark. Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright. Harvard University Press,
2005.
Royster, Jacqueline Jones. “When the First Voice You Hear is Not Your Own.” CrossTalk in Comp Theory: A Reader. Ed. By Victor Villanueva and Kristin Arola.
NCTE, 2011. 555-66.

156

Selfe, Cynthia, and Richard Selfe. “The Politics of the Interface: Power and Its Exercise
in Electronic Contact Zones.” Cross-Talk in Comp Theory: A Reader. Ed. By
Victor Villanueva and Kristin Arola. NCTE, 2011. 739-64.
Smith, Adam. The Wealth of Nations. Penguin, 1982.
Srinicek, Nick. Platform Capitalism. Polity, 2017.
Stallman, Richard. Free Software: Free Society. GNU Press, 2002.
Syverson, Margaret A. The Wealth of Reality: An Ecology of Composition. Southern
Illinoise University Press, 1999.
Thompson, Clive. “Clive Thompson on the New Literacy.” Wired Magazine, 2009.
Trice, Michael and Liza Potts. “Building Dark Patterns into Platforms: How GamerGate
Perturbed Twitter’s User Experience.” Present Tense, vol. 6, no. 3, 2018.
Trimbur, John. “Composition and the Circulation of Writing.” College Composition and
Communication, vol. 52, no. 2, 2000, 118-219.
Tsu. “Tsu for You.” https://tsulovers.com/ Accessed 5/10/2021.
United States, Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. American Geophysical Union v.
Texaco Inc., No. 1479, Oct. 1994. Open Jurist, https://openjurist.org/60/f3d/913
United States, Supreme Court. Eldred v. Ashcroft. United States Report, vol. 537, Jan.
2003, pp. 186-221. Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep537186/
United States, Supreme Court. Mazer v. Stein. United States Reports, vol. 347, Mar.
1954, pp. 201-20. Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep347201/
University of Massachusetts Amherst. “Intellectual Property Policy.” Research
Administration and Compliance.
https://www.umass.edu/research/policy/intellectual-property-policy. Accessed 220-2022.
Valens, Ana. “Mastodon is Crumbling—and Many Blame its Creator.” Dailydot, 2019.
Vero. “Values.” https://vero.co/values. Accessed 5/10/2021.
Villanueva, Victor. “Memoria is Not a Friend of Ours: On the Discourse of Color.”
Cross-Talk in Comp Theory: A Reader. Ed. By Victor Villanueva and Kristin
Arola. NCTE, 2011. 567-580.
---. “Toward a Political-Economy of Rhetoric (Or a Rhetoric of Political Economy).”
Radical Relevance: Toward a Scholarship of the Whole Left. Edited by Laura
Gray-Rosendale and Steven Rosendale. State University of New York P, 2005,
pp. 57-68.
157

Walton, Rebecca, Kristen Moore, and Natasha Jones. Technical Communication After the
Social Justice Turn. Routledge, 2019.
Wark, McKenzie. A Hacker Manifesto. Harvard, 2004.
Wark, McKenzie. Capital Is Dead. Verso, 2021.
Vee, Annette, Coding Literacy: How Computer Programming is Changing Writing. MIT
Press, 2017.
Weinstein, Mark. “I’m Mark Weinstein: AMA.” Reddit: Ask Me Anything.
https://www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/9sq3jf/im_mark_weinstein_founderce
o_of_mewe_the/. Accessed 2/21/2022.
Wendling, Amy E. Karl Marx on Technology and Alienation. Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
Wolff, William I. “Interactivity and the Invisible: What Counts as Writing in the Age of
Web 2.0.” Computers and Composition, vol. 30, 2011, 211-225.
Woodmansee, Martha and Peter Jaszi. “The Law of Texts: Copyright in the Academy.”
College English, vol 57., no. 7, Nov. 1995, pp. 769-87.
Yancey, Kathleen Blake. “Made Not Only in Words: Composition in a New Key.”
College Composition and Communication, vol. 56, no. 2, 2006, 297-328.
Yormak, Michael. “What is Tsu?” Youtube.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HOy9Ie41Lww Jan 23, 2020.
Zuboff, Shoshana. The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at
the New Frontier of Power. PublicAffairs, 2019.

158

